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Dissertation Abstract 
This dissertation studies the relationship between economic ideas and financial crises. It 
focuses on a subset of economic ideas, economic conventions, of which there are three 
types: ergodicity, expert opinion, and conventional expectations. This dissertation argues 
that conventions account for six inter-related phenomena in financial markets. First, 
stable economic conventions produce stable markets. Second, some conventions are more 
likely to produce asset market imbalances than others are. Third, conventions sow 
epistemic blindness to the prospect of non-routine change in financial markets. Fourth, 
shocks to agents’ convention-given expectations catalyze convention uncertainty in 
financial markets. Fifth, given sufficient financial fragility, convention uncertainty causes 
agents to revert to first principles of survival, hoarding liquid capital and disrupting the 
market’s normal price mechanism. Sixth, conventions set the bounds of elite responses to 
financial crises. These six propositions emerge from a theoretical synthesis of several 
paradigms of understanding agent behavior in complex social systems, including Post-
Keynesian asset market theory, Keynesian epistemology, Charles Doran’s power cycle 
theory, and economic constructivism. The study employs counter-factual, process-
tracing, and econometric techniques to demonstrate empirically its causal propositions 
via a case study of central banking and shadow banking during the global financial crisis. 
The dissertation finds that economic conventions explain the Federal Reserve’s 
accommodative monetary policy from 2001-2006, and that conventions such as bond 
ratings, value-at-risk, and conventional expectations in shadow banking markets were key 
drivers of financial fragility ex-ante the global financial crisis. This dissertation finds that 
regulators’ repeated interventions in financial markets, including their orchestration of 
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the bailout of hedge fund Long-Term Capital Management in 1998, bailout of investment 
bank Bear Stearns, and bailouts for the government-sponsored enterprises Fannie Mae 
and Freddie Mac in 2008, established a conventional expectation in financial markets that 
regulators would serve as de facto deposit guarantors for shadow banking conduits. It is 
proposed that the failure of Lehman Brothers in September 2008 eviscerated the market’s 
tenuous, convention-engendered stability, thus initiating a period of convention 
uncertainty in financial markets. Convention uncertainty disrupted the market’s normal 
price mechanism and explains the market’s “flight to quality” after Lehman’s bankruptcy. 
Regulators’ unconditional bailouts of the U.S. financial system can be understood as an 
attempt to restore convention certainty to wholesale funding markets. All told, the 
findings of this dissertation provide support for the argument that economic ideas, and in 
particular economic conventions, need to be taken seriously as important causal drivers 
of stability, fragility, and change in financial markets. 
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1 
By ‘uncertain’ knowledge, let me explain, I do not mean merely to distinguish what is 
known for certain from what is only probable. The game of roulette is not subject, in this 
sense, to uncertainty; nor is the prospect of a Victory bond being drawn…The sense in 
which I am using the term is that in which the prospect of a European war is uncertain, 
or the price of copper and the rate of interest twenty years hence, or the obsolescence of 
a new invention, or the position of private wealth-owners in the social system in 1970. 
About these matters there is no scientific basis on which to form any calculable 
probability whatever. We simply do not know. Nevertheless, the necessity for action and 
for decision compels us as practical men to do our best to overlook this awkward fact and 
to behave exactly as we should if we had behind us a good Benthamite calculation of a 
series of prospective advantages and disadvantages, each multiplied by its appropriate 
probability, waiting to be summed. 
- J.M. Keynes1 
There is no truth about markets ‘out there’ other than the prevailing wisdom that markets 
have about markets themselves, and this can be a very fickle thing. 
- Mark Blyth2 
Massive structural change causes the decision maker to miscalculate the strength of 
established conventions in the face of evidence which runs counter to them…“Hot” 
processes of emotion and motivation shape perception and therefore judgment. The 
capacity to think in terms of sequence of causal logic during successful intervals may 
become blurred. An increase in the mere volume and complexity…can cause 
stress…When extremely stressful conditions arise, cognition is disrupted, thinking 
becomes simplistic, memory fades, and the probability of wrong choice among strategic 
alternatives increases substantially. 
- Charles F. Doran3 
  
                                                 
1
 (Keynes 1937a, 213-214) 
2
 (Blyth 2002, 43) 
3
 (Doran 1991, 28-30) 
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Economic Conventions and Financial Stability 
This dissertation examines the relationship between economic ideas and financial 
stability. It focuses on a subset of economic ideas, economic conventions, of which there 
are three types: ergodicity, expert opinion, and conventional expectations.
4
 Ergodicity is 
the assumption that the past reliably foretells the future.
5
 Expert opinion refers to the 
propensity of market participants to adopt the views of authoritative agents and 
conventional wisdom when forming their own. Conventional expectations describe the 
tendency of market participants to make second and third order guesses about other 
actors’ beliefs when making individual investment decisions. Together, these three 
conventions serve as the epistemological basis of agents’ decisions in complex social 
systems. 
J.M. Keynes prominently featured economic conventions in his analysis of the 
economy. According to Keynes, asset markets were plagued by moments of structural 
uncertainty that, left unchecked, would prevent them from functioning normally. To cope 
with this uncertainty, agents employ economic conventions to “save [their] faces as 
rational, economic men” by giving them a pretense of knowledge upon which they can 
base their behavior given uncertainty about the future.
6
 When conventions “maintain the 
allegiance of the majority of agents, they will help provide continuity and predictability 
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to economic life,” and “help produce order and continuity where chaos might have been,” 
as James Crotty contends.
7
 Confidence in conventions produces stable markets.  
This dissertation answers the following theoretical research questions:   
1. What is the relationship between economic conventions and financial stability?  
2. How can economic conventions be incorporated into the Post-Keynesian model of 
financial crises?  
This dissertation advances six, inductively derived propositions that answer the 
above questions: first, convention stability produces financial stability. As a corollary, 
convention-engendered stability initiates a financial system’s endogenous shift from 
robustness to fragility over time. Second, conventions influence both the amplitude and 
periodicity of asset market imbalances. Third, conventions blind agents to the prospect of 
non-ergodic change in financial markets. Fourth, information shocks to agents’ 
convention-given expectations trigger convention uncertainty. Fifth, within fragile 
financial systems, convention uncertainty causes agents to revert to “first-principles” of 
survival by hoarding liquid capital and rationing credit. Sixth, conventions critically 
determine the nature and success of elite responses to financial market instability.  
Building on the Post-Keynesian Model 
Theoretically, this dissertation brings economic conventions “back into” the Post-
Keynesian model of financial instability in the tradition of Hyman Minsky, Charles 
Kindleberger, Robert Aliber, Joan Robinson, Sheila Dow, Victora Chick, James Crotty, 
and Thomas Palley, among others. In the Post-Keynesian model, financial crises unfold 
in three stages: a “displacement” or bubble inflation stage, a crisis stage, and a crisis-
                                                 
7
 (Crotty 1994, 123-124).  




 This dissertation argues that economic conventions are critically 
important in each stage of the Post-Keynesian model.     
According to Hyman Minsky, financial crises begin with an exogenous 
“displacement” that changes the “anticipated profit opportunities…in at least one 
important sector of the economy.”
9
 Higher profit expectations cause financial institutions 
to extend credit to finance capital accumulation in the displaced sector. Asset prices rise. 
Positive feedback between rising prices and investor optimism ensues. Consumers and 
firms feel wealthier, and finance consumption via greater leverage. Output rises and 
unemployment falls. “Euphoria” develops as investors purchase assets to flip them for 
short-term capital gains, rather than on their long-term income-generating potential. 
Financial authorities, aware that “something exceptional is happening,” come up with 
“extensive explanations” that “this time is different,” and that the traditional rules of 
economic gravity no longer apply. As the boom wears on, insiders sell assets to monetize 
paper profits. Eventually, capital prices fall. A period of “financial distress” follows. 
Banks book mark-to-market losses and interbank credit dries up. The failure of a major 
financial institution, a notable investor boycotting the bubble asset class, or a sharp, 
unanticipated drop in the price of a security might trigger a financial panic. Declining 
market confidence exposes the underlying fragility of the financial system, making it 
difficult for banks and firms to meet their maturing obligations. Trading in certain asset 
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classes ceases. Investors purchase safe assets in a “flight to quality.” Lenders of last 
resort might intervene in financial markets to remove bad debts from the financial system 
and alleviate funding pressures facing financial institutions. If regulators are successful, 
their interventions can restore market confidence, though other measures might be needed 
to buffer the real economy from the financial fallout.
10
 
This dissertation brings economic conventions “back into” the Post-Keynesian 
model in four ways:  
First, economic conventions help us understand the sociological micro-
foundations of stability in financial markets. Hyman Minsky believed that prolonged 
financial stability endogenously produces fragility over time. Minsky claimed that 
financial systems predominated by robust financing structures (i.e. hedge finance) create 
incentives for firms to issue increasingly short-term debt with lower margins of safety. As 
Minsky argues:  
As a previous financial crisis recedes in time, it is quite natural for central 
bankers, government officials, bankers, businessmen, and even economists 
to believe that a new era has arrived. Cassandra-like warnings that nothing 
basic has changed…are naturally ignored in these 
circumstances…Nevertheless, in a world of uncertainty, given capital 
assets with a long gestation period, private ownership, and the 
sophisticated financial practices of Wall Street, the successful functioning 
of an economy within an initially robust financial structure will lead to a 
structure that becomes more fragile as time elapses. Endogenous forces 
make a situation dominated by hedge finance unstable, and endogenous 
disequilibrating forces will become greater as the weight of speculative 
and Ponzi finance increases.
11
 
This dissertation accepts Minsky’s contention, and recognizes that while stability is a 
powerful descriptive variable of endogenous financial change, it too is something that 
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needs to be explained. As such, this dissertation explores the sociological micro-
foundations of stable markets, and finds that financial stability critically depends on 
conventions. When conventions are stable, markets are stable. When conventions are 
unstable, markets can become unstable. Prolonged, convention-engendered stability 
catalyzes a financial system’s endogenous shift from robustness to fragility over time.  
Second, conventions improve our understanding of “displacements” and agents’ 
epistemic blindness to fragility ex-ante crises. Conventions specify the social 
mechanisms by which heightened profit expectations in a specific sector proliferate 
across the economy (e.g. via expert opinion and conventional expectations) and how 
market optimism sustains itself (for instance, by agents projecting present trends into the 
future). In addition, imbalances and fragility often require a critical mass of market 
participants willing to justify or at least ignore dis-confirmatory (i.e. bubble-indicative) 
market data.
12
 Economic conventions explain why agents are blind to the risks of ex-post 
obvious financial calamities a priori their occurrence.  
Third, economic conventions provide a framework for understanding how stable 
(but fragile) financial systems erupt into crisis. As Keynes argued, conventions are 
subject to “sudden and violent changes,” and convention uncertainty can cause 
“the…calmness and immobility, of certainty and security,” to suddenly break down. 
“Once confidence in the meaningfulness of the forecasting process is destroyed, 
irreducible objective uncertainty forces its way into the consciousness of agents, breaking 
down the conventional barriers they have constructed to conceal it,” as James Crotty 
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 Reinhart and Rogoff aptly identify pre-crisis epistemic blindness as “this time is different” syndrome, 
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 While Keynes and Crotty provide a plausible framework of understanding why 
convention uncertainty leads to financial instability, these authors underspecify the 
causes of convention uncertainty in financial markets. To fill this scholarly lacuna, this 
dissertation draws on insights from Charles Doran’s model of crises in international 
relations, which argues that shocks to agents’ convention-given expectations of the future 
catalyze structural uncertainty in complex social systems. According to Doran, when 
agents realize that their taken-for-granted conventional anchors are “suddenly proven 
wrong,” convention uncertainty ensues. Doran argues that the “massive structural 
change” associated with an unforeseen information shock can “cause the decision maker 
to miscalculate the strength of established conventions in the face of evidence which runs 
counter to them.” As a result, “the capacity to think in terms of sequence of causal 
logic…may become blurred.”
14
 This dissertation adapts Doran’s insights to the study of 
financial stability. It proposes that given sufficient financial fragility, shocks to agents’ 
widely shared, taken-for-granted conventions catalyze convention uncertainty and thus 
financial instability.
15
 Absent convention certainty, agents experience Knightian 
uncertainty and hoard liquid capital, bidding up the price of safe assets (e.g. money and 
its substitutes) and selling risky assets.
16
 
Fourth, economic conventions explain how financial authorities respond to 
financial crises. Regulators, politicians, bureaucrats, and central bankers rely on 
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economic conventions for the same epistemological reasons that financial market 
participants do. Policymakers have an array of choices to make when faced with a crisis, 
and which path is chosen ultimately depends on both economic conventions held by 
regulators and the market’s economic conventions about them. Economic elites use 
economic conventions to both diagnose and react to the novel stress and uncertainty 
presented by financial market instability, and conventions delimit the permissible choices 
available to them.     
Ontologically, this dissertation advances a strongly constitutive standard of 
causality that describes conventions and market outcomes as mutually constituted, 
endogenous, and deeply recursive. It corroborates the view, expressed by Mark Blyth, R. 
Ned Lebow, and other constructivists, that ideational social science advances its own, 
distinct social ontology. Methodologically, this dissertation employs a variety of research 
techniques to demonstrate its causal propositions, including counter-factual analysis, 
process-tracing via elite interviews and discourse analysis, and econometric analysis of 
time series financial market data. Empirically, this dissertation contributes to our 
collective understanding of the inter-subjective drivers of monetary policy and shadow 
banking outcomes in the U.S. economy from 2001-2009, as explained below.  
Conventions and the Global Financial Crisis 
To paraphrase an old adage, theory without evidence has no legs upon which to 
stand, while evidence without theory has no eyes with which to see. To that end, this 
dissertation presents a conventions-based account of continuity and change in the U.S. 
economy from 2001-2009. It finds that economic conventions were important causal 
Neil K. Shenai 
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drivers of both central banking and shadow banking outcomes in the U.S. economy 
during this period. This study answers the following empirical research questions:  
1. How did economic conventions influence the Federal Reserve’s monetary policy 
from 2001-2006?  
2. How did economic conventions contribute to the rise of fragile financial 
structures in the U.S. economy prior to the global financial crisis?     
3. How did the market’s conventional expectations determine the stability of shadow 
banking conduits before, during, and after the global financial crisis?  
By now, the story of the global financial crisis is clear: from 2001-2007, the U.S. 
economy experienced a housing boom backed by an unsustainable credit expansion. 
When housing prices fell, banks booked mark-to-market write-downs on their assets, 
leading to funding problems and contagion effects in financial markets. The simultaneous 
failure of investment bank Lehman Brothers and bailout of insurance giant American 
International Group (AIG) initiated a generalized bank run in the commercial paper and 
repurchase agreement markets, causing credit rationing and margin calls among 
systemically important financial institutions. Fearing the total collapse of the U.S. 
financial system, America’s fiscal and monetary authorities granted unconditional 
bailouts to bank and non-bank financial institutions.
17
 These measures succeeded in 
preventing the financial economy from falling off a cliff, but could not forestall the 
general contraction of credit and loss of confidence from affecting the real economy. 
Facing slower growth and rising unemployment, the U.S. Congress passed an $800 
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billion fiscal stimulus bill, worth roughly six percent of America’s 2009 GDP, in 
February 2009. The Federal Reserve also purchased $1.1 trillion in mortgage securities 




Conventions tell several aspects of this story, including the causes of the housing 
bubble and the rise of fragile financial structures from 2001-2007, as well as the market’s 
epistemic blindness to the economy’s systemic vulnerability to instability ex-ante the 
crisis. Conventional change explains why investors ran on shadow banking conduits 
idiosyncratically before Lehman Brothers’ bankruptcy and generally afterward. 
Moreover, conventions reveal how regulators reacted to the crisis and why their 
interventions restored market confidence by March 2009.  
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Figure 1: The U.S. Housing Bubble 
Source: Standard & Poor’s 
 How did the housing bubble relate to economic conventions? Many scholars, such 
as John Taylor, Marek Jarociński, and Frank Smets argue that the Federal Reserve’s 
accommodative monetary policy caused the housing bubble.
19
 They claim that the Fed’s 
interest rate setting body, the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC), cut and held 
interest rates “too low for too long” after the 2000-2001 recession, causing mortgage 
interest rates to fall and housing demand to surge. Higher home prices begat ever-rising 
expectations of future price increases, as banks extended credit to prospective 
homeowners in anticipation of capital gains and origination fees. Once the housing 
bubble took off, consumers tapped into their home equity to finance their above-trend 
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consumption, beginning a broad-based economic expansion across many sectors of the 
U.S. economy led by real estate and financial services.
20
  
Though monetary policy was the proximate cause of the housing bubble (with 
short-term interest rates serving as the key, intervening variable), economic conventions 
drove the Fed’s monetary policy, and were thus the housing bubble’s ultimate cause. 
These conventions include the FOMC’s members’ fears of repeating Japan’s historical 
experience with deflation (i.e. ergodicity), the Fed’s use of owners’ imputed rent rather 
than housing prices to calculate housing inflation (i.e. expert opinion that housing prices 
and rents constituted ontologically distinct categories), and Fed technocrats’ widespread 
acceptance of the “Greenspan Doctrine” that it was preferable to clean up the aftermath 
of a bubble rather than lean against its inflation (i.e. expert opinion setting the discursive 
bounds of appropriate policy). It follows that different conventions would have led to 
different Fed monetary policy, altering both the periodicity and amplitude of the housing 
bubble.  
 As Hyman Minsky notes, however, bubbles are necessary but insufficient 
conditions for systemic crises. Rather, Minsky believed that financial fragility explains 
why some bubbles cause crises while others deflate benignly.
21
 To understand why the 
deflating housing bubble triggered the global financial crisis, then, it is necessary to 
investigate the causes of fragility in the U.S. economy that developed in tandem with the 
housing bubble.  
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 Building on Gary Gorton’s work on banking crises, this dissertation argues that at 
its heart, the global financial crisis is best understood as a banking panic that took place 
in the asset-backed commercial paper (ABCP) and repurchase agreement (“repo”) 
markets that, coupled with securitization, formed the foundation of the global “shadow 
banking” system. As Gorton contends, shadow banking could be conceptualized 
analogously to traditional banking, with ABCP and repo counterparties serving as 
wholesale “depositors” and securitized assets serving as shadow banking “borrowers.” 
Unlike traditional banking, shadow banking lacked Federally-sponsored deposit 
insurance, so shadow banking conduits were vulnerable to bank runs.
22
 If ABCP and repo 
counterparties doubted banks’ ability to meet their obligations (as they did when 
collateral prices fell because of rising mortgage delinquencies), they might refuse to “roll 
over” banks’ maturing liabilities, causing funding costs to rise and financial contagion to 
spread. The rise of unsecured shadow banking, via ABCP, repo, and securitization, 
created systemic vulnerability to falling housing collateral by predicating banks’ liquidity 
on the continued willingness of counterparties to roll over banks’ maturing short-term 
debt backed by risky collateral.
23
 The proliferation of these fragile shadow banking 
financing structures was facilitated by three kinds of economic conventions, as described 
below.   
First, the stability of shadow banking conduits depended on counterparties’ 
conventional expectations about the creditworthiness of shadow banking conduits. 
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Shadow banking conduits (and their sponsors) remained liquid as long as ABCP and repo 
counterparties believed that fellow market participants would continue to roll over banks’ 
maturing short-term liabilities. If counterparties doubted the intentions of fellow 
investors, however, they might refuse to roll over their ABCP and repo holdings, 
triggering a run on shadow banking conduits.
24
 Under unsecured shadow banking, rumors 
of insolvency could prove self-fulfilling, as demonstrated by the swift collapse of Bear 
Stearns in March 2008 (see Chapter 5). Bank runs occurred idiosyncratically pre-Lehman 
and generally, across all ABCP and repo issuers, after Lehman’s bankruptcy.  
Second, shadow banking relied on institutionalized expert opinions rendered by 
credit rating agencies, which allowed risk-averse investors (e.g. money market mutual 
funds) to invest in the collateralized debt of financial institutions. Provided that banks 
posted safe collateral in ABCP and repo transactions, shadow banking carried de minimis 
counter-party and credit risk – in the worst case scenario, counterparties could seize the 
collateral backing their transaction and sell it for its face value. Bond ratings gave 
counterparties a conventional anchor to gauge the creditworthiness of ABCP and repo 
collateral, while also allowing financial institutions to tap into a deep pool of risk-averse 
capital to fund their shadow banking operations. Thus, ratings served a mutual 
conventional need for both shadow banking counterparties and financial institutions, 
leading both parties to believe that ABCP and repo collateral was information-insensitive, 
or immune to adverse selection problems due to information asymmetry. When market 
participants realized that favorable bond ratings underestimated the likelihood of default 
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of asset-backed securities, conventional change ensued, thus altering market outcomes as 
well.
25
   
Third, fragility also stemmed from financial institutions’ undercapitalization, 
which also depended on economic conventions. Prior to the global financial crisis, 
regulators assumed that banks were the best arbiters of their own portfolio risk and left 
banks to write their own regulatory capital rules. Banks assumed that housing and 
securities prices would adhere to their historical bounds (i.e. conventions of ergodicity) 
when making regulatory capital provisions, which made banks susceptible to credit write-
downs and undercapitalization when prices deviated from their historical trends. The rise 
of uninsured shadow banking, coupled with bank capital inadequacy, explains why the 
deflating housing bubble wreaked such havoc on the U.S. financial system during the 
global financial crisis.  
Yet these factors alone do not give us a point estimate about why markets suffered 
an acute seizure after the failure of Lehman Brothers. This dissertation found that prior to 
Lehman’s failure, regulators’ repeated interventions in financial markets, ranging from 
their responses to Long-Term Capital Management in 1998, and Bear Stearns, Fannie 
Mae, and Freddie Mach in 2008, created a conventional expectation among ABCP and 
repo counterparties that regulators would serve as liquidity providers of last resort in 
wholesale funding markets. Ultimately, the market came to believe that regulators would 
bail out counterparties at the face value of their loans any time a systemically important 
financial institution ran into trouble. This convention maintained a tenuous stability in 
financial markets, insofar as fears over counterparty solvency remained isolated to 
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specific firms, and not generalized across all ABCP and repo markets. After September 
15, 2008, things changed. Lehman’s failure and AIG’s bailout eviscerated the market’s 
conventional expectation about regulators and thus initiated a generalized bank run in the 
shadow banking markets by ABCP and repo counterparties. Convention uncertainty 
about regulators’ willingness to provide de facto deposit insurance to shadow banking 
conduits caused investors to assume the worst about their counterparties and hoard liquid 
capital. Investors sold risky assets and purchased perceived safe-havens like short-term 
Treasury bills, just as Keynes would have predicted.
26
 Trading in certain derivatives 
markets ceased, while asset prices plunged.  
Faced with this banking panic in commercial paper and repo markets, regulators 
had a choice: allow the crisis to conclude via Schumpeterian creative destruction, or 
intervene in financial markets to re-establish convention certainty by offering de facto 
deposit insurance to the shadow banking system. As we now know, regulators opted for 
the latter option, which raises two inter-related questions: first, how did conventions 
influence regulators’ decision to grant unconditional bailouts to financial institutions after 
Lehman’s bankruptcy, and second, how did the market’s conventions about regulators 
implicate regulators’ intervention capacity in the U.S. financial system?  
This dissertation found that regulators’ historic memories of past crises (namely 
the Great Depression), coupled with the market’s faith in the U.S.’s sovereign 
creditworthiness (conventional expectations), granted America’s regulators a high degree 
of policy latitude to respond to the crisis. Regulators’ response to the crisis is best 
understood as their attempt to restore convention certainty to markets by demonstrating 
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their commitment to serving as the guarantor of banks’ short-term liabilities, thus 
obviating counterparty fears in wholesale funding markets and restoring confidence to the 
financial system. The fact that regulators were successful in their intervention reveals a 
great deal about the market’s perception of regulators’ credibility, as well as regulators’ 
preferences about the optimum means of restoring market confidence when faced with a 
panic.  
Relevance 
This dissertation contributes to several academic literatures and also has relevance 
to practical matters of financial stability.   
Academically, this dissertation remedies some of the shortcomings of neoclassical 
financial economics, the primary theoretical lens used by professional economists to 
investigate asset markets today. It answers a call issued by numerous scholars and 
practitioners, including David Colander, Joseph Stiglitz, Roman Frydman, Michael 
Goldberg, Rawi Abdelal, Mark Blyth, Adair Turner, among many others, to re-appraise 
the core theoretical contentions of neoclassical finance, including market efficiency, 
rational expectations, a priori knowable risk distributions, and materially given equilibria 
based on “fundamental value.”
27
 This study does not dismiss the notion that agents in 
financial markets tend to use all publicly known information about a security before 
investing (i.e. the weak form of market efficiency).
28
 Rather, it argues that market 
information must be efficient qua some information set, and that this information set is 
given by agents’ conventions. While the concept of “fundamental value” might hold in 
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the real economy, it is far harder to dis-embed asset prices from their broader social 
environment in financial markets, where prices and social constructs mutually constitute 
one another.
29
 This recursive relationship between ideas and outcomes in asset markets is 
under-investigated by mainstream economics research, but is nonetheless recognized by 
many market participants as an everyday fact of life in asset markets.
30
 While treating 
ideas and outcomes as mutually constituted might muddy the theoretical waters treaded 
by this dissertation, this posture reflects the author’s prejudice that it is “better to be 
vaguely right than exactly wrong” about economic ideas and market outcomes, to quote 
Carveth Read. Recognizing the endogeneity of ideas and outcomes lends itself to better 
(if not as parsimonious and elegant) theory.
31
  
This dissertation thus makes a theoretical contribution to the field of economic 
constructivism in the tradition of Rawi Abdelal, Mark Blyth, Matthias Matthijs, Kathleen 
McNamara, and Craig Parsons, among others.
32
 A seminal volume on economic 
constructivism written by Abdelal, Blyth, and Parsons, entitled Constructing the 
International Economy, concludes with a call for scholars “to undertake a more synthetic 
collective enterprise that produces a richer account of how the world works, and one that 
will leave us more intellectually ready for future shifts.”
33
 This dissertation’s convention-
based account of continuity and change in financial markets is exactly the type of 
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synthetic enterprise envisioned by Abdelal et al. By treating conventions as causal 
variables of financial stability, this dissertation opens a wide avenue of research on the 
socially contingent sources of stability and instability in complex social systems. This 
dissertation’s inter-disciplinary theoretical framework, which draws on insights from 
Post-Keynesian asset market theory, Keynesian epistemology, international relations 
theory, and economic constructivism, qualifies as a type of collective enterprise 
envisioned by Abdelal, Blyth, and Parsons.   
This dissertation also contributes to the field of Post-Keynesian asset market 
theory. It builds on the Post-Keynesian model of financial instability by shedding light 
onto the social processes that drive outcomes in financial markets. Economic conventions 
allow the researcher to dig deeper into the social interdependencies that lead to market 
participants’ memory loss of past crises, epistemic blindness to fragility and bubbles ex-
ante crises, and the socially imposed constraints on elite responses to financial instability, 
to name a few examples. This dissertation thus addresses one of the core critiques of the 
Minsky model: that it is narrative in nature and thus less rigorous than its neoclassical 
alternatives.  
This dissertation’s conventions-based theoretical framework also improves our 
understanding of the inter-subjective triggers of banking crises. As Gary Gorton argues, 
the global financial crisis is best understood as a banking panic in the ABCP and repo 
markets. A central feature of Gorton’s model is the notion that banking systems provide 
depositors with so-called “information-insensitive” debt, or debt immune to adverse 
selection problems because of information asymmetry. Economic conventions explain 
how agents inter-subjectively construct information-insensitive debt (by institutionalizing 
Neil K. Shenai 
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expert opinion via bond ratings, for instance).
34
 Conventional change also explains why 
credit events like bond downgrades catalyze change in financial markets. By synthesizing 
insights about conventions with Gorton’s account of banking crises, this dissertation 
arrives at a more robust model of banking panics.  
In addition to contributing to the academic study of financial instability, this 
dissertation bridges the divide between theory and practice in financial markets. While 
some collaboration between finance’s scholars and practitioners takes place, the 
information flow tends to be uni-directional, from research universities to Wall Street. 
Nevertheless, academics have much to gain by incorporating the insights of market 
practitioners into their theories of financial stability. Notwithstanding potential problems 
of survivorship and selection biases when building inductive theories of asset markets, 
some of the most successful investors, such as George Soros and Nassim Taleb, 
recognize that mainstream accounts of financial markets do not account for the two-way, 
contingent relationship between the market’s “material fundamentals” and realized 
market outcomes. This dissertation remedies these limitations of the academic study of 
asset markets by incorporating first-hand accounts from market practitioners that have 
lived through the market’s vicissitudes into its empirical work.
35
 
This dissertation also enhances our understanding of the global financial crisis. To 
the extent that the crisis has become an object of popular investigation for policymakers 
and financial journalists alike, much of this analysis falls short on several axes.   
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Many mainstream accounts of the crisis tend to elevate moral and agency-based 
explanations of the crisis over alternatives. Notions of swashbuckling traders, imprudent 
and ideology-fueled central bankers, greedy financiers, and incompetent regulators 
checker most mainstream accounts of the crisis. No doubt, incompetence was in high 
supply before the crisis, but ex-post theorizing about the moral and intellectual flaws of 
agents does not lend itself to better theory. Quite the opposite is true. For if we accept 
that this was a crisis caused by greedy bankers, then our policy prescription for financial 
stability is misleadingly simple: replace the bankers with their morally circumspect 
counterparts, and the future crises can be averted.
36
 However, the regularity of crises in 
capitalism should cause us to take greedy bankers as ontological givens – most of the 
time, financial agents will do what is in their best short and medium-term financial 
interest. It is insufficient to simply blame the crisis on bankers and move on. Instead, we 
must consider what this crisis means for the broader study of human agency in financial 
markets, including how economic ideas make some courses of action socially permissible 
while others unthinkable. Furthermore, many accounts of the global financial crisis tend 
to treat its occurrence as a once-in-a-generation event, and thankfully, most systemic 
financial crises are rare in advanced-industrial states. Still, treating the crisis as a unique 
occurrence runs the risk of over-stating its idiosyncratic features at the cost of ignoring its 
commonalities with other crises. By focusing on the universal features of financial 
instability, this dissertation moves beyond a mere description of events and dives deeper 
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into the generalizable causal processes at play in financial markets. To paraphrase Rahm 
Emanuel, Chicago’s current mayor and former Chief of Staff to President Barack Obama, 
academics have a responsibility to ensure that “no crisis should go to waste.”
37
 The crisis 
should be investigated through a number of lenses, with subsequent interpretations 
getting us closer to the limit point of truth about why the crisis occurred.  
Plan for Subsequent Chapters 
 This dissertation continues in Chapter 2 by reviewing several perspectives of 
agent behavior in complex systems, including Post-Keynesian asset market theory, 
Keynesian epistemology, Charles Doran’s power cycle theory, and economic 
constructivism. These paradigms yield the study’s six, inductively derived propositions 
about the role of economic conventions in financial markets. The chapter then discusses 
this dissertation’s ontology and operationalization via the subsequent case study of the 
global financial crisis.   
 Chapters 3, 4, 5, and 6 comprise the empirical chapters of the study, which 
illustrate the utility of a conventions-based theoretical framework via a case study on the 
global financial crisis.  
Chapters 3 and 4 explain how economic conventions contributed to three inter-
related phenomena: the inflation of the U.S. housing bubble from 2001-2007, the rise of 
so-called “fragile” finance via shadow banking and off-balance sheet financial 
intermediation, and agents’ ex-ante epistemic blindness toward the prospect of systemic 
financial collapse. Chapter 3 argues that the housing bubble stemmed from economic 
conventions held by Federal Reserve bankers about how best to measure inflation, 
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historical memories of Japan’s experience with deflation, and the Greenspan Doctrine 
that central bankers should refrain from using monetary policy to pre-emptively pop 
bubbles. It follows that if FOMC members maintained different economic conventions, 
both the amplitude and periodicity of the housing bubble would have differed.  
Chapter 4 recounts the emergence of so-called “shadow banking,” or off-balance 
sheet financial intermediation via asset-backed commercial paper (ABCP) and repurchase 
agreement (repo) conduits and asset-backed securities (ABS). Non-technically speaking, 
these developments allowed “the market” to provide banking services to different 
borrowing classes. Like regular banking before deposit insurance, shadow banking was 
subject to cash crunches, liquidity withdrawals, and bank runs. Chapter 4 argues that 
institutionalized economic conventions of ergodicity, expert opinion, and pro-cyclical 
conventional expectations combined to create a toxic incentive mix that allowed several 
large, systemically important financial institutions to sit at the crossroads of an under-
capitalized and under-regulated shadow banking system. Even though these arrangements 
proved profitable during the boom years, they also served as a key point of vulnerability 
during the crisis.  
Chapters 5 and 6 discuss the global financial crisis from August 2007 – March 
2009. Chapter 5 explains how regulators’ repeated interventions in financial markets, 
ranging from hedge fund Long-Term Capital Management in 1998 and Bear Stearns and 
the GSEs in 2008, created a conventional expectation that regulators would serve as 
shadow banking liquidity providers of last resort. Chapter 6 demonstrates how the 
simultaneous failure of Lehman Brothers and bailout of insurance giant AIG eviscerated 
this stable (but tenuous) convention-engendered stability in financial markets, thus 
Neil K. Shenai 
25 
initiating a generalized panic in shadow banking markets by ABCP and repo 
counterparties. Chapter 6 also explores how regulators at the U.S. Department of 
Treasury and Federal Reserve responded to the panic in financial markets after Lehman 
and AIG. It finds that regulators’ carte blanche bailout of systemically important 
financial institutions depended on two key factors: first, regulators maintained a certain 
set of economic conventions that predisposed them to granting unconditional bailouts to 
systemically important financial institutions. Second, the market’s conventions about 
regulators gave America’s financial first responders considerable policy latitude in 
addressing America’s shadow banking panic. This convention-enabled leeway allowed 
regulators to intervene in financial markets and thus gave them considerable intervention 
capacity in markets.  
Chapter 7 re-evaluates the study’s primary propositions based on the study’s 
empirical results, discusses the dissertation’s limitations and avenues of future research, 
and concludes the study.   










CHAPTER 2:  
LITERATURE REVIEW AND  
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
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Introduction 
This chapter presents this dissertation’s conventions-based theoretical framework 
of financial instability. This framework emerges from a theoretical synthesis of several 
academic traditions, including Post-Keynesian asset market theory, Keynesian 
epistemology, Charles Doran’s power cycle theory, and economic constructivism. The 
chapter begins with an overview of these four paradigms, from which the study’s causal 
propositions follow. Thereafter, the chapter discusses the dissertation’s ontology and 
operationalization in the context of its case study of central and shadow banking during 
the global financial crisis.  
Weaknesses of the Post-Keynesian Model 
Overall, the insights of Post-Keynesian asset market theory have received much 
acclaim after the global financial crisis.
38
 Post-Keynesianism is praised for 
problematizing the endogenous tendency of markets to produce asset price bubbles and 
systemic crises. The Post-Keynesian model also correctly identifies that prolonged 
periods of stability tend to precede bouts of instability in markets. Minsky and 
Kindleberger’s depiction of asset market imbalances is also reasonably apt, affording for 
both micro-level (i.e. individual) and macro-level (market-wide) irrationality in inflating 
and sustaining bubbles. For all of its benefits, however, Post-Keynesianism is not a 
perfect theory. This dissertation identifies four shortcomings of this model that the 
following theoretical framework addresses in its causal propositions.  
First, the Post-Keynesian model does not account for the source of 
“displacements” in financial markets, and claims that they are exogenous to their model. 
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Nevertheless, to what extent are displacements exogenous in any empirical sense? If we 
accept a broad and historical view of the economy, then the distinction between 
exogenous and endogenous causes is, as Mark Blyth describes, mere “convenient 
artifice,” since what we describe as “exogenous” in complex social systems has its own 
independent causes that need to be explained.
39
 Adopting a holistic view of the economy, 
displacements are important causal variables worthy of our attention. Second, the Post-
Keynesian model does not specify the causes of stability in financial markets. While it is 
intuitive to argue that prolonged periods create incentives for firms to adopt fragile 
financing arrangements, stability is just the proximate cause of fragility. Post-Keynesian 
asset market theory says little about how agents socially construct stable markets, and 
treats stability as a model prior, rather than an important object of investigation in the 
study of financial stability. Third, the Post-Keynesian model does not give us a point 
estimate about how and why stable but fragile financial systems erupt into crisis. 
Although Charles Kindleberger and Robert Aliber offer some plausible descriptions of 
crisis triggers (such as the revelation of widespread fraud in the displaced sector, a sharp 
price in the fall of a commodity, the failure of a large and interconnected financial 
institution, among others), they do not put forth a generalized causal mechanism that 
specifies the conditions under which a stable (but fragile) system yields to instability.
40
 
Pure point prediction might be impossible in complex social systems, but it is worth 
trying to describe the generalizable inter-subjective triggers of instability in financial 
markets. Fourth, while the Post-Keynesian model argues that regulators will sometimes 
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intervene to restore confidence to the financial system, it does not provide guidelines for 
understanding when regulators will choose to issue carte blanche bailouts of the entire 
financial system and when they will opt for Schumpeterian ideal-type creative 
destruction. Furthermore, Post-Keynesians do not offer a unified theory about how cross-
national differences in the intervention capacity of regulators implicate the ability of 
states to restore confidence in their financial systems. As any Greek finance minister 
since 2010 would argue, cross-national differences in regulatory capacity are important. 
Yet Post-Keynesians say little about this fact, other than presenting intervention as a 
binary choice about which they provide little guidance.  
While these four limitations do not pose a systemic risk to the usefulness of the 
Post-Keynesian paradigm, addressing them would go a long way toward building a more 
valid model of financial crises. The following sections outline several complementary 
paradigms of understanding that yield insights that remedy the above theoretical 
shortcomings of the Post-Keynesian model.  
Keynesian Epistemology 
 J.M. Keynes believed that economic conventions dominate economic life because 
of the nature of knowledge in uncertain environments. Keynes claimed that contrary to 
utilitarian models of agent behavior, in which cost-benefit optimizing automatons made 
Benthamite calculations about risk and reward under conditions of information symmetry 
and low transactions costs, capital markets were plagued by fundamental (or 
“Knightian”) uncertainty.
41
 Uncertainty did not just refer to the absence of knowledge 
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that was, in principle, attainable. Rather, Keynes’ uncertainty referred to situations in 
which rational agents lacked a basis of predicting the probability distributions of future 
outcomes. Facing irreducible uncertainty about the future, agents lacked the 
informational basis of making rational decisions. This “extreme precariousness of the 
basis of knowledge” could prevent capital markets from efficiently allocating credit.
42
 
 Still, even though agents know that they have “no scientific basis on which to 
form any calculable probability whatever,” they nevertheless “do [their] best to overlook 
this awkward fact” and “behave in a manner which saves [their] faces as rational, 
economic men.” How do they do this? According to Keynes, the answer was economic 
conventions:  
We do not know what the future holds. Nevertheless, as living and moving 
beings, we are forced to act. Peace and comfort of mind require that we 
should hide from ourselves how little we foresee. Yet we must be guided 
by some hypothesis. We tend, therefore, to substitute for the knowledge 
which is unattainable certain conventions…
43
 
Conventions allow agents to ignore their own ignorance of the future and act as though 
they could make a “good Benthamite calculation of a series of prospective advantages 
and disadvantages, each multiplied by its appropriate probability, waiting to be 
summed.”
44
 Conventions thus allow agents to believe that they live in a world of 
calculable risk, rather than irreducible uncertainty. As this dissertation argues, not only 
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do conventions mitigate uncertainty, but they might also be responsible for generating the 
very stability that agents end up taking for granted. Keynes identified three types of 
conventions in financial markets, which form agents’ epistemological basis of behavior 
given fundamental uncertainty about the future.   
Keynes’ first convention is the belief that the future will resemble the past, which 
reflects the tendency of market participants to extrapolate linearly from past trends when 
forming expectations about the future. In the parlance of statistics, agents tend to believe 
that the world is “ergodic,” in which the “relevant statistical properties” of markets “can 
be known from an adequate sample of the process,” as Mark Blyth describes.
45
 Keynes 
describes ergodicity conventions as follows:  
We assume that the present is a much more serviceable guide to the future 
than a candid examination of past experience would show it to have been 
hitherto. In other words we largely ignore the prospect of future changes 
about the actual character of which we know nothing.
46
 
This dissertation argues that agents’ tendency to use ergodic conventions to mitigate 
uncertainty, on one hand, while occupying a world that is fundamentally non-ergodic, on 
the other, is a key driver of fragility in financial markets.
47
  
Keynes’ second convention, expert opinion, refers to the tendency of market 
participants to believe that status quo market outcomes (as reflected in market prices) 
adequately approximate the “true” value of assets. Expert opinion also refer to agents’ 
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tendency to latch onto the narratives of authoritative actors when forming their own 
expectations of the future.
48
 Keynes described this convention as follows:  
We assume that the existing state of opinion as expressed in prices and the 
character of existing output is based on a correct summing up of future 
prospects, so that we can accept it as such unless and until something new 
and relevant comes into the picture. 
Agents over-estimate the stability of status quo market outcomes. This tendency ensures 




 Keynes’ third convention, conventional expectations, describes the tendency of 
financial market participants to consider what fellow market participants believe before 
acting in the first place. Keynes argued that portfolio allocation decisions are not based 
on solipsistic calculations of risk and reward (i.e. in a “Benthamite” fashion). Rather, 
investment is a second and third order practice in which market participants must 
consider the beliefs of fellow investors. As Keynes put it:  
Knowing that our own individual judgment is worthless, we endeavor to 
fall back on the judgment of the rest of the world which is perhaps better 
informed. That is, we endeavor to conform with the behavior of the 
majority or the average. The psychology of a society of individuals each 
of whom is endeavoring to copy the others leads to what we may strictly 
term a conventional judgment.
50
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Keynes argued that investment was a social activity, and often involved trying to guess 
the intentions of fellow investors. Seen in this light, investment is not a single-iteration 
decision of an agent qua the market, but a social process in which many agents 
simultaneously divine the beliefs of fellow market participants.
51
 Conventional 
expectations explain phenomena such as bank runs, in which rumors of insolvency are 
self-fulfilling. If investors believe that fellow investors doubt the solvency of 
counterparty, then it is rational to ration credit to the counterparty in question (based on 
the logic that fellow market participants believe the same thing). If many investors think 
the same thing, then a counterparty will be denied access to credit, leading to liquidity 
and solvency issues. For instance, this dissertation found evidence that the liquidity of 
shadow banking conduits critically depended on the stability of the market’s conventional 
expectations. When investors feared that fellow investors would ration credit to shadow 
banking conduits, this created an environment ripe for self-fulfilling credit crises in 
markets.  
 Together, these three conventions – the past as a guide to the future, expert 




Economic conventions are not just individual biases, but are shared by the 
epistemic community of the market writ large. As James Crotty contends, conventions 
“are not mere idiosyncratic figments of the individual’s imagination,” but are “socially 
constituted and socially and externally sanctioned.” The social construction of economic 
conventions links them to the level of market confidence and thus stable markets. When 
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conventions “maintain the allegiance of the majority of agents, they will help provide 
continuity and predictability to economic life.” Shared conventions can “generate an 
illusion of continuity that can contribute to the creation of stability when conditions are 
right” and “produce order and continuity where chaos might have been.” Crotty 
concludes that during periods of “tranquility” or “normality” in which there is convention 
certainty, forecasts could become “self-fulfilling prophesies that reinforce confidence in 
the conventions that sustain extrapolative expectations.”
52
 Thus, epistemic consensus or 
convention certainty can produce stable markets. This central insight – that stable 
conventions produce stable markets – helps us understand the sociological micro-
foundations of stability in the Post-Keynesian model, as described in Proposition 1 of this 
dissertation’s theoretical framework.  
Doran’s Model of Systems Transformation and Uncertainty 
 Markets are stable as long as a critical mass of market participants believes that 
their conventions provide a reliable basis of knowledge in the face of uncertainty.
53
 
However, what happens when market participants doubt the veracity of their 
conventions? According to Crotty, “when a majority of agents lose faith in the 
conventions that sustain the expectations-generating process” in markets, “irreducible 
objective uncertainty forces its way into the consciousness of agents, breaking down the 
conventional barriers they have constructed to conceal it.”
54
 As Keynes adds, conventions 
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are “subject to sudden and violent change” during which “the practice of calmness and 
immobility, of certainty and security, suddenly breaks down.”
55
 Furthermore, “at all 
times the vague panic fears and equally vague and unreasoned hopes are not really lulled, 
and lie but a little way below the surface,” leading Keynes to conclude that “all these 
pretty, polite techniques, made for a well-panelled Board Room and a nicely regulated 
market, are liable to collapse.”
56
 Even though conventions might stabilize markets, then, 
they cannot stabilize markets ad infinitum because convention-given expectations cannot 
account for the complete range of possible market futures.  
 If we accept that conventions stabilize markets, then convention uncertainty could 
destabilize markets.
57
 To understand the triggers of financial instability, we must study 
the conditions that cause agents to lose faith in their conventions. As this dissertation 
argues, when agents think that conventions fail to describe the structural realities of 
markets, accurate expectations of the future cannot be formed and panic results, thus 
precipitating instability within fragile financial systems. 
Charles Doran provides an apt framework for understanding how shocks to 
agents’ expectations catalyze structural uncertainty. Doran’s model of agent decision-
making draws on his power cycle theory, which is a dynamic theory of international 
relations that describes the behavior of political leaders in anarchy based on the evolution 
of their state’s relative power over time. Doran, like Keynes, believed that in uncertain 
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environments, agents extrapolate from past trends when forming expectations about the 
future. Since linear projections will be “right more of the time than the multitude of more 
complicated models conceivable,” they become “ingrained in the consciousness of the 
decision maker.” Whereas Keynes spoke of irrationality of markets in perpetuity, Doran 
stresses “conditional non-rationality,” by which he means that markets are rational most 
of the time, and usually contain enough information upon which firms and individuals 
can make appropriate decisions about the future. Trouble emerges because linear 
extrapolations from past trends leave agents unprepared for non-linear moments on their 
respective state’s power cycle.
58
 Non-linearities in the trajectory of history can produce 
novel “surprises” for which agents’ linear expectations leave them unprepared to handle. 
During a crisis, agents have to cope with the stress associated with the realization that 
their extrapolative forecasts of the future were wrong. Facing “conditional non-
rationality,” investors adopt conventions that are rigid and often wrong, thus precipitating 
massive uncertainty in complex social environments. The moment of acknowledgement 
of a non-linearity, along with the shock of realizing that the future that does not comport 
with expectations, is the catalyst of uncertainty in Doran’s decision-making model.  
Doran thus provides a probabilistic understanding of the likelihood of conflict in 
the international system, hypothesizing that the likelihood of systemic crises rise as more 
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states simultaneously go through critical intervals on their power cycles.
59
 This notion 
comports with Crotty’s contention that conventional certainty breaks down when a 
“majority of [central actors] lose faith in the conventions that sustain the expectations-
generating process” in markets. As more states have to cope with the stress of a critical 
interval (i.e. upon realizing that their expectations-generating process is no longer 
reliable), the likelihood of crisis rises. This is because during a moment of convention 
uncertainty inside of a critical interval, “the abnormal becomes the normal” and “the 
irrational becomes rational.” Coping with the fact that the discovery that “all prior 
assumptions…are wrong” puts tremendous stress on decision-makers,
60
 and agents no 
longer face a world of risk as such, but uncertainty as described by Frank Knight, J.M. 
Keynes, and Mark Blyth.
61
 Agents realize that learned patterns of behavior, which were 
reflected in assumptions about the future that were “rewarded year by year in actual 
outcomes, suddenly lose credibility.”
62
 As more states experience structural uncertainty, 
their likelihood of over-estimating their material capabilities while under-estimating the 
costs of violent conflict and capability of their adversaries rises. This dynamic of systems 
transformation often triggers systemic conflict, which this dissertation analogizes to 
systemic financial panics. Agents realize that the information that went into the market’s 
price detection process is further from “true value” than previously imagined, in turn 
sowing structural uncertainty in markets.  
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Figure 2: A Visualization of Doran's Model 
Source: Charles F. Doran
63
 
 This dissertation incorporates Doran’s model of systems transformations into its 
study of financial stability, as visualized above. As Doran argues, systems transformation 
(brought about by massive, abrupt, and unanticipated structural change) belies agents’ 
expectations, initiating a period of conditional non-rationality and massive uncertainty, in 
turn leading to a change in agent behavior. To understand why crises emerge in financial 
markets, one must study the conditions under which agents have to cope with acute 
uncertainty triggered by defied expectations. Propositions 4 and 5 of this dissertation’s 
theoretical framework argue that given sufficient financial fragility, when a number of 
agents have to cope with the stress associated with belied, extrapolative, conventions-
based expectations of the future, the likelihood of systemic crisis rises. By merging 
Doran’s insights with Keynes’ notions of conventionality, this dissertation provides a lens 
of understanding how stable (but fragile) financial systems erupt into crisis.
64
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Economic Ideas and Agents’ Responses to Crisis 
 Keynes and Doran provide a solid understanding about how agents socially 
construct stability in financial markets via conventions, and how non-routine deviations 
from agents’ convention-given expectations catalyze uncertainty in complex systems. 
However, how do elites respond to crises once convention uncertainty takes hold?  
 Kindleberger and Aliber note that when faced with a crisis, regulators have a 
choice between restoring confidence in the economy via intervention and letting markets 
clear via Schumpeterian ideal-type creative destruction. Intervention might include 
extending lender of last resort insurance to troubled financial institutions, asset purchases, 
and lowering policy interest rates, among other measures. Non-intervention might mean 




By framing regulators’ crisis response as a binary choice of intervention, the Post-
Keynesian model fails to account for the wide array of policy options that fall on the 
spectrum between full nationalization of a state’s banking system (i.e. total intervention) 
and allowing Schumpeterian ideal-type creative destruction (i.e. laissez-faire ad 
absurdum). Also, the Post-Keynesian model does not specify how regulators choose 
certain intervention alternatives over others, nor does it account for the heterogeneity of 
intervention capacities available to regulators across disparate national contexts. After 
all, the market grants some states more policy latitude than others, and regulators’ 
credibility often determines whether interventions are successful.
66
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To address these concerns, this dissertation draws on the insights of economic 
constructivists like Matthias Matthijs and Mark Blyth, who put forth a comprehensive 
framework of understanding how economic ideas influence elite responses to economic 
crises. In Ideas and Economic Crises in Britain from Attlee to Blair (1945-2005), 
Matthijs presents a “punctuated evolution” model of ideational change to understand 
economic policy in Post-War Britain. Matthijs’ framework builds on Mark Blyth’s work 
on institutional change in the United States and Sweden in the 1930s and 1970s, which he 
presents in his book, Great Transformations: Economic Ideas and Institutional Change in 
the Twentieth Century. Matthijs and Blyth’s arguments, while not about financial crises 
per se, nevertheless provide several core insights that specify how regulators respond to 
moments of crisis, and thus remedy the aforementioned shortcomings of the Post-
Keynesian model.    
According to Matthijs and Blyth, economic ideas frame elites’ responses to crises 
by reducing uncertainty, giving agents cogent narratives about the causes of crises, and 
specifying appropriate crisis responses. As Matthijs claims, “during a moment of ‘crisis’, 
economic ideas will play a decisive role by explaining what went wrong and how to fix 
it.”
67
 Blyth found that “in moments of economic crisis, ideas are important explanatory 
devices that themselves reduce uncertainty” by giving agents coherent narratives about 
the causes of crisis and thus the appropriate regulatory responses to them.
68
 Blyth 
describes this relationship between economic ideas, uncertainty reduction, and crisis 
resolution as follows:   
                                                 
67
 (Matthijs 2011, 29) 
68
 (Blyth 2002, 37) 
Neil K. Shenai 
41 
Enter the political entrepreneur, who touts an analysis that sorts out the 
confusion of other political actors by suggesting a plausible account of 
why the world no longer works as it did, and proposes a new 
programmatic menu grounded in this analysis. The economic ideas that 
allow agents to do this are therefore crucial resources…They allow agents 
to define the solutions to their problems, and perhaps more importantly, to 
define the very problems that agents face in the first place.
69
 
According to Matthijs, crises themselves are by no means “self-apparent phenomena,” 
but instead “need to be constructed and explained in a coherent narrative, which find 
resonance with the public at large and can convince a majority of the need for a radical 
intervention.”
70
 By narrowing down “possible interpretations of the crisis, and hence 
courses of action, to a significant degree,” economic ideas shape how elites respond to 
crises and enable coalition building by “specifying the ends of collective action,” as Blyth 
argues.
71
 Applying these insights to moments of financial instability, economic ideas help 
regulators diagnose the causes of the crisis, identify potential crisis responses, and build 
institutional support for “radical intervention” should bailouts be required.   
Economic ideas also explain why the market sanctions some policy choices over 
alternatives. Jonathan Kirshner finds that economic ideas held by the market about 
regulators determine the permissibility of certain policy responses over others. Capital 
mobility implies that states that enact unpopular policies can feel the sting of capital 
flight and higher interest rates, while states that adopt market-sanctioned policies are 
rewarded by continued access to international credit at lower interest rates.
72
 As Abdelal 
et al. put it:  
                                                 
69
 (Blyth 2002, 38) 
70
 (Matthijs 2011, 28-29) 
71
 (Blyth 2002, 37-39) 
72
 (Kirshner 2003) 
Neil K. Shenai 
42 
…policies that are deemed illegitimate by the international financial 
community, composed also of market participants, simply cannot succeed: 
capital outflows sparked by an out-of-bounds policy can undermine a 
choice that, at another historical moment, may have been a perfectly 
plausible response to a policy challenge.
73
 
Economic ideas held by the market about regulators determine the efficacy of regulators’ 
response to financial instability given capital mobility. How regulators are perceived, qua 
the market’s economic conventions, determines the efficacy and policy latitude of 
national regulators in responding to bouts of financial instability.  
Theoretical Synthesis: Six Propositions about Economic Conventions and 
Financial Stability 
 Having presented an overview of the weaknesses of Post-Keynesian asset market 
theory, along with the main contentions of Keynesian epistemology, Charles Doran’s 
power cycle theory, and economic constructivism, this chapter now presents this study’s 
six, inductively derived causal propositions about economic conventions in financial 
markets. Throughout the discussion below, effort is made to link this study’s propositions 
to the Post-Keynesian model, while also identifying evidence and causal indicators 
marshaled in the subsequent empirical chapters. 
Propositions 1, 2, and 3 describe the relationship between economic conventions, 
financial stability, asset market imbalances, fragility, and epistemic blindness ex-ante 
financial crises. Proposition 4 specifies how non-routine shocks to agents’ convention-
given expectations catalyzes convention uncertainty, while proposition 5 describes how 
convention uncertainty causes financial instability within fragile financial systems. 
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Proposition 6 elucidates the relationship between economic conventions and elite 
responses to financial instability.  
Proposition 1 Convention stability produces financial stability.  
This first proposition draws on the insights of J.M. Keynes, James Crotty, and 
Sheila Dow, among others, who argue that economic conventions stabilize financial 
markets by coordinating agents’ expectations and serving as a social basis of knowledge 
given uncertainty about the future.
74
 As long as a majority of market participants believe 
in the truth-value of their conventions, then conventions are self-stabilizing and provide 
continuity to economic life.
75
 This proposition specifies the sociological micro-
foundations of stability in the Post-Keynesian model. This study demonstrates the 
analytical utility of this proposition in three ways.   
First, this dissertation explores the role of conventions in stabilizing America’s 
shadow banking system. Based on author interviews, descriptive economic statistics, and 
secondary sources, this dissertation finds that the stability of shadow banking conduits 
critically depended on conventional expectations regarding conduit solvency. Prior to the 
global financial crisis, counterparties’ positive conventional expectations regarding the 
solvency of shadow banking conduits were both pro-cyclical and self-fulfilling, creating 
incentives for financial institutions to issue short-term debt in the ABCP and repo 
markets to capture capital gains associated with the housing bubble and credit boom. As 
long as shadow banking counterparties believed that fellow counterparties would 
continue to roll over banks’ maturing commercial paper and repo liabilities (i.e. given 
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stable conventional expectations regarding conduit solvency), then banks routinely rolled 
over their maturing short-term obligations and shadow banking conduits remained liquid 
and stable. When conventional expectations became unstable, as they did after the failure 
of Lehman Brothers, financial instability ensued.  
Second, this dissertation explores the relationship between bond ratings and 
shadow banking outcomes, and argues that bond ratings can be conceptualized as 
institutionalized conventions of expert opinion. Unrealistically favorable ratings on risky 
asset-backed securities (ABS) facilitated capital flows into highly rated, risky mortgage 
securities, depressing bond yields and reifying the very creditworthiness that ratings were 
meant to reflect.
76
 Stable bond ratings allowed risk-averse investors, such as money 
market mutual funds, to lend to shadow banking conduits that  purchased ex-post risky 
(but highly rated) ABS, decreasing bond spreads and incentivizing greater risk-taking by 
financial institutions and borrowers, thus adding incrementally more risk to the financial 
system prior to the global financial crisis.
77
  
Third, this dissertation describes how banks’ ergodic risk management 
technologies, such as value-at-risk, made them vulnerable to non-ergodic changes in 
financial markets. The adoption of these ergodic risk measures were self-stabilizing in the 
near term, as investors trusted banks to monitor their own risks on their balance sheets. 
However, banks also took advantage of the leeway afforded to them by regulators to set 
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their own regulatory capital standards, taking on greater risks while justifying their high 
leverage on the basis of their own internal risk management technologies. During the 
boom years, banks appeared well capitalized while simultaneously adding more risk to 
their balance sheets. In this way, institutionalized economic conventions such as value-at-
risk endogenously produced incentives for banks to adopt fragile financing structures 
prior to the global financial crisis.  
Proposition 2 Conventions influence the amplitude and periodicity of 
asset market imbalances. 
Proposition 2 is the most intuitive proposition of the study: if economic 
conventions serve as the epistemological basis of agents’ beliefs in financial markets, and 
some beliefs are more prone to producing asset market imbalances than others, then 
variance in agents’ economic conventions can produce divergent outcomes in financial 
markets, ceteris paribus. The empirical challenge faced by this dissertation is 
demonstrating that agents based their behavior on their governing economic conventions 
(and not caprice), such that different economic conventions would have led to different 
outcomes in financial markets.
78
  
 To demonstrate the analytic utility of this proposition, Chapter 3 draws on the 
research of John Taylor, Marek Jarociński, and Frank Smets, who argue that the Federal 
Reserve’s accommodative monetary policy contributed to the unsustainable increase in 
housing prices in the U.S. economy from 2001-2006.
79
 This dissertation shows how 
economic conventions explain the Fed’s monetary policy from 2001-2006. Three 
economic conventions are discussed, including the Fed’s use of imputed rent as opposed 
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to housing prices to calculate housing inflation in their preferred inflation metrics (i.e. 
expert opinion of metric construction), FOMC members’ fears of deflation based on 
memories of Japan’s monetary history (i.e. ergodicity of advanced-industrial state 
monetary policy), and central bankers’ ideology that it was better to “clean up” after the 
deflation of a bubble rather than “lean against” its inflation ex-ante a bubble’s deflation 
(known in the literature as the “Greenspan Doctrine,” or expert opinion setting the 
discursive bounds of appropriate monetary policy). By showing that the Fed’s monetary 
policy depended on a specific set of economic conventions (ranging from 
institutionalized metrics to informal ideology), this dissertation demonstrates how 
economic conventions shaped housing market outcomes in the U.S. economy as 
intermediated by short-run interest rates. It suggests that different economic conventions 
would have led to different monetary policy choices and thus different housing market 
outcomes prior to the global financial crisis.  
Proposition 3 Conventions blind agents to the prospect of non-routine 
change in financial markets.     
This particular proposition draws on the work of Mark Blyth, Frank Knight, and 
J.M. Keynes, who argued that agents do not live in a world of risk as such, but one of 
uncertainty, in which both the causal generators and probability distributions of outcomes 
are in principle unknowable.
80
 This proposition argues that economic conventions are 
responsible for the market’s epistemic blindness to non-routine change ex-ante crises.
81
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Markets, like all complex social systems, are uncertain arenas. As rational actors, 
agents come up with different narratives and conventions that serve as a basis of social 
knowledge that end up generating the very stability that agents take for granted. Trouble 
emerges because no amount of past sampling yields perfect conventions that give agents 
complete knowledge of the future because complex social systems are prone to discrete 
and a priori unknowable shifts. As Keynes puts it, “we simply do not know.”
82
   
 Conventions are useful because they elevate certain narratives over alternatives, 
such that prolonged periods of convention stability tunnel agents’ expectations and sow 
epistemic blindness to non-routine change in financial markets. In the process of taking 
conventions for granted, agents become blind to futures not illuminated by their 
animating conventions. As a result, long-run uncertainty mitigation via conventions is 
simply a mirage because markets are non-ergodic systems.
83
   
 This dissertation shows how the institutionalization of certain economic 
conventions, such as bond ratings and ergodic risk metrics, created epistemic blindness 
among banks, their counterparties, regulators, and the market writ large toward non-
routine change in financial markets. The conventions underpinning these models were 
based on assumptions of normally distributed asset price returns and low default 
correlations given by historical asset returns. Because agents based their expectations of 
losses on their conventions, they underestimated the likelihood of situations in which 
realized market outcomes diverged from their convention-given expectations.
84
  
                                                 
82
 (Keynes 1937a, 214) 
83
 In markets, no amount of past sampling of historical data will give agents’ perfect foresight into future 
outcomes. For more, see: (Blyth 2011). 
84
 As Abdelal et al. put it, economic conventions become the “most powerful when they become taken for 
granted.” (Abdelal, Blyth and Parsons 2010, 11) 
Neil K. Shenai 
48 
Proposition 4 Information shocks to agents’ convention-given 
expectations catalyze convention uncertainty.  
 Propositions 4 and 5 consider the conditions under which stable (but fragile) 
financial systems erupt into crisis. Proposition 4 draws on the work of Charles Doran to 
argue that non-linear deviations from agents’ extrapolative forecasts of the future 
catalyze structural uncertainty in complex social systems. Doran’s insights delineate how 
stable systems yield to structural uncertainty when non-linearities in the trajectory of 
history occur, and refine the Post-Keynesian model by offering a mode of understanding 
how and why fragile financial systems erupt into crisis.
85
   
Recall that Keynes believed that the “conventional method of calculation will be 
compatible with a considerable measure of continuity and stability…so long as we can 
reply upon the maintenance of the convention.”
86
 When convention certainty yields to 
uncertainty, as Keynes believed it periodically would, “the practice of calmness and 
immobility, of certainty and security, suddenly breaks down.” As a result, “new fears and 
hopes will, without warning, take charge of human conduct. The forces of disillusion may 
suddenly impose a new conventional basis of valuation.”
87
  
 What causes the conventional method of decision-making to break down? 
According to Crotty, a “rupture of expectations” causes agents to question their 
conventional method of decision-making, thus catalyzing convention uncertainty: 
Once confidence in the meaningfulness of the forecasting process is 
destroyed, irreducible objective uncertainty force its way into the 
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consciousness of agents, breaking down the conventional barriers they 
have constructed to conceal it.
88
 
Crotty, like Doran, argued that novel shocks, or “surprises” to agents’ expectations 
causes them to question their most taken-for-granted ontological assumptions. Absent 
conventional anchors of behavior, agents must cope with acute informational uncertainty. 
If a majority of actors experience convention uncertainty, the likelihood of systemic crisis 
rises dramatically. 
 How does this study illustrate the analytic utility of this proposition in the context 
of the global financial crisis? The following empirical chapters discuss the rise of the 
shadow banking system, in which various wholesale “depositors” lent to securitized 
“borrowers” via asset-backed commercial paper (ABCP) and repurchase agreement 
(repo) conduits. Unlike traditional banking, shadow banking lacked Federally-sponsored 
deposit insurance, and was thus vulnerable to bank runs. This dissertation found evidence 
that regulators’ successive interventions in financial markets, ranging from orchestrating 
the bailout of hedge fund Long-Term Capital Management (LTCM) in 1998, investment 
bank Bear Stearns in March 2008, and the Federal Housing Agencies in September 2008, 
created a conventional expectation in financial markets that regulators would serve as de 
facto liquidity providers of last resort in the wholesale funding markets, as argued in 
Chapter 5. Agents’ acceptance of this convention maintained a tenuous stability in 
shadow banking markets and ensured that the deflating housing bubble did not lead to a 
generalized panic across all shadow banking conduits.   
 Regulators’ decision to allow Lehman Brothers to fail while bailing out the larger 
and more systemically important American International Group (AIG) changed 
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everything. Fears of counterparty solvency, idiosyncratically limited to specific financial 
institutions pre-Lehman, metastasized into a generalized bank run against all shadow 
bank-sponsoring financial institutions in the wholesale funding markets. Seen via the 
paradigm of conventionality, regulators’ disparate treatment of Lehman Brothers and 
AIG introduced convention uncertainty into markets regarding regulators’ commitment to 
backstopping shadow banking conduits, eviscerating the very stability to which markets 
had grown accustomed because of regulators’ prior interventions. The absence of 
conventional anchors of behavior translated Lehman’s failure into broader financial 
instability, as described in the following proposition.  
Proposition 5 Given the prior existence of a fragile financial structure, 
convention uncertainty causes agents to revert to first principles of 
survival, disrupting the market’s normal price mechanism and triggering 
financial instability. 
 This proposition draws on the insights of J.M. Keynes, Charles Doran, and Frank 
Knight to explain how agents behave during moments of convention uncertainty.
89
 
Lacking conventional anchors of behavior, agents revert to “first-principles” of survival 
by hoarding safe assets and trying to sell risky ones.
90
 This “flight to quality” disrupts the 
market’s normal price mechanism and can lead to adverse selection problems in markets, 
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Keynes recognized that one of the main indicators of convention uncertainty in 
markets was elevated money demand, which Keynes saw as a symptom of the market’s 
degree of “disquietude” regarding conventions: 
…our desire to hold Money as a store of wealth is a barometer of the 
degree of our distrust of our own calculations and conventions concerning 
the future. Even tho (sic) this feeling about money is itself conventional or 
instinctive, it operates…at a deeper level of our motivation. It takes charge 
at moments when the higher, more precarious conventions have 
weakened. The possession of actual money lulls our disquietude; and the 
premium which we require to make us part with money is the measure of 
the degree of our disquietude.
92
  
In modern parlance, the price of safe assets (such as bank deposits and short-term U.S. 
Treasury securities) increases because of convention uncertainty, thus causing the yield 
on these securities to fall. Individual attempts to make portfolios liquid and less risky 




 A visualization of this dissertation’s crisis schematic, as described in Propositions 
4 and 5, is presented below:  
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Figure 3: A Schematic of Crises and Conventions 
 
 This visualization shows how massive, abrupt, unanticipated structural change 
within fragile financial systems shocks agents’ expectations of the future. Defied 
expectations cause agents to reappraise the veracity of their most taken-for-granted 
economic conventions, and the stress associated with convention uncertainty introduces 
acute, structural uncertainty into agents’ decision-making, causing them to revert to first 
principles of survival and hoard liquid capital. Convention uncertainty can cause either 
positive or negative feedback vis-à-vis agents’ expectations. Negative feedback entails 
“divergent equilibria,” or situations in which individually rational behavior (for instance, 
hoarding liquid capital) proves collectively disastrous for all market participants (e.g. 
exacerbating liquidity issues for the market as a whole). Regardless of these recursive 
loops, the shock engendered by an unanticipated structural change defies agents’ 
expectations and causes them to reappraise the truth-value of their dominant convention 
set, changing agent behavior as a result of changed economic conventions.    
Applying this proposition to the global financial crisis, this dissertation 
demonstrates how the simultaneous failure of investment bank Lehman Brothers and 
bailout of insurance giant AIG catalyzed convention uncertainty in financial markets 
regarding the willingness of regulators to act as liquidity providers of last resort in 
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shadow banking markets. Convention uncertainty made it rational for agents to hoard 
liquid capital and withhold financing from shadow banking conduits given their 
perception of the Fed and Treasury’s ambivalence toward bailouts. ABCP and repo 
counterparties withdrew their funds from shadow banking conduits and sold risky assets 
while also purchasing safe havens like short-term Treasury securities. The contraction of 
credit in the wholesale funding markets made it difficult for both bank and non-bank 
financial institutions to finance their operations, further adding to the dynamic of 
uncertainty. Other indicators of convention uncertainty include rising stock market 
volatility, the flight to quality in foreign exchange markets, and the ceasing of trading in 
certain derivatives markets because of a lack of information symmetry. In particular, this 
dissertation found that during the most acute phase of the global financial crisis, 
information asymmetry about collateral quality caused an adverse selection problem in 
certain securities markets, in which securities of disparate quality are sold at the same 
low price, so too much of the low quality good and too little of the high quality goods are 
supplied.
94
 It is proposed that convention uncertainty caused trading in certain derivatives 
asset classes to cease, just as George Akerlof and other scholars of asymmetric 
information would have predicted.
95
   
Proposition 6 Elite responses to financial market instability are a function 
of their economic conventions used to diagnose a crisis and the 
conventions held by the market about regulators. 
This proposition argues that regulators’ response to financial instability is a 
function of both their conventions about markets and the market’s conventions about 
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regulators. It applies the insights of economic constructivists such as Matthias Matthijs 
and Mark Blyth to understand how regulators respond to financial instability.
96
 It also 
draws on the work of Jonathan Kirshner, who argued that open capital markets allow 
market participants to set the bounds of regulatory intervention in the economy by 
“punishing” bad policies via capital flight and “rewarding” good policies via capital 
inflows.
97
 This proposition builds on the Post-Keynesian model by specifying the 
constraints on elite intervention in the economy when faced with a crisis, and outlines 
why the market deems identical policy responses legitimate in some national contexts but 
not others.  
After regulators decided to let Lehman Brothers fail, they retreated from their 
anti-bailout posture to bail out other systemically important financial institutions such as 
AIG, Citigroup, Bank of America, among many others. Their response to the market’s 
convention uncertainty encompassed a wide array of policies to stem the banking panic 
and restore confidence in America’s wholesale funding markets, including granting 
investment banks access to the Federal Reserve’s discount window, asset purchases, the 
extension of Federal deposit insurance to bank and non-bank short-term market-based 
liabilities, the passage and adoption of the $700Bn Troubled Asset Relief Program, 
among many other measures. Together, these interventions restored convention certainty 
that regulators stood as liquidity providers of last resort in wholesale funding markets, 
successfully reducing funding pressures facing financial institutions. 
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This dissertation finds that regulators’ response to the crisis stemmed from two 
sets of economic conventions, including those held by regulators about appropriate crisis 
responses and the market’s conventions about regulators and America’s sovereign 
creditworthiness.  This dissertation demonstrates that regulators’ response to the crisis 
followed from their fears of repeating the Great Depression (i.e. ergodicity), which biased 
them toward carte blanche bailouts of the entire U.S. financial system. Moreover, 
regulators’ ability to extend de facto deposit insurance to the shadow banking system 
depended on the market’s willingness to accept such invasive interventions and deem 
them credible over alternatives.
98
  
Constitutive Explanations of Financial Instability 
 One of the primary difficulties of operationalizing a conventions-based model of 
continuity and change in financial markets is that it does not lend itself to telling a clean 
causal story with clearly delineated independent and dependent variables, linked by 
observable and non-recursive causal pathways. Reality, unfortunately, is far more 
complex.  
 Constructivists like John Ruggie, Alexander Wendt, R. Ned Lebow, and Mark 
Blyth, among others, recognize that linear causal standards are inapplicable to matters of 
social construction.
99
 They argue that complex social systems like financial markets are 
“emergent” systems, in which outcomes “emerge” from the complex interplay of the 
system’s dynamics. Outcomes are irreducible and unforeseeable a priori their 
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 Matters are complicated further because ideas and outcomes in markets are 
inseparable – agents’ thoughts and perceptions are causally imbricated into asset prices 
and market outcomes.
101
 For this reason, Mark Blyth concludes that ideational 
scholarship occupies its own “distinct social ontology” because economic ideas and 
material outcomes are often the same thing. Blyth finds that the interdependence of 
economic subjects and objects renders linear causal standards irrelevant because the very 
narratives and conventions we divine about how markets operate has a two-way, 
reflexive relationship with the causal generators of markets themselves. Blyth claims that 
economic ideas “are simultaneously the media through which understand the world and 
the material that constitutes it.”
102
 Thus the relationship between ideas and outcomes is 
endogenous and recursive, such that it is impossible to separate them when attempting to 
determine causality in complex social systems. As Blyth describes:  
In this case [of markets], and in many other cases in the social and 
political world, particularly at higher levels of aggregation, subject and 
object are not independent. Rather, they are interdependent since actions 
taken in light of beliefs alter the nature of the system itself. Admitting the 
problem of interdependence as an endemic feature of social systems 
means that linear causation becomes far more contingent than merely 
‘necessary and sufficient.’ For if many causes have their roots in the 
reciprocal relations of ideas, agents, and objects (financial theorists, 
financial analysts, and financial systems) then non-linearity due to 
interdependence must be seen as an endemic feature of social reality rather 
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Blyth notes that this social ontology allows the researcher to discuss the “unintended 
consequences of action in [agents’] environments,” and as such, seems well suited to 
studying the role of economic conventions in financial markets.
104
 Rather than disputing 
or working around these endogenous and recursive causal pathways (via partial 
equilibrium analysis and comparative statics), this dissertation problematizes and 
investigates endogeneity in markets.  
 So if this dissertation rejects linear causality on ontological grounds, where does 
this leave us? According to R. Ned Lebow, constructivists offer a unique method of 
social inquiry known as “constitutive causality,” which he describes as follows:   
Constitutive causality seeks to develop layered accounts of human 
behavior in lieu of law-like statements. It rejects the latter, not only 
because of all the philosophical and methodological problems associated 
with such a project, but out of recognition that outcomes – and their 
meanings – almost always depend on idiosyncratic features of 
context…At the deepest levels, causation is cognitive and works by 




This quotation seems particularly apt to the study of conventions. Conventions explain 
how agents elevate certain behavioral choices over alternatives and delineate the 
cognitive pathways by which economic ideas motivate agent behavior and translate into 
material outcomes in the economy. Conventions thus specify the “idiosyncratic features 
of context” that explain why some outcomes occur over others.  
 This dissertation thus adopts a strongly constitutively standards of causation, and 
argues that economic conventions make some behavior “all but necessary” and others 
“almost inconceivable.” Furthermore, cognitive frameworks like conventions “shape the 
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way in which people formulate goals and choose means of achieving them.” Belief in 
certain conventions “also influences the kind of information people pay attention to and 
how they interpret it.” Lebow suggests that to demonstrate the causal importance of 
social constructs like conventions, one has to “work back from [observed] behavior to 
understandings and goals and show how they in turn were the product of particular 
identities or cognitive frames.” Additionally, Lebow argues that in an ideal world, “we 
should demonstrate that the behavior in question would be inconsistent with other 
identities and frames.”
106
 This is the causal standard employed in the present study, and 
this dissertation shows how economic conventions foreclose certain outcomes while 
making others inevitable. To that end, the following section outlines the empirical 
methods used by this dissertation to test its causal propositions, given this dissertation’s 
ontology and non-linear causal standards.  
Operationalization and Methodology 
To illustrate the applicability of this chapter’s theoretical framework in 
investigating asset markets based on the above ontology, this study marshals evidence 
from author interviews, discourse analysis of archival documents and speeches, 
descriptive economic statistics, time series econometric analysis, and other secondary 
sources to show that economic conventions must be taken seriously as causal drivers of 
stability and change in financial markets. The empirical methods employed by this 
dissertation include counter-factual analysis, process-tracing, and econometric 
techniques.  
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According to sociologist Max Weber, counterfactual analysis involves “the 
mental construction of a course of events which is altered through modifications in one or 
more ‘conditions’.”
107
 In evaluating the relationship between conventions and market 
outcomes, it is necessary to judge whether conventions and conventional change have 
independent causal weight in determining market outcomes or are epiphenomenal to 
other, material causal processes. One way of solving this puzzle is by envisioning how 
different conventions might have altered the decision-making calculi of agents, and thus 
produced different outcomes in markets.
108
 Counter-factual analysis of economic 
conventions allows the researcher to speculate how variance in agents’ conventions might 
have caused them to make different decisions, thus producing variance in market 
outcomes. This dissertation employs counterfactual methods to illustrate its causal 
propositions. For instance, Chapter 3 argues how policy entrepreneurs’ operationalization 
of inflation metrics, fears of repeating Japan’s experience with deflation, and ideology 
that central banks should not pop asset price bubbles explain the Federal Reserve’s 
monetary policy prior to the global financial crisis. The chapter then provides some 
reasons why different economic conventions would have caused different outcomes in the 
U.S. economy (i.e. counterfactual conventions and their attendant outcomes). Chapter 5 
describes how regulators’ repeated interventions in financial markets created a 
conventional expectation in markets that regulators would serve as lenders of last resort 
for shadow banking conduits. Chapter 6 hypothesizes that Lehman Brothers’ bankruptcy 
nullified this conventional expectation, initiating a period of convention uncertainty and 
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thus financial instability in financial markets. It is possible to envision an alternative 
history in which regulators issued a carte blanche bailout of the entire financial system 
before the failure of Lehman Brothers, thus affirming the market’s belief in regulators’ de 
facto shadow banking deposit insurance and avoiding much of the instability that 
overwhelmed financial markets after Lehman Brothers.  
While counter-factual analysis gives the researcher prima facie support for the 
notion that conventions shape agent behavior and thus outcomes in financial markets, one 
must employ other methods to show the causal links between specific conventions and 
certain outcomes in financial markets. This dissertation employs process-tracing research 
techniques, in which the researcher observes “the decision processes by which various 
initial conditions are translated into outcomes,” as argued by George and McKeown. 
Process-tracing “attempts to uncover what stimuli…actors attend to; the decision process 
that makes use of these stimuli to arrive at decisions; the actual behavior that then occurs; 
the effect of various institutional arrangements on attention, processing, and behavior; 
and the effect of other variables of interest on attention, processing, and behavior.”
109
 
King, Keohane, and Verba argue, “Process tracing will...involve searching for evidence - 
evidence consistent with the overall causal theory - about the decisional process by which 
the outcome was produced.” To find this evidence, King et al. believe that process-
tracing might require the researcher to conduct elite interviews and review their written 
record to explain their choices over plausible alternatives, as this dissertation does in 
Chapters 4, 5, and 6 to explain the decision-making processes of market participants, 
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 As Matthias Matthijs contends, process-tracing is suited 
to ideational analysis because it allows the researcher to “gain significant insights into 
economic decision making since it involves the reconstruction of actors’ motivations as 
well as their definitions and evaluations of particular situations.”
111
  
This dissertation also uses quantitative techniques to show how changes in 
conventions cause material changes in financial markets. Chapter 6 and Appendix IV 
discuss the results of a series of econometric tests to illustrate that the conjoined failure of 
Lehman Brothers and bailout of insurance giant AIG initiated a structural break in inter-
bank lending markets based off time series econometric data. Furthermore, this 
dissertation draws on descriptive economic statistics to illustrate the link between 
economic conventions and market outcomes. Chapter 3 computes several correlations to 
show that housing related interest rates varied directly with the Fed’s monetary policy. It 
also uses statistical techniques to demonstrate the existence of a “Great Moderation” in 
macroeconomic volatility from 1980-2008. All empirical chapters present myriad 
economic data to help readers understand the aggregate forces facing the U.S. economy 
from 2001-2009.  
Taken together, these three empirical methods – counter-factual analysis, process-
tracing, and quantitative techniques – help the study present clear links between 
economic conventions and financial market outcomes.  
This dissertation employs the above empirical methods in the context of a “single-
n,” representative case study on the global financial crisis. Helen Simons defines a case 
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study as “an in-depth exploration from multiple perspectives of the complexity and 
uniqueness of a particular project, policy, institution, program or system in a ‘real life’ 
context.”
112
 According to John S. Odell, this dissertation qualifies as a “preliminary 
illustration of a theory” form of case research, since this dissertation “puts concrete flesh 
on the bare bones of an abstract idea in order to help readers see its meaning more 
clearly, and to convince them that the idea is relevant to at least one significant real-world 
instance.”
113
 John Gerring would argue that this dissertation’s case study of the global 
financial crisis qualifies as a “pathway case,” insofar as it attempts to complete an 
“intensive analysis of an individual case…to elucidate causal mechanisms (i.e. to clarify 
a theory.).”
114
 Regardless of one’s terminology, the researcher must keep in mind Gary 
Thomas’ caveat that a sound case study design requires two complementary components: 
a subject of the case study (in this case, the global financial crisis) and an object of the 
study (what he terms “an analytical or theoretical frame,” which this case is the 
theoretical framework advanced in the above six propositions).
115
 The present study 
satisfies Thomas’ criteria of conducting a case study.  
To conduct an effective case study, George and Bennett argue that “the 
investigator should clearly identify the universe – that is, the ‘class’ or ‘subclass’ of 
events – of which a single case or a group of cases to be studied are instances.” In this 
case, the global financial crisis is part of the broader universe of systemic financial crises. 
The authors go on to summarize several strengths and weaknesses associated with the 
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case study approach. First, case studies allow for “conceptual validity,” as social science 
concepts like power, legitimacy, democracy, among others are context dependent, so 
forming causal propositions that take into account contextual idiosyncrasies that cloud 
our ability to elucidate specific concepts can lead to better theory building. Second, case 
studies allow the researcher to “derive new hypotheses” for deviant cases. Whereas 
traditional, large-n approaches to financial markets increase the number of data points 
and, in so doing, lose precision, a targeted single-n study on the global financial crisis can 
identify the causal links that large-n theorizing ignores. Third, George and Bennett argue 
that case studies allow the researcher to “explore causal mechanisms” in detailed cases. 
Fourth, case studies lend themselves to “modeling and assessing complex causal 
relations,” which is important when trying to understand why humanly-devised social 
systems like markets erupt into crisis, as these domains are rife with feedback loops and 
deeper, idiosyncratic complexity that large-n case studies often ignore.  
That said, the case study method is not without its faults. George and Bennett 
identify the following weaknesses of the case study method that the researcher must 
consider before committing to a case study research design. First, they argue that case 
studies are subject to case selection bias, or picking cases because they share a desired 
outcome. Selection bias can lead to invalid results because the researcher might ignore 
negative cases that also share the same proposed causal variables, in turn leading to false 
confidence in results.
116
 Second, George and Bennett argue that case studies suffer from 
the fact that they do not allow the researcher to test for variances in scope of particular 
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 This particularly concern is mitigated by the fact that the present study investigates the U.S. economy 
over a period of both financial market stability and instability, so there is adequate variance within the 
single case to mitigate selection bias concerns. 
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variables. In the parlance of statistics, case studies might not allow the researcher to 
gauge the magnitude of the beta coefficients of the variables studied. This is particularly 
stark when considering that this study advances the claim that convention uncertainty 
leads to financial market instability. More formally, this study argues that convention 
uncertainty is a necessary (if not sufficient – the critical complement being the existence 
of a fragile financial structure) condition for initiating financial market instability. Yet a 
single-case study makes it difficult to conclude that convention uncertainty, coupled with 
a fragile financial system, generates financial instability across all cases in all contexts. 
Third, George and Bennett argue that case studies might exhibit a “lack of 
representativeness” that could result in concept stretching if the researcher mechanically 
jumps to conclusions based on a single case.
117
 Although it is impossible to address all of 
these weaknesses of the case study method, one of the best defenses against these pitfalls 
is to be aware of them, so every effort will be made to eschew hyperbole, bias, and 
ideology when presenting the reader with a clear understanding of the causal role of 
economic conventions during the case in question. This dissertation does not claim to 
hold a monopoly of explanation over other interpretations of financial instability across 
cases. Rather, this dissertation argues that a fuller consideration of economic conventions 
within pre-established and popular lenses of investigating asset market outcomes (e.g. 
Post-Keynesian asset market theory and neoclassical economics) lends itself to better 
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 (George and Bennett 2004, 22-30). When addressing this third criticism, it is important to remember that 
the present study does not endeavor to provide a mutually exclusive explanation for the global financial 
crisis, or all financial crises for that matter. Instead, the goal of this study is to show how a theoretical 
synthesis of different strands of investigating outcomes in complex environments (economics, both 
neoclassical and Post-Keynesian, on one hand, and ideational studies, including economic constructivism 
and power cycle theory, on the other) can enable the researcher “to get ever closer to that limit point” of 
truth, as described by Charles Doran in the opening quotation to this chapter. This conventions-based 
account of continuity and change in financial markets sits among other competing paradigms of 
understanding financial market instability 
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theory and greater empirical validity. It is up to the reader to judge the relative merits of a 
conventions-based approach compared with alternatives.  
Finally, it is worth noting that this dissertation has a number of units of analysis, 
including “sell side” financial institutions, “buy side” money market mutual funds and 
other bank counterparties, regulators at both the U.S. Treasury and the Federal Reserve, 
and “the market” writ large. Given the scope of global capital markets, this dissertation’s 
primary units of analysis might not fit into territorially delimited states. While the Federal 
Reserve and U.S. Treasury have a clear legal authority over the United States, 
institutional investors and financial institutions are complicated entities and cross 
international boundaries. Shadow banking, a major locus of analysis in this dissertation, 
is decidedly international and globalized (as the losses accrued across the global financial 
system during the global financial crisis illustrate all too well). Even though many of the 
world’s biggest financial institutions are incorporated in the United States, firms like 
Citigroup and J.P. Morgan have operations in over one hundred countries worldwide. 
Furthermore, international capital flows are unregulated, and thus implicit in any analysis 
of, for instance, the flight to safety given convention uncertainty, is an interaction of 
financial flows both within and among states. States themselves are also important 
economic actors in the international economy and are thus important objects of study 
when considering the reflexive relationship between agents and social structures. States 
are particularly important to Proposition 6 of this dissertation’s conventions-based 
theoretical framework, as national regulators are often the first line of defense against 
financial instability.
118
 Still, the presence of open capital markets, coupled with 
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idiosyncratic market perceptions of regulator credibility, begets a divergence of national-
level intervention capacities in financial markets. Simply put, some national regulators 
are given more leeway by financial markets than others, and this leeway determines the 
autonomous power of financial elites to intervene in financial systems given convention 
uncertainty. State power (qua regulators’ intervention capacity) in the age of 
globalization is not the primary focus of this dissertation.
119
 Chapter 6 focuses on the 
actions of the Federal Reserve and U.S. Treasury, which, because of the dollar’s 
dominant global role, exercise autonomous and deep intervention capacity in financial 
markets. This condition does not hold across all circumstances of financial instability. 
But since this dissertation is studying the United States and not, say, Thailand in 1997, or 
Greece in 2010, stateness and power are important but ultimately not decisive variables in 
this study’s theoretical framework.  
Conclusion 
 The purpose of this chapter was four-fold: first, it placed the present study in its 
appropriate academic context, summarizing the core weaknesses of Post-Keynesian asset 
market theory and the main theoretical contentions of Keynesian epistemology, Doran’s 
power cycle theory, and economic constructivism. Second, this chapter presented this 
dissertation’s primary theoretical framework, which consists of six inductively derived 
causal propositions about economic conventions, continuity, and change in financial 
markets. When describing these propositions, effort was made to link them to the Post-
Keynesian model of financial instability while also discussing their operationalization in 
the subsequent case study. Third, this chapter discussed this dissertation’s ontology and 
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methodological posture of “strong constitutive causality,” in which economic 
conventions and market outcomes are treated as mutually constituted, endogenous, and 
recursive. Fourth, the chapter described the operationalization of this dissertation’s 
theoretical framework in the context of a representative case study of the global financial 
crisis. It described this dissertation’s empirical methods, including counter-factual 
analysis, process-tracing, and econometric techniques, and the types of evidence 
marshaled via these techniques to illustrate the applicability of the study’s causal 
propositions.  
 Having described this study’s research design, the next two chapters present the 
operationalization of the first three propositions of this dissertation’s conventions-based 
theoretical framework. They describe how, in the years prior to the 2008 global financial 
crisis, the U.S. Federal Reserve’s interest-rate setting body, the Federal Open Market 
Committee, kept interest rates “too low for too long,” thus inducing the precipitous rise in 
housing prices in the U.S. economy from 2001-2006. Chapters 3 and 4 also describe the 
economic conventions that underpinned the Fed’s interest rate decisions, and argue that 
different economic conventions would have produced different housing market outcomes 
in the U.S. economy.  
Chapter 4 picks up where Chapter 3 leaves off, and describes how many of 
America’s systemically important financial institutions adopted risky financing 
arrangements in tandem with the unsustainable increase in housing prices. It too argues 
that the emergence of financial fragility was due to several enabling economic 
conventions, including pro-cyclical conventional expectations in the wholesale funding 
market, institutionalized, favorable bond ratings for risky ABS, and bank-determined 
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capital charges based on ergodic risk models, which permitted authoritative actors to add 
more risk into the U.S. financial system, sowing systemic vulnerability to credit write-
downs when the housing market collapsed.  
In both chapters, effort is made to show how convention adoption produced 
stability, fragility, and epistemic blindness to non-routine change ex-ante the global 
financial crisis, as described in Propositions 1-3 of this dissertation’s theoretical 
framework. 
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Of course, any time that there is a public involvement that softens the blow of private-
sector losses – even as obliquely as in this episode – the issue of moral hazard 
arises…Over time, economic efficiency will be impaired as some uneconomic investments 
are undertaken under the implicit assumption that possible losses may be borne by the 
government. 
- Alan Greenspan120 
In the shadow banking system, loans, instead of being held on the books of banks as was 
virtually always the case in the 1930s, were packaged together in complex ways and sold 
to investors. Many of these complex securities were held in off-balance-sheet vehicles 
financed by short-term funding. When the housing slump shook investors' faith in the 
values of the loans underlying the securities, short-term funding dried up quickly, 
threatening the banks and other financial institutions that explicitly or implicitly stood 
behind the off-balance-sheet vehicles. This was a new type of run, analogous in many 
ways to the bank runs of the 1930s, but in a form which was not well anticipated by 
financial institutions or regulators. In an additional variation on the theme of the bank 
run, in September 2008 money market mutual funds saw massive outflows after one 
prominent fund suffered losses related to the failure of Lehman Brothers. 
- Ben Bernanke121 
…yet for all the risks they’re taking on, banks insist they’re safer than ever. They’ve 
hired many of the greatest mathematical minds in the world to create impossibly complex 
risk models. They deal in so many markets that the chances of all of them going haywire 
simultaneously appear minuscule. 
- Businessweek Magazine, 2006122 
More and more leverage in the system, The whole building is about to collapse anytime 
now…Only potential survivor, the fabulous Fab…standing in the middle of all these 
complex, highly leveraged, exotic trades he created without necessarily understanding 
the implications of those monstruosities (sic)!!! 
- “Fabulous” Fabrice Tourre123 
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 (BusinessWeek 2006) 
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 (G. White 2010); Tourre was a Vice President at Goldman Sachs, subsequently indicted by the 
Securities and Exchange Commission for fraud. 










CHAPTER 3:  
CONVENTIONS AND MONETARY POLICY 
  











Proposition 1: Stable conventions produce stable markets.  
Proposition 2: Conventions influence the amplitude and periodicity of asset market 
imbalances. 
Proposition 3: Conventions blind agents to the prospect of non-routine change in 
financial markets.     
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Introduction 
 Chapters 3 and 4 of this dissertation empirically demonstrate the first three 
propositions of this study’s theoretical framework. Chapter 3 discusses the relationship 
between economic conventions and the Federal Reserve’s monetary policy prior to the 
global financial crisis. It traces how Federal Reserve monetary policy contributed to the 
housing bubble, and it identifies three links between accommodative monetary policy and 
higher housing prices: lower housing related interest rates, higher asset prices, and 
reduced macroeconomic volatility. Together, these factors link the Fed’s monetary policy 
to housing market outcomes prior to the global financial crisis. Thereafter, the chapter 
identifies the economic conventions that motivated the Federal Reserve’s monetary 
policy. This dissertation finds that three sets of economic conventions – including the 
Fed’s use of owners’ equivalent rent to measure housing inflation in their official 
inflation statistics, FOMC members’ fears of repeating Japan’s historical experience with 
deflation, and the ideology, held by senior Fed central bankers, that it was better to clean 
up the aftermath of a deflated asset price bubble rather than lean against its inflation – 
explain the Fed’s monetary policy during the 2000s. It follows from this analysis that 
different conventions would have led to different housing market outcomes in the U.S. 
economy, ceteris paribus.  
The Federal Reserve and the Global Financial Crisis 
Like the 2000s, which bore witness to the housing bubble, the late 1990s had its 
own version of “irrational exuberance” in the public equity markets. The NASDAQ 
composite, a stock index of leading technology companies, increased from 1,500 in 
August 1998 to nearly 4,700 in February 2000, with many of its constituent companies 
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boasting stock prices several hundred times their annual earnings. It did not take long for 
the stock market’s momentum to give way to fundamental economic realities, however, 




The deflation of the technology stock bubble, along with the September 11 
terrorist attacks, caused the U.S. economy to fall into recession in 2001. GDP growth 
contracted in the first and third quarters of that year, while the unemployment rate 
increased from four percent in 2000 to just above six percent in 2003. In 2002, a wave of 
corporate scandals hit Wall Street, further adding to the dynamic of economic 
uncertainty. 
Figure 4: NASDAQ Composite Index Boom and Bust: 1998-2003 
Source: Yahoo™ Finance 
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Figure 5: U.S. GDP Growth: 1999-2003 
Source: U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis 
Figure 6: U.S. Unemployment and Job Creation: 1998-2003 
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In response to collapsing public equity prices, contracting output, and rising 
unemployment, the Federal Reserve’s interest rate-setting body, the Federal Open Market 
Committee (FOMC), cut the target federal funds rate from 6.5% in January 2001 to 1% 
by June 2003.
125
 Accommodative monetary policy succeeded in cushioning growth in the 
U.S. economy, as the 2000-2002 contraction was relatively shallow compared with other 
Post-War recessions, though unemployment remained elevated throughout 2003.
126
  
Low interest rates can stimulate many aspects of the economy, however, not just 
output and employment. William White, one of the few economists who foresaw the 
crisis, argued that prolonged, lax monetary conditions could lead to “significant 
deviations” in home prices from their fundamental value. White found that low interest 
rates and financial liberalization “increased the likelihood of boom-bust cycles of the 
Austrian sort,” and went on to identify what he saw as a bubble dynamic taking root in 
the U.S. economy because of the Fed’s easy monetary policy: 
The dynamics of the process can be described in the following way. 
Buoyed by justified optimism about some particular development, credit is 
extended which drives up related asset prices. This both encourages fixed 
investment…, and increases collateral values, which supports still more 
credit expansion. With time, and underpinned by an associated increase in 
output growth, this process leads to increasing willingness to take on risks 
(‘irrational exuberance’), which gives further impetus to the credit cycle. 
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 Minutes from the FOMC’s November meeting in 2002 reveal the Fed’s rationale for their 2001-2003 
rate cutting cycle: “While the current stance of monetary policy was still accommodative and was 
providing important support to economic activity, the members were concerned that the generally 
disappointing data since the previous meeting, reinforcing the general thrust of the anecdotal evidence in 
recent months, pointed to a longer-lasting spell of subpar economic performance than they had anticipated 
earlier. In the circumstances, a relatively aggressive easing action could help to ensure that the current soft 
spot in the economy would prove to be temporary and enhance the odds of a robust rebound in economic 
activity next year.” (Federal Open Market Committee 2002). Emphasis added.  
126
 (B. S. Bernanke 2010a) Even though GDP growth remained positive, the broader economic recovery 
was “jobless” throughout 2003, which might have contributed to the Fed’s decision to keep interest rates 
low despite rebounding output. The Fed has a dual mandate to support stable employment and stable prices, 
and with inflation low, the Fed felt it was within its purview to maintain accommodative monetary policy 
to spur employment growth in the early 2000s.  
Neil K. Shenai 
76 
As White saw it, the primary risk facing the U.S. economy was that “exaggerated 
expectations concerning both risk and return are eventually disappointed,” and that “the 
whole process…[could go] into reverse.” When the reckoning occurred, asset price 
values would fall, output would contract, and unemployment would rise.
127
  
Indeed, there is prima facie evidence that comports with White’s narrative of 
events, as short-term interest rates inversely correlated with housing prices from 2001-
2007. In 2002, the average annual federal funds effective rate was 1.7%, while home 
prices increased 15% over the same period. The following year, in 2003, the Fed’s policy 
rate hovered near 1% on average, while home prices increased another 13.4%. In 2004, 
when the Fed was debating whether to raise interest rates, housing inflation spiked to 
roughly 19% on the year. When the Fed did tighten monetary policy in 2006 and kept the 
federal funds rate at 5% on average, housing prices increased a scant .22%.  
Table 1: Average Annual Federal Funds Rate and Change in Housing Prices 
Year 
Average Annual Federal  
Funds Effective Rate 
Change in Home Prices (% 
change,  YoY) 
2001 3.7% 8.9% 
2002 1.7% 15.0% 
2003 1.1% 13.4% 
2004 1.3% 18.7% 
2005 3.2% 15.9% 
2006 5.0% 0.2% 
2007 5.0% -9.8% 
Source: The Federal Reserve, Standard and Poor’s 
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 (W. R. White 2006, 3-9). The trigger of White’s irrational exuberance – “optimism about some 
particular development” – is analogous to a “displacement” in the Post-Keynesian model. 
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Figure 7: Federal Funds Rate and U.S. Housing Prices: 2000-2012 
Source: The Federal Reserve, Standard and Poor’s 
Still, the mere existence of an inverse correlation between interest rates and rising 
housing prices does not necessarily allow us to conclude a causal relationship exists 
between these variables.
128
 What links existed between the Fed’s accommodative 
monetary policy and the housing market? This study identified three channels by which 
monetary policy affected the U.S. housing market.  
First, the federal funds rate affected interest rates tied to real estate investment, 
adding incremental demand to the housing market. The federal funds rate is the interest 
rate at which banks borrow from one another on an overnight basis to maintain their Fed-
mandated reserve requirements. If banks can borrow cheaply in the federal funds market, 
so the theory goes, they will be more inclined to lend at lower interest rates to other 
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borrowers. Therefore, when the Fed wants to stimulate economic activity, it will lower 
the federal funds target, and when the Fed wants to contain inflation and curtail economic 
activity, it will raise interest rates to reduce lending, investment, and output. 
There is empirical evidence that the federal funds rate affected interest rates tied 
to residential real estate investment, which could have contributed to the market’s 
“irrational exuberance” in the housing market.
129
 From early 2001 through mid-2004, 
when the Fed cut the federal funds rate from above 6% to 1%, thirty-year fixed mortgage 
rates fell from above 8% to 5%. From January 2000 through December 2008, the thirty-
year conventional mortgage rate had a 0.66 correlation to the federal funds effective rate. 
During the same period, adjustable mortgage rates had a 0.86 correlation to the federal 
funds effective rate. Lower policy interest rates also affected real interest rates, as 
measured by the yield on the 1997 vintage 10-year Treasury Inflation Protected Security 
(TIPS). From 1997-2006, the TIPS yield correlated with the federal funds rate 
approximately 0.84, and appears to fall lock-step with the Fed’s interest rate cutting cycle 
in 2001-2003, falling from just above 4% in 2000 to less than 0% by early 2004. 
Low interest rates also allowed mortgage originators to offer adjustable-rate 
mortgages (ARM) to borrowers with poor credit histories, many of whom borrowed at 
low “teaser” rates that were tied to short-term interest rates. Benjamin Tal found that 
housing prices rose most in markets with higher proportions of exotic mortgage 
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 (Greenspan 2005). Though short-term interest rates can have an effect on other interest rates, this 
relationship is ambiguous. For instance, a monetary expansion (i.e. falling short-term interest rates) could 
cause both lower or higher long-term bond yields, depending on whether market participants view the 
monetary expansion as an effective economic stimulus (and thus an inflation pressure), or a sign of 
continued economic stagnation (thus lowering inflation expectations and bond yields with them). Alan 
Greenspan once called the decoupling of long-term interest rates from short-term rates a “conundrum,” and 
pointed out that long-term interest rates are determined by countless other factors, such as inflation 
expectations, risk tolerance of money managers, and global supply and demand for Treasury bonds, among 
other causes. 
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structures, such as ARMs.
130
 When the FOMC raised interest rates, these teaser interest 
rates rose as well, thus increasing borrowers’ monthly payments and their likelihood of 
default. Anthony Sanders argued that the Fed’s rate tightening cycle was an important 
determinant in the timing of rising defaults after the housing bubble burst, and claimed 




Figure 8: The Federal Funds Rate and Selected Mortgage Rates 
Source: The Federal Reserve 
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Figure 9: The Federal Funds Rate and Real Interest Rates 
Source: The Federal Reserve 
The Fed’s monetary policy also incentivized housing construction. By 2003, in 
the midst of the Fed’s rate cutting cycle, housing starts climbed to a twenty-five year 
high, which economist John Taylor attributed to accommodative monetary policy.
132
 
Using Bayesian vector auto regression techniques, Federal Reserve economists Marek 
Jarociński and Frank Smets concurred with Taylor, and found that monetary policy had a 
“significant effect on housing investment and house prices and that easy monetary policy 
designed to stave off perceived risks of deflation in 2002-2004 has contributed to the 
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Figure 10: The Federal Funds Rate and U.S. Housing Starts 
Source: The Federal Reserve 
The second channel by which monetary policy affected housing demand was via 
other asset prices in the economy, including stock prices. According to Barry 
Eichengreen, lax monetary policy tended to increase equity valuations, which in turn 
made banks more inclined to lend across the economy. Higher share prices also make 
consumers feel wealthier and more willing to spend money on consumption and other 
assets, including homes.
134
 Andrew Smithers found that low short-term interest rates 
created “excessive liquidity” in the loanable funds market, which served as a “major 
transmission mechanism between monetary policy and aggregate demand.”
135
 Harold 
Vogel argued that based on his empirical tests, the Fed’s monetary policy had an 
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appreciable effect on asset prices, observing the following relationship between the 
federal funds rate and asset price bubbles:   
Interest-rate policy levers such as Fed funds rates appear to have some 
effect on the creation and sustainability of bubble conditions. 
Experiments…indicate that bank credit creation begins with decreases in 
non-borrowed reserves that then work through to increases in business 
and/or consumer lending. A plausible theory is thus that once such lending 
exceeds what can be readily absorbed by or used for GDP transactions, the 
excess spills over into incremental demand for shares and/or other 
levereagable financial assets, including real estate and commodities. This 
is entirely consistent with what happened in the Japanese bubble of the 




Some commentators argued that the FOMC implicitly targeted asset prices when 
formulating monetary policy. This notion, colloquially described as the “Greenspan-
Bernanke Put,” held that the Federal Reserve, led by Chairmen Alan Greenspan and later 
Ben Bernanke, cut interest rates to buoy market confidence whenever share valuations 
fell past a certain level.
137
 Anecdotal evidence seems to support the case for the existence 
of the Greenspan (and later Bernanke) put. After every recession in the United States 
since the 1980s, the Federal Reserve cut its target interest rate to spur economic activity. 
While the real economy rebounded during these periods, the financial economy took off 
as well. Though difficult to quantify, the existence of the Greenspan Put helps explain a 
source of moral hazard among equity market investors, many of whom might have 
maintained unrealistic expectations for stock prices because of their belief that the Fed 
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 (Vogel 2010, 224) 
137
 (Goodhart 2009) Greenspan himself dismissed the notion of a Greenspan put, while scholars such as 
Charles Goodhart speculated that Fed officials would not allow asset prices to fall past the point of what 
they deemed logical valuations. Thus, one could expect to see the Fed to cut interest rates if valuations fell 
past a certain point. 
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would intervene in asset markets to protect investors from downside risk, thus “bailing 
out” equity investors should valuations fall below the Fed’s perceived “correct” level.
138
  
The third channel by which monetary policy contributed to the U.S. housing 
bubble was by stabilizing output and unemployment volatility. Throughout the mid-
2000s, the U.S. economy exhibited signs of profound resilience and stability, leading 
some policymakers to hypothesize that the United States was undergoing a 
macroeconomic shift in which economic volatility had been conquered. In 2004, Ben 
Bernanke gave a speech about the decline in macroeconomic volatility in the United 
States since the 1980s, noting that based on most macroeconomic aggregates, including 
the variability of quarterly GDP growth and quarterly inflation, U.S. macroeconomic 
volatility was declining. He termed this development the “Great Moderation” and 
hypothesized three explanations of diminished macroeconomic volatility: ‘structural 
change’, better macroeconomic management, and luck.  
The first view – structural change – held that changing economic institutions, 
smarter inventory management by firms, and a greater sophistication of financial markets 
made the United States economy more resilient to cyclical fluctuations. The second view, 
monetary policy, claimed that sound macroeconomic management by America’s central 
bankers improved the resilience of the economy, since better monetary policy could 
lessen the sensitivity of wage and price functions to external shocks. Chairman Ben 
Bernanke, a proponent of this view, also believed that better monetary policy could 
dampen inflation expectations, which made firms less likely to pass on the costs of 
commodity price shocks to customers, thus insulating the broader economy from these 
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 (Miller, Weller and Zhang 2001) 
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forms of macroeconomic volatility.
139
 The third view, luck, views lower volatility as the 
result of randomness: while reduced macroeconomic volatility might have coincided with 
certain monetary policy choices, there was no causal link between the two.  
Regardless of one’s preferred explanation (in reality, there was some truth to all 
of them before the crisis), macroeconomic volatility had not been vanquished, and the 
2008 crisis debunked many of the myths associated with the Great Moderation. 
Revisiting the Great Moderation thesis after the global financial crisis, it seems like 
Bernanke ignored one of the key reasons for the decline in economy volatility from 1980-
2008, namely the accumulation of debt on the balance sheets of U.S. households. The 
link between debt accumulation and reduced macroeconomic volatility is as follows: 
when the Federal Reserve lowers interest rates in response to an economic shock, 
households and firms add leverage to their balance sheets because of lower funding costs. 
Greater consumer leverage buffers the real economy from the inevitable economic 
reckoning associated with the initial economic shock that caused the Fed to lower interest 
rates in the first place. As a result, each rate loosening cycle added debt onto household 
balance sheets, giving the appearance of lower volatility while sowing fragility realized 
during the 2008 global financial crisis.  
Despite the ex-post debunking of the Great Moderation thesis, this dissertation 
found evidence that from 1970 through 2008, output, inflation, and unemployment 
volatility declined, even if this took place against a backdrop of rising debt to GDP.
140
 
Reduced macroeconomic volatility might have lulled financial market participants into 
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 GDP, unemployment, and inflation volatility were calculated on the basis of the coefficient of variation, 
which is found by taking 3-year trailing standard deviation and dividing it by the 3-year trailing sample 
mean, which allows the researcher to normalize and control for scalar changes in the underlying series.   
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taking more risk, per the Minsky logic of stability begetting fragility over time. Federal 
Reserve Board Vice Chairman Donald Kohn suggested as much in a speech given during 
the height of the global financial crisis: 
In a broader sense, perhaps the underlying cause of the current crisis was 
complacency. With the onset of the ‘Great Moderation’ back in the mid-
1980s, households and firms in the United States and elsewhere have 
enjoyed a long period of reduced output volatility and low and stable 
inflation. These calm conditions may have led many private agents to 




Perhaps the Federal Reserve was too good at satisfying its statutory mandate of stable 
prices and full employment, lulling financial market participants into a false sense of 
security and sowing the seeds for future macroeconomic troubles.  
Figure 11: U.S. Consumer Debt to GDP 1968-2012 
Source: The Federal Reserve 
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Figure 12: GDP Volatility 1970-2012 
Source: U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis, author calculations 
Figure 13: Unemployment Volatility 1970-2012 
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Figure 14: Inflation Volatility 1970-2012 
Source: U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis, author calculations 
Economic Conventions and Monetary Policy 
Given the causal importance of monetary policy to U.S. housing market 
outcomes, this chapter now explains the economic conventions that motivated the Fed’s 
pre-crisis monetary policy. These conventions include how Fed technocrats measured 
inflation in the U.S. economy, the Fed’s fears of repeating Japan’s historical experience 
with deflation, and the FOMC’s widespread belief in the “Greenspan Doctrine” regarding 
central bank posture toward potential asset market imbalances.  
 The Federal Reserve Act of 1913 states that the Federal Reserve is responsible 
for ensuring three goals: maximum employment, stable prices, and moderate long-term 
interest rates. Since the great inflation of the 1970s, the Fed has focused on price stability 
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sustainable growth and low unemployment. While the “price level” is a straightforward 
concept, coming up with an appropriate abstraction of the actual price level is subject to 
the discretion by policy entrepreneurs.
142
  
Consider the case of the CPI, which is an inflation metric compiled by the Bureau 
of Labor Statistics (BLS) that measures the prices of a “representative basket” of goods 
and services across twenty-three thousand retail stores in eighty-seven municipalities in 
the United States.
143
 This representative consumption basket includes food and 
beverages, housing, water and utilities, clothing, transportation, and medical care, among 
other categories. The BLS weights the different components of the market basket to come 
up with an index of prices for the entire economy.  
Housing is the biggest component of the CPI, comprising nearly 42% of the 
consumption basket. The BLS calculates housing inflation based on “owners’ equivalent 
rent,” which the BLS finds by asking survey respondents the following two questions: for 
those who own their own homes, the survey asks, “if someone were to rent your home 
today, how much do you think it would rent for monthly, unfurnished and without 
utilities?” For those who rent their primary residences, the BLS CPI survey asks, “What 
is the rental charge to your [household] for this unit including any extra charges for 
garage and parking facilities? Do not include direct payments by local, state or federal 
agencies. What period of time does this cover?” Based on these questions, it is evident 
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  According to Yash Mehra and Bansi Sawhney, the FOMC’s preferred inflation measure has evolved 
over time, with the Fed originally opting for the GDP deflator measure of inflation through 1988, followed 
by the Consumer Price Index (CPI) through 2000, and thereafter choosing for the personal consumption 
expenditures (PCE) deflator (with an emphasis on so-called “core” PCE inflation) from 2004 onwards. 
(Mehra and Sawhney 2010, 123-124) 
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that the BLS does not measure housing inflation based on actual housing prices per se, 
but on changes in actual and imputed housing rent paid by consumers.
144
 
Figure 15: CPI Weights by Category (2006) 
Source: U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics; *Housing is Owners’ Equivalent Rent 
The effect of using owners’ equivalent rent rather than housing prices in the CPI 
is as follows: during periods of rising housing prices relative to owners’ rent, overall 
inflation rates as measured by the CPI might understate the prevailing inflation rate 
facing consumers, given that almost two thirds of all Americans own their own homes. 
For instance, owners’ equivalent rent increased a scant 3.3% in 2002, while housing 
prices increased 15% over the same period. In 2004, a banner year for homeowners in 
which prices increased nearly 19%, owners’ equivalent rent increased a paltry 2.3%.  
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Based on original CPI data, the Case-Shiller home price index, and 
homeownership rates, it is possible to construct counter-factual CPI measure that better 
accounts for the cost of living facing consumers in the U.S. economy. Doing so shows 
that if the BLS were to have used a weighted value for housing based on the relative 
proportion of homeowners to renters (and otherwise holding all other components of the 
CPI constant in both their weightings and values, see Appendix II), the average annual 
inflation rate between 2001 and 2005 would have been 7.5%. The original value of the 
CPI, using only owners’ equivalent rent, showed an average annual CPI increase of 2.6% 
during the same period.  























1996 2.8% 1.9% 65.3% 2.2% 3.0% 2.7% 
1997 2.6% 5.4% 65.5% 4.4% 2.3% 3.2% 
1998 2.2% 9.1% 66.0% 6.8% 1.6% 3.7% 
1999 2.1% 10.8% 66.7% 8.1% 2.2% 5.1% 
2000 3.4% 14.1% 67.1% 11.1% 3.4% 7.0% 
2001 3.9% 8.9% 67.6% 7.7% 2.8% 4.9% 
2002 2.2% 15.0% 67.9% 11.8% 1.6% 6.6% 
2003 2.4% 13.4% 68.1% 10.9% 2.3% 6.8% 
2004 2.5% 18.7% 68.7% 15.6% 2.7% 9.8% 
2005 3.2% 15.9% 69.2% 13.9% 3.4% 9.5% 
2006 3.7% 0.2% 68.6% 0.4% 3.2% 1.5% 
2007 3.0% -9.8% 68.5% -7.5% 2.8% -3.1% 
2008 3.1% -19.2% 67.9% -14.9% 3.8% -6.3% 
2009 0.4% -2.4% 67.4% -1.9% -0.4% -1.1% 
2010 -0.4% -1.3% 67.2% -1.2% 1.6% 1.1% 
2011 1.3% -4.1% 66.5% -2.9% 3.2% 0.9% 
Source: U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, Standard and Poor’s, U.S. Census Bureau, 
Author calculations 
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 This weighted average was calculated by the following equation: a*(1-c) + b*c, where a = owners’ 
equivalent rent, b = Case-Shiller index value, and c = homeownership rates.  
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Figure 16: Owners' Equivalent Rent vs. Case-Shiller (percentage change YoY) 
Source: U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, Standard and Poor’s 
Figure 17: CPI vs. Modified CPI (Case-Shiller and owners’ equivalent rent, 
proportional to average homeownership rates) 
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In August 2003, just as the housing bubble took off, meeting minutes reveal that 
FOMC members believed that “further disinflation was probable over the year ahead,” 
during which this dissertation’s modified CPI measure increased roughly seven 
percent.
146
 Minutes from the FOMC’s January 2004 meeting show that a majority of 
FOMC members believed that “disinflation appeared to be the most likely prospect” for 
the U.S. economy based on their forecasts of inflation based on the CPI. Over the course 
of 2004, the modified CPI measure increased nearly 10%.
147
 Throughout the inflation of 
the housing bubble, Fed officials affirmed that inflation threats remained subdued based 
on their inflation metrics, while ignoring evidence of home price inflation based on their 
inflation statistics.  
Rent was also used to represent housing prices in the Fed’s other preferred 
measure of inflation, the Personal Consumptions Expenditure (PCE) deflator. In the 
2000s, Chairman Alan Greenspan claimed that the PCE deflator was a better 
approximation of the “real” inflation rate of the economy because it measures the price 
change of a variable basket of goods, rather than the CPI, which uses a fixed basket of 
goods. Note that the PCE deflator is based on the CPI, though the PCE deflator measures 
housing prices on the basis of “rent of nonfarm owner-occupied homes,” which is similar 
to owners’ equivalent rent, since it measures inflation on the basis of rent paid and not 
housing prices. The primary difference between these indicators is that owners’ 
equivalent rent is derived based on the unobserved opportunity cost of foregone rent in an 
owner-occupied home in the CPI, while the PCE deflator measures rent based on actual 
                                                 
146
 (Federal Open Market Committee 2003) 
147
 (Federal Open Market Committee 2004) 
Neil K. Shenai 
93 
rent paid. In both cases, rent is the primary means of representing housing in the Fed’s 
chosen inflation basket. Therefore, the methodological deficiencies that existed with the 
CPI are also present in the construction of the PCE deflator. 
Many Fed officials also expressed their preference for so-called “core” CPI, 
which is the CPI less food and energy prices. According to the Federal Reserve Bank of 
Cleveland, core CPI is a better measure of the price level because food and energy prices 
can cause “fluctuations in the inflation measure that are not characteristic of the inflation 
statistic’s longer-term trend” value.
148
 Core CPI also measures housing inflation based on 
owners’ equivalent rent, so it too is subject to the same blindness as the regular CPI 
measure.  
This counter-factual analysis shows that metric construction could have affected 
the FOMC’s monetary policy. The choice of a specific inflation measure (e.g. between 
one that includes housing prices and one that includes owners’ rent) could cause central 
banks to make different monetary policy choices ceteris paribus, depending on which 
economic metric they employed, which could influence prices not included in officials’ 
inflation metric. In other words, the monetary policy decision made because of a specific 
inflation basket affects the total inflation rate of all commodities in an economy, not just 
those in the basket. Based on the above exercise, it follows that if the Fed used an 
inflation metric that better captured the underlying realities of homeownership in 
America, the likelihood that the FOMC would have raised interest rates given 
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 (Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland n.d.) Of course, others claim that the CPI actually overstates 
inflation because it does not take into account substitution that occurs between commodities when relative 
prices increase (e.g. substituting other paper products when the price of paper towels rises). See: (Reed and 
Rippy 2012, 2-3) 
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appreciating home prices would have increased.
149
 By choosing to measure inflation 
based on owners’ equivalent rent as opposed to actual home prices, the Fed might have 
underestimated the cost of living facing consumers and, as a result, kept interest rates too 
accommodative given prevailing macroeconomic conditions. This is the essence of the 
two-way relationship between metric construction and market outcomes. In this case, the 
first-order decision about what to include in an inflation basket has secondary effects on 
market outcomes, as intermediated by the cognition of central bankers and their short-
term interest rate decisions.  
A second economic convention that motivated the Federal Reserve’s monetary 
policy was the Fed’s fears of the U.S. economy falling into a deflationary spiral, much 
like Japan did in the 1990s. This dissertation found that from 2002-2004, fears of 
deflation loomed large in the minds of the Federal Reserve’s central bankers. As a result, 
FOMC members believed that accommodative monetary policy might have been 
necessary to stave off deflation in the U.S. economy.  
To see why the Fed was so concerned about deflation, it is worth discussing some 
macroeconomic theory. While the Federal Reserve affects nominal short-term interest 
rates, real interest rates are the primary transmission mechanism between monetary 
policy and the real economy. Economist Irving Fisher points out that the real interest rate 
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 At least, the probability of the FOMC raising short-term interest rates would have risen, given the 
overwhelming evidence of housing prices affecting the overall inflation rate. In addition, the point of this 
exercise is not to indict the Fed with hindsight bias and claim that Fed officials ought to have used a 
consumption basket based on home prices instead of rents. On the contrary, there is considerable debate 
about where to draw the line with expanded price indices. Should the Fed include stock and bond prices, in 
addition to housing? Should they target commodity prices? Moreover, if the Fed were to use monetary 
policy to target one specific sector (e.g. residential real estate), they would run the risk of cooling sectors 
that might have been growing at sustainable rates, thereby running the risk of toppling the whole economy 
into recession. The point of this exercise is to show that how the Fed chooses to construct its economic 
metrics has a causal, intervening effect on macroeconomic outcomes in the U.S. economy.  
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is equal to nominal interest rates less the expected inflation rate. Central banks can lower 
nominal interest rates to zero percent, though the lowest real interest rate possible (i.e. the 
most accommodative) is the negative inflation rate. Therefore, if inflation were three per 
cent annually and nominal interest rates were zero, the lower bound of monetary policy 
would be real interest rates of negative three percent. In theory, negative real interest 
rates are a powerful disincentive against saving and push consumers and entrepreneurs to 
borrow and invest, thus spurring real economy activity, though recent history in Japan 
and post-crisis in the United States might cause economists to rethink this proposition.
150
  
 The Fisher relationship highlights the circumstances under which monetary policy 
might be ineffective at spurring growth: with deflation (or more formally, negative 
inflation), real interest rates rise as the price level falls. Left unchecked, the momentum 
of falling prices can lead to a deflationary spiral wherein rising real interest rates depress 
consumption and investment, leading to lower aggregate demand, falling prices and 
further increasing real interest rates, leading to a phenomenon that J.M. Keynes termed a 
“liquidity trap.” Under these conditions, the momentum of falling prices might render 
traditional monetary policy ineffective.
151
  
Fears of repeating Japan’s experience with deflation contributed to the Fed’s pre-
crisis accommodative monetary policy. According to Ben Bernanke, in 2002, the FOMC 
worried that the United States might experience deflation, hitting the lower bound of 
monetary policy and rendering monetary policy ineffective to spurring growth in the U.S. 
economy. Bernanke claimed that at the time, the consensus opinion of the FOMC was 
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that when facing the prospect of deflation, monetary policy should become preemptively 
accommodative to avoid hitting the lower bound of policy interest rates. Bernanke 
summarized this consensus of the FOMC as follows:  
Taking note of the painful experience of Japan, policymakers worried that 
the United States might sink into deflation and that, as one consequence, 
the FOMC’s target interest rate might hit its zero bound, limiting the scope 
for further monetary accommodation. FOMC decisions during [2002-
2004] were informed by a strong consensus among researchers that, when 
faced with the risk of hitting the zero lower bound, policymakers should 
lower interest rates preemptively, thereby reducing the probability of 




In an influential 2002 study, Federal Reserve economists Alan Ahearne, Joseph 
Gagnon, Jane Haltmaier, and Steve Kamin argued that when on the verge of a 
deflationary spiral, both fiscal and monetary stimulus “should go beyond the levels 
conventionally implied by baseline forecasts of future inflation and economic activity.”
153
 
As Frederic Mishkin argues, Ahearne et al.’s findings might have influenced the thinking 
of FOMC members in the early 2000s.
154
 FOMC minutes from 2003 reveal that the Fed 
fixated on the prospect of a Japan-style deflationary trap, which cemented the FOMC’s 
consensus to cut interest rates and keep them low. For instance, at June and December 
2003 FOMC meetings, Fed officials repeatedly mentioned the prospect “pernicious” 
deflation as a reason to keep monetary policy accommodative.
155
 Based off these sources, 
Japan proved a cautionary tale that added incremental justification for the FOMC to keep 
short-term interest rates low, despite the precipitous increase in real estate prices.  
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A third convention that motivated the FOMC’s interest rate policy was the belief, 
professed by Chairman Alan Greenspan and shared by fellow members of the FOMC, 
that it was better for central banks to allow asset price bubbles to run their course and 
deflate on their own momentum rather than to use monetary policy to pop bubbles 
preemptively. This view, known as the “Greenspan Doctrine” explains why the FOMC 
was reluctant to raise interest rates when faced with prima facie evidence of a housing 
bubble.  
In general, there are two schools of thought regarding central bank posture toward 
potential asset market imbalances: the first view holds that monetary policy should lean 
against an inflating asset price bubble by raising interest rates and popping the bubble 
before it grows too large.
156
 The second view, as articulated by Fed Chairman Alan 
Greenspan, holds that it is easier to clean up after a bubble bursts rather than to lean 
against its inflation. This view rests on the assumption that the costs for leaning against a 
bubble with monetary policy are high, whereas the costs of cleaning up a bubble are 
low.
157
 The Greenspan Doctrine traces its roots to a 2002 speech given by Chairman 
Greenspan at the Jackson Hole conference of central bankers in which he claimed that “it 
was very difficult to identify a bubble until after the fact – that is, when bursting 
confirmed its existence” and that “it was far from obvious that bubbles, even if identified 
early, could be pre-empted short of the central bank inducing a substantial contraction in 
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popping bubbles, see: (Posen 2006); Post-crisis, William White argues that it is better for central banks to 
only lean against bubbles backed by unsustainable credit expansions (W. R. White 2009) 
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The Greenspan Doctrine rested on four pillars. First, central bankers faced an 
“identification problem” of discerning the difference between a bubble and a secular shift 
in equilibrium market prices. Deflating a bubble using monetary policy implies that the 
Fed had an information advantage over private markets. According to the rational 
expectations and efficient markets hypothesis, if there were a bubble, financial market 
participants would make trades to restore equilibrium to the market. Why should the 
Fed’s economists, many of whom were strong adherents to neoclassical financial 
economics, believe that they had a unique advantage in identifying bubbles when 
compared with private actors? Second, proponents of the Greenspan Doctrine did not 
believe that raising interest rates could pop bubbles, since market participants already 
expected high returns from buying bubble-inflated securities, such that different 
monetary policy would do little to alter agents’ bubble-level optimism. If an investor 
expects double-digit returns from the bubble asset class, would a marginally higher 
policy interest rate really deter bubble speculation? Third, the Greenspan Doctrine held 
that monetary policy was too blunt of a tool to target asset prices and that the spillover 
effects of trying to target a narrow asset class using broad-based monetary aggregates 
diminished the net benefit of popping a bubble in the first place. After all, monetary 
aggregates affect all prices, not just certain asset classes. Fourth, Fed officials believed 
that attempting to pop a bubble could cause the bubble to burst more severely than had it 
just run its own course, thus violating the central bankers’ Hippocratic Oath to the 
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economy. If private markets are prepared for a looming bubble deflation, then fickle 
monetary policy could make things worse.
159
  
Regardless of the merits of these arguments (and the author believes that they 
might bear reconsideration after the global financial crisis), according to Frederic 
Mishkin, they were popular among senior FOMC central bankers in the mid-2000s. As 
Mishkin concludes, the Greenspan Doctrine “held great sway in the central banking 
world before the crisis” and was “strongly supported by Federal Reserve officials” prior 




What does all this mean for this dissertation’s conventions-based theoretical 
framework put forth in Chapter 2?  
 The first issue is identifying whether the Fed’s inflation metrics, fears of 
deflation, and the “Greenspan Doctrine” qualify as economic conventions. Recall that 
according to J.M. Keynes, economic conventions can take three forms: the past as a guide 
to the future (i.e. ergodicity), expert opinion, and conventional expectations.
161
 The Fed’s 
inflation metrics qualify as economic conventions, as it would be impossible for the Fed 
to make interest rate decisions without first rendering an expert opinion or judgment on 
how best to measure the price level. There is nothing structurally preordained about using 
rent instead of housing prices in a preferred inflation metric. Rather, central bankers must 
make an authoritative judgment about what constitutes the price level and what does not, 
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which in turn serves as a basis of knowledge for their decisions when faced with 
uncertainty about how to operationalize abstract notions like the “price level.” 
The second convention studied by this chapter, the FOMC’s fears of repeating 
Japan’s historical experience with deflation, qualifies as an economic convention, since 
the recency and poignancy of Japan’s monetary policy history loomed large in the minds 
of FOMC members. As Keynes argued, the chief tendency of agents when faced with 
uncertainty is to assume that the “future will resemble the past.”
162
 Much as Keynes 
would have argued, FOMC members considered information in idiosyncratic and 
historically contingent ways. Had the FOMC adopted a broader appraisal of Japan and 
other advanced-industrial states’ monetary policy, they might have viewed 
accommodative monetary policy as a precursor to financial fragility and economic 
stagnation, as the Japan case makes all too clear. With hindsight, the FOMC might have 
“extrapolated too mechanically” from the Japanese case, as Barry Eichengreen put it, and 
their decision to keep short-term interest rates low to stave off deflation might have 
sowed the seeds for “an even greater boom and bust down the road.”
163
 Indeed, 
‘mechanical extrapolation’ is a sine qua non of conventional judgment in the economy. 
The tendency of FOMC officials to extrapolate linearly from Japan’s historical case 
illustrates how Federal Reserve technocrats are subject to the same types of conventional 
biases as market participants. The FOMC’s fixation on avoiding Japan’s past errors 
caused the Fed to adopt a monetary policy posture that paradoxically produced the 
economic malaise their policies were intended to avoid.     
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The third monetary policy rationale studied above, the Greenspan Doctrine, 
qualifies as a convention of expert opinion, since Chairman Greenspan occupied a 
privileged position within the FOMC, and could thus set the discursive boundaries of 
appropriate policy among other voting FOMC members. The Greenspan Doctrine also 
reflected Chairman Greenspan’s tendency to adopt conventions of expert opinion, since 
of the pillars of the Greenspan Doctrine was that the Fed did not maintain an 
informational advantage over private markets in identifying bubbles a priori their 
deflation. When defending the Greenspan Doctrine, Greenspan argued that it was 
difficult for central banks to identify nascent bubbles, invoking information uncertainty 
as a key reason for his Doctrine:  
If equity premiums were redefined to include both the unrealistic part of 
profit projections and the unsustainably low segment of discount factors, 
and if we had associated measures of these concepts, we could employ this 
measure to infer emerging bubbles. That is, if we could substitute realistic 
projections of earnings and dividend growth, perhaps based on structural 
productivity growth and the behavior of the payout ratio, the residual 
equity premium might afford some evidence of a developing bubble. Of 
course, if the central bank had access to this information, so would private 
agents, rendering the development of bubbles highly unlikely.
164
   
Implicit in Greenspan’s defense of the Greenspan Doctrine is his tendency to defer to the 
collective judgment of informationally efficient private markets, exhibiting the natural 
tendency of economic agents to “assume that the existing state of opinion as expressed in 
prices…is based on a correct summing up of future prospects,” as Keynes put it.
165
 So 
not only was the Greenspan Doctrine a convention of expert opinion that guided the 
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FOMC’s behavior, but it was also based on the conventional premise of expert opinion 
regarding the information efficiency of the market.  
 Based on the evidence, is it possible to conclude that the Fed’s economic 
conventions motivated FOMC decision-making in the early 2000s? There is no way to 
know for sure. The evidence marshaled by this dissertation includes speeches by senior 
central bankers, FOMC meeting minutes, and secondary accounts of the Fed’s governing 
ideas in the mid-2000s. This chapter also presented the results of a counter-factual 
analysis that showed how metric construction could influence the market’s perceived 
“prevailing” inflation rate. Underpinning this chapter’s evidentiary standard was an 
assumption that the FOMC practiced good faith in preparing their meeting minutes and 
that secondary source material accurately depicted the prevailing views of key FOMC 
decision-makers ex-ante the global financial crisis. While it is hard to say that 
conventions caused the FOMC’s monetary policy per se,
166
 it is equally difficult to 
account for the fact that had it not been for economic conventions, something else had to 
have driven the FOMC’s decisions. Was it caprice, randomness, or some under-reported 
cause for which their stated conventions served as public justifications? We cannot know 
for certain. What we do know is that that conventions suffice as the most probable 
explanation for the Fed’s interest rate decisions, and that different economic conventions 
would have raised the probability of the Fed making different monetary policy choices, 
ceteris paribus. If headline inflation were 7%, as opposed to more benign level of 2-3%, 
if Japan had not experienced deflation, and if the Greenspan Doctrine advocated for 
central bank hawkishness in the face of potential asset market imbalances rather than 
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ambivalence, the Fed would have been more likely to raise short-term interest rates when 
faced with rapidly appreciating housing prices.
167
  
That said, the Federal Reserve does not deserve mono-causal blame for inflating 
the housing bubble and causing the global financial crisis. After all, the Fed only controls 
short-run interest rates, so even if the Federal Reserve wanted to raise interest rates to pop 
the housing bubble, it is unclear whether they had the means of influencing long-term 
interest rates to do so.
168
 Also, it would be a stretch to hold the Fed responsible for the 
systematic dismantling of America’s Depression and Bretton Woods-era regulatory 
apparatus, most of which stemmed from legislation by the U.S. Congress and other 
bodies over which the Federal Reserve had no regulatory jurisdiction.
169
 The FOMC did 
not control the lending activity of America’s Government-Sponsored Enterprises (GSEs), 
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac – Chairman Greenspan himself testified to Congress about 
the potential consequences of the GSEs’ populist credit expansion.
170
 The Fed did not 
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 (Mehra and Sawhney 2010), (W. R. White 2009), and (Mishkin 2011) 
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 (Wu 2008) Federal Reserve economist Tao Wu identified that long-term interest rates might have 
decoupled from short-term rates in the years preceding the global financial crisis, so if the Fed had raised 
the Federal Funds target to cool the housing bubble, this might not have achieved its intended result. 
Worse, pre-emptively raising interest rates prior to the housing bubble bursting runs the risk of causing the 
rest of the economy, which might be operating at or below potential, to contract as well, essentially causing 
an “elective” economic recession. Wu identified four factors that might have accounted for this conundrum: 
higher foreign official purchases of long-term U.S. Treasury debt, higher demand from pension funds, 
decreases in macroeconomic uncertainty, and lower asset market volatility.  
169
 (Kohn 2008) In a speech during the crisis, Federal Reserve Vice Chairman Donald Kohn openly 
questioned whether the Fed could have reversed the “complacency” of excessive risk taking in the housing 
market and among financial institutions, thus averting the crisis. He answered his rhetorical question 
thusly: “Would a somewhat tighter stance of policy in recent years have reversed this complacency? It 
seems doubtful. Central banks would likely have needed to produce recessions of some consequence in 
order to force agents to reevaluate the costs of taking on risk--an outcome unlikely to improve societal 
welfare. Rather than using the blunt tool of monetary policy to induce prudence, we should examine more 
closely the possibility of using regulation and prudential supervision to address concerns about 
overleveraging and other risk-taking behavior.” That said, many top Fed officials, including Greenspan 
himself, were proponents of financial sector deregulation, to the point where Greenspan felt it necessary to 
recant his prior support for deregulation after the global financial crisis. For more, see: (Andrews 2008) 
170
 (Greenspan 2005) 
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render unrealistically favorable credit ratings on risky ABS, nor does America’s central 
bank control foreign savings and investment decisions, which might have also 
contributed to lower long-term interest rates. Therefore, even if monetary policy did 
influence the housing market, it would be a stretch to pin mono-causal blame for the 
bubble and crisis on the Fed.  
Yet the Fed is not free from blame, insofar as it had non-material recourse to 
contain the housing bubble. Since the Fed is viewed as an authoritative actor in financial 
markets, it could have engaged in so-called “open-mouth operations” to convince markets 
that it would stand ready to pop the housing bubble should prices continue to trend above 
equilibrium.
171
 Such a pronouncement could have changed the market’s expectations 
about future housing price increases, thus dampening the amplitude of the housing bubble 
regardless of short-term interest rates. Alan Greenspan also championed financial market 
deregulation for much of his career, reversing his position after the global financial crisis 
struck and a majority of the damage had been done.
172
 Moreover, the Fed did have some 
regulatory jurisdiction over financial institutions, ignoring their heighted leverage and 
risk-taking prior to the crisis.  
That said, a central bank is only as good as its mandate. The Fed was not legally 
tasked to prick bubbles. Rather, the Fed’s reluctance to use monetary policy to pop the 
housing bubble was not an issue of their mandate per se, but instead related to how Fed 
technocrats came to interpret their mandate from a conventional perspective. In hindsight, 
it is easy to re-assess these conventions and deem them foolish, but America’s central 
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 (Mishkin 2011b, 61) 
172
 (Andrews 2008) 
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bankers were simply victims of the frailty of human cognizance given fundamental 
uncertainty about the future. The conventions employed by Fed technocrats helped them 
make sense of these novel features of the global economy in the face of uncertainty, 
providing decision-making anchors for the FOMC while also sowing the seeds of their 
own invalidity down the road when the global financial crisis struck. 
Conclusion 
Many scholars argue that Federal Reserve’s monetary policy contributed to the 
increase in housing prices and credit boom that culminated in the global financial crisis. 
According their version of events, in response to the deflation of the technology stock 
bubble and September 11 terrorist attacks, the Federal Reserve’s interest rate-setting 
body, the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC), expanded the money supply and 
kept interest rates “too low for too long,” causing a surge in demand for real estate assets 
and boom in housing prices. When housing prices fell, the Fed had no choice but to bail 
out an insolvent financial system that its monetary policy helped to create.
173
 While 
debate over the Fed’s responsibility for the global financial crisis is of tremendous 
academic and policy importance, it is not this dissertation’s primary focus.
 174
  
                                                 
173
 (Gjerstad and Smith 2011, 114-115) 
174
 (Tempelman 2010) The notion that central banks bear responsibility for inflating asset price bubbles 
traces its roots to the economic theory of Ludwig Von Mises and Friedrich Von Hayek. According to these 
Austrian school economists, when central banks set interest rates artificially low, entrepreneurs misread 
market signals and expand the capital supply based off of a flawed cost-benefit analysis, which induces a 
temporary economic expansion that causes to oversupply of capital goods relative to the needs of society. 
Eventually, the boom runs out of momentum and capital prices fall. Financial intermediaries, having 
extended credit based off of inflated collateral values, are left holding large portfolios of devalued assets, 
leading to their insolvency. This Austrian narrative of the crisis has intuitive appeal and seems to describe 
the U.S. economy in the years prior to the global financial crisis. For instance, anti-Fed U.S. Congressman 
Ron Paul is a self-avowed adherent to the Austrian school of economics, and routinely cites Von Mises and 
Hayek in his missives about the Fed’s lack of monetary rectitude. For more, see: (Paul 2011). That said, not 
all economists accept the Austrian depiction of the Fed as the primary driver of the housing bubble and 
ensuing crisis. Defenders of the Fed’s monetary policy, including former Federal Reserve Chairmen Alan 
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 Rather than joining the chorus of scholars seeking to impugn or exonerate the 
Fed for its pre-crisis monetary policy, this dissertation uses the Federal Reserve as a case 
study of the political power of economic ideas, and shows how several economic 
conventions held by the Fed’s senior central bankers determined the Fed’s 
accommodative monetary policy during the mid-2000s. This chapter finds that if Fed 
technocrats employed different economic conventions in the mid-2000s, the U.S. 
economy could have averted the precipitous rise in housing prices that took place from 
2001-2006.  
Still, as Hyman Minsky notes, asset price bubbles are necessary but insufficient 
conditions for systemic financial crises. To understand why the U.S. economy 
experienced an acute banking panic when the housing bubble burst, it is necessary to 
investigate the sources of fragility that pervaded financial markets prior to the global 
financial crisis. Chapter 4 picks up where this chapter leaves off, describing how the 
Fed’s monetary policy caused the U.S. Treasury interest rate term structure to become 
upward sloping, thus creating incentives for firms to engage in term structure arbitrage 
and adopt speculative financing structures prior to the global financial crisis. The chapter 
describes the rise of shadow banking, in which wholesale depositors make loans to 
securitized borrowers via ABCP and repo conduits sponsored by systemically important 
financial institutions. It argues that shadow banking is best understood as a socially 
                                                                                                                                                 
Greenspan and Ben Bernanke, claim that the crisis was the result of financial market deregulation and low 
long-term interest rates, rather than the Federal Reserve’s monetary policy. Greenspan went so far as to 
claim that the Fed had little influence over long-term interest rates in the U.S. economy, identifying this 
decoupling as a “conundrum” for monetary policy. Not everyone agrees with Greenspan’s exculpatory 
view. Stanford University economist John Taylor found empirical evidence that if the Fed raised interest 
rates more aggressively in the mid-2000s, housing prices would not have inflated as precipitously as they 
did. Had the Fed followed a more predictable, “rules based” approach to interest rates in the mid-2000s, the 
U.S. economy could have averted an unsustainable increase in housing prices. For more, see: (B. S. 
Bernanke 2010a), (Thornton 2012), and (Taylor 2007). 
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contingent process, dependent on three types of economic conventions, including pro-
cyclical conventional expectations among shadow banking counterparties, 
institutionalized conventions of expert opinion vis-à-vis bond ratings, and banks’ risk 
management technologies based on assumptions of perpetual asset price ergodicity. The 
institutionalization of these economic conventions into banks and regulators’ risk 
management regime sowed financial fragility ex-ante the global financial crisis, such that 
different economic conventions might have caused different outcomes in the U.S. 
financial system, ceteris paribus.  
  











CHAPTER 4:  
THE RISE OF FRAGILE FINANCE 
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Introduction 
Having described the economic conventions behind the Fed’s accommodative 
monetary policy in Chapter 3, this chapter discusses the rise of America’s fragile 
financial system from 2001-2006 that emerged in tandem with the U.S. housing bubble. It 
describes the mechanics of shadow banking, or off-balance-sheet financial 
intermediation, in which wholesale “depositors” made loans to securitized “borrowers” 
via asset-backed commercial paper (ABCP) and repurchase agreement (repo) conduits. It 
builds on the work of Gary Gorton, Andrew Metrick, Viral Acharya, Matthew 
Richardson, Eric Helleiner, Tobias Adrian, and Hyun Song Shin, among others, who 
argue that shadow banking was analogous to traditional banking.
175
  
This dissertation argues that at its core, the global financial crisis can be 
conceptualized as a generalized banking panic in wholesale funding markets, triggered by 
a fall in home prices and accelerated by the simultaneous failure of investment bank 
Lehman Brothers and insurance giant AIG. On the eve of the crisis, America and 
Europe’s financial institutions stood at the crossroads of a global banking system that fell 
largely outside of the legal and regulatory domain of traditional banking authorities but 
still allocated credit across the global economy. Within this shadow banking system, 
financial institutions took advantage of favorable financing conditions in wholesale 
funding markets, using their proceeds of short-term ABCP and repo borrowing to 
purchase longer-dated (and higher yielding) securitized assets. Going into 2008, 
                                                 
175
 (Gorton and Metrick 2010b), (Acharya and Richardson 2011), (Helleiner 2011), (Adrian and Shin 
2009), and (Shin 2012). A key difference between shadow banking and traditional banking, however, was 
that shadow banking lacked government-sponsored deposit insurance, and was thus susceptible to bank 
runs and contagion effects once collateral prices fell. Shadow banking structures depended on continued 
access to fresh capital to maintain their liquidity and solvency, and thus qualified as speculative finance per 
Minsky’s taxonomy of finance. See: (Minsky 1992, 7-8) and (Minsky 2008, 230-235).  
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America’s banks were over-reliant on short-term financing and under-capitalized relative 
to the risk in their loan portfolios, such that the simultaneous failure of Lehman Brothers 
and bailout of insurance giant American International Group (AIG) tipped a fragile 
financial system into a full-blown bank run on all wholesale funding markets and shadow 
banking conduits. 
This chapter explains how financial institutions ended up presiding over an 
unsecured, under-regulated, and under-capitalized shadow banking system prior to the 
global financial crisis, and how economic conventions fundamentally drove this process. 
These conventions include pro-cyclical conventional expectations about the solvency of 
shadow banking conduits by ABCP and repo counterparties, institutionalized expert 
opinions via bond ratings for measuring the credit risk of ABS, and banks’ risk 
management technologies based on assumptions of ergodicity that made banks vulnerable 
to so-called “tail risks” in their loan portfolios. 
Shadow Banking as Fragile Finance 
Why was the global financial system vulnerable to disruptions in the supply of 
wholesale funding credit when housing prices fell starting in 2007? After all, asset price 
bubbles occur with a reliable degree of regularity in market economies, but they do not 
always cause systemic banking crises. As Hyman Minsky argues, asset market 
imbalances are necessary but insufficient conditions for systemic crises. The presence of 
financial fragility, coupled with a deflating asset price bubble, explains why some 
bubbles produce systemic crises while others deflate benignly. So to understand the U.S. 
economy’s proneness to systemic crisis in 2007, it is necessary to investigate the sources 
of financial fragility that emerged in tandem with the inflating housing bubble from 
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2001-2007. Two developments in particular, including securitization and banks’ reliance 
on wholesale funding, explain the U.S. economy’s vulnerability to systemic financial 
collapse on the eve of the global financial crisis.
176
  
Securitization is the process by which banks pool loans to resell them as a 
tradable security to a third party. The buyer of a securitized asset (or asset-backed 
security, (ABS)) receives the cash flows generated by the loans comprising the original 
asset pool, though they also bear both the interest and credit risk associated with the 
underlying collateral.
177
 Although securitization was invented in the late 1960s, it took 
off in the mid-2000s, with financial institutions pooling and securitizing a wide array of 
different loans into tradable securities, including mortgages, credit card receivables, 
student loans, health club account receivables, auto leases, and movie ticket receipts, 
among other asset classes. From 2002 through 2006, the total market of securitized loans 
rose from roughly $2 trillion to $5 trillion.
178
  
In theory, securitization lowered the barriers to “Pareto optimal” credit 
transactions in the global financial system.
179
 Before the crisis, analysts assumed that 
securitization would spread out the risks associated with a specific asset class to investors 
across the global economy, matching borrowers with different risk profiles to lenders 
                                                 
176
 (Adrian and Shin 2009) 
177
 (Helleiner 2011, 70-71)  
178
 (Gorton 2010, 22 and 39) 
179
 (Helleiner 2011, 70-72). The main exception to this was the securitized debt insured and sponsored by 
America’s Government-Sponsored Enterprises, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, which carried full credit 
guarantees (which themselves were implicitly and, after the financial crisis, explicitly backed by the U.S. 
government). Holders of so-called Agency-backed MBS were exposed to prepayment risk associated with 
changing mortgage interest rates.  
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with commensurate risk appetites.
180
 In practice, rather than serving as financial 
intermediaries in the securitization chain, financial institutions ended up becoming the 
primary investors in ABS. As Viral Acharya and Matthew Richardson find, securitization 
concentrated the risk associated with ABS on banks’ balance sheets, rather than 
dispersing it among investors.
181
 
Why did this happen, especially if the benefit of securitization was to move loans 
off the balance sheets of financial institutions? As it turns out, prior to the global financial 
crisis, banks borrowed in the short-term wholesale funding markets via asset-backed 
commercial paper (ABCP) and repurchase agreements (repo) to fund their purchases of 
ABS. The difference between the cost of borrowing in short-term wholesale funding 
markets and lending via long-term ABS created an incentive for banks to engage in term 
structure arbitrage, capturing rents from the upward-sloping yield curve.
182
  
ABCP is a form of collateralized debt issued for short durations (usually less than 
ninety days). By 2007, U.S. and European commercial banks sponsored some $900 
billion worth of asset-backed commercial paper conduits with full credit guarantees.
183
 
                                                 
180
 See, for example, Alan Greenspan’s defense of derivatives comports with his vision of financial 
sophistication begetting stability. A choice quotation: “the history of the development of [derivatives] 
encourages confidence that many of the newer products will be successfully embraced by the markets.” 
(Greenspan 2005). Emphasis added. 
181
 (Acharya and Richardson 2011, 188)  
182
 (Gorton and Metrick 2010), (Gorton and Metrick 2010b), (Gorton 2010), (Acharya and Richardson 
2011), and (Blyth 2013a). 
183
 (Acharya, Schnabl and Suarez 2013) In addition to issuing ABCP, many financial institutions ended up 
insuring ABCP and repo conduits via liquidity puts. For instance, the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission 
finds that commercial banks like Citigroup issued liquidity puts that provided guarantees to mitigate the 
liquidity risk facing ABCP investors, which subsequently caused the credit rating agencies to issue 
favorable ratings on the ABCP backing risky ABS. As the FCIC finds, banks like Citigroup “did not have 
to hold any capital against such contingencies. Rather, [they were] permitted to use [their] own risk models 
to determine the appropriate capital charge.” Their report goes on to discuss how Citigroup vastly 
underestimated the possibility that their liquidity puts would be triggered, thus leading to their 
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Repo is a form of collateralized borrowing in which a bank sells an asset that it agrees to 
purchase at a future date at a pre-determined price. The percentage difference between 
the future price paid and present price received is the functional equivalent of an interest 
rate on a bank deposit.
184
 The greater the difference between the future and present price 
on a repo transaction, the higher the repo interest rate. The discount to face value of repo 
is known as a ‘haircut’, and the greater the repo haircut facing a bank (i.e. the deeper the 
discount of the present value relative to the repurchase price of a repo transaction), the 
more expensive it is for banks to borrow in repo markets.
185
  
Because ABCP and repo transactions were short-term and collateralized (such 
that in the worst case scenario, a repo counterparty could seize the underlying collateral 
and sell it in the open market in case of default) repo interest rates tended to be several 
percentage points lower than the yields on ABS. Thus, ABCP and repo were attractive 
sources of financing available to financial institutions as long as they posted high quality 
collateral.  
Many authors, such as Gary Gorton, Mark Blyth, and the Financial Crisis Inquiry 
Commission, believe that shadow banking was banking, and can be conceptualized 
analogously to traditional banking.
186
 In shadow banking, “depositors” are the many 
money market mutual funds, institutional investors, and other asset-backed commercial 
paper and repurchase agreement counterparties that “lend” to financial institutions, which 
                                                                                                                                                 
undercapitalization when the ABCP market seized after Lehman Brothers. For more, see: (The Financial 
Crisis Inquiry Commission 2011, 137-138) and (Kacperczyk and Schnabl 2010, 33) 
184
 ([FP – PP]/PP), or the difference between the price the repo counterparty receives in the future (FP) for 
purchasing an asset at its present price (PP). 
185
 (Gorton and Metrick 2010, 263-264)  
186
 See, for example: (Gorton 2010), (Blyth 2013a, 23-24), and (The Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission 
2011, 29-34) 
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in turn “make loans” to different borrowers via ABS. Unlike in traditional banking, 
however, where banks kept minimum reserves and depositors had deposit insurance to 
protect their assets, shadow banking had repo haircuts and collateral to protect 
counterparties from losses. A visualization of this relationship is presented below. Note 
that in this case, shadow banking “depositors” purchase ABCP and repo obligations from 
the S.I.V., which in turn uses its proceeds to purchase ABS. The ultimate bank sponsor 
(i.e. “Bank Co.”) provides credit guarantees to the S.I.V. and gains profits from the 
S.I.V.’s term structure arbitrage.
187
  
Figure 18: A Visualization of Off-Balance Sheet Financial Intermediation 
 
 
Thus is the answer to the original question about how banks accumulated such 
large ABS exposures prior to the global financial crisis. Financial institutions sponsored 
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 (Gorton and Metrick 2010) and (Gorton and Metrick 2010b).  
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structured investment vehicles (SIVs) that borrowed in wholesale funding markets to 
invest in ABS.
188
 Because markets and regulators assumed that SIVs invested in high 
quality collateral sponsored by ostensibly creditworthy financial institutions, SIV 
collateral tended to command the highest ratings from America’s credit rating agencies. 
Favorable bond ratings enabled conservative investment funds, such as money market 
mutual funds, to invest in SIV-sponsored ABCP and repo.
189
 ABCP and repo also 
enabled financial institutions to hypothecate and re-hypothecate their risky collateral and 
increase their leverage to accumulate large exposures to the real estate market during the 
housing boom. For instance, banks could use risky ABS to raise funds in the repo market 
and then reinvest their funds to accumulate more assets. By tapping short-term debt 
markets via ABCP and repo, financial institutions could borrow at near-LIBOR interest 
rates and then invest their proceeds into higher yielding (but more risky) assets.
190
 Repo 
allowed broker-dealers to run leverage ratios thirty to forty times their equity, making 
them vulnerable to minor changes in the face value of their collateral when housing 
prices fell.
191
 As such, leverage was a double-edged sword: it increased banks’ profits 
during the boom years, but was a point of vulnerability during the bust.  
As long as investors were willing to “roll over” banks’ ABCP and repo debt, 
however, SIVs remained liquid. If ABCP and repo investors feared for the solvency of a 
SIV-sponsoring financial institution, or grew dubious of the collateral quality underlying 
                                                 
188
 (M. K. Brunnermeier 2009, 79-80) 
189
 (Johnson and Kwak 2010, 73-85)  
190
 (Gorton and Metrick 2010, 278-280)  
191
 (Blyth 2013a, 25-26) Indeed, when real estate prices fell and collateral prices collapse, banks found it 
difficult to raise liquidity in theretofore-buoyant repo markets, leading them to sell assets en masse, as 
described in the following chapter. 
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their ABCP and repo transaction, they could refuse to roll over the SIVs debt, leading to 
liquidity issues for financial institutions.
192
 Kacperczyk and Schnabl describe this risk as 
follows:  
Most investors in the commercial paper market purchase the paper at 
issuance and hold it until maturity. Hence, there is little trading of 
commercial paper in secondary markets. Instead, many investors 
continuously roll over maturing commercial paper, which means that they 
purchase newly issued commercial paper from the same issuer once their 
holdings of commercial paper mature. As a result, issuers usually 
refinance the repayment of maturing commercial paper with newly issued 
commercial paper. This risk is often called roll-over or liquidity risk. In 




Indeed, counterparties’ refusal to roll over banks’ ABCP and repo was a key transmission 
mechanism of instability between falling collateral prices and liquidity issues for 
financial institutions during the crisis. That said, this risk seemed remote before the crisis. 
Broker-dealers and commercial banks regularly issued and rolled over ABCP and repo to 
purchase long-dated ABS, earning the spread differential between their low cost of 
financing and higher returns from securitized assets.  
Why did ABCP and repo borrowing take off prior to the global financial crisis, 
and how did banks’ increased reliance on ABCP and repo borrowing qualify as 
speculative finance, in the Minsky sense?  
Hyman Minsky believed that firms could choose among three types of financing 
structures, the relative mix of which determined an economy’s proneness to crisis. These 
financing arrangements include hedge, speculative, and Ponzi structures. Hedge finance 
units have income sufficient to cover both the interest and principal of their liabilities. 
                                                 
192
 (Gorton 2010, 13-15)  
193
 (Kacperczyk and Schnabl 2010, 31). Emphasis added.  
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Speculative units have operating income that covers interest and principal payments, but 
must rely on continued access to fresh capital to refinance maturing obligations. Ponzi 
finance units have insufficient operating income to cover both interest and principal, so 
they must use balance sheet cash or sell assets to meet their debt burden.  
If an economy is comprised of hedge financing units, it will be “an equilibrium 
seeking and containing system.” The greater the proportion of speculative and Ponzi 
financing arrangements relative to hedge finance, however, the more likely an economy 
will be a “deviation amplifying system,” or one prone to asset market imbalances and 
fragility. Thus the first theorem of Minsky’s financial instability hypothesis: some 
financing regimes are more stable than others.
194
 Minsky believed that economies 
predominated by hedge financing structures are more robust to instability compared to 
speculative and Ponzi structures, since hedge finance units were “vulnerable only to cost 
escalation or to revenue declines,” as their “balance-sheet payment commitments will not 
be directly affected by developments in financial markets.” Conversely, speculative and 
Ponzi financing arrangements are vulnerable to adverse financial market developments, 
such as credit downgrades, rising interest rates, and flagging investor confidence.
195
  
Hyman Minsky argued that within a robust financial system and given an upward-
sloping interest rate term structure, firms had an incentive to issue short-term debt to 
capture rents associated with the yield differential between short-term and long-term 
interest rates. For this reason, economies with upward-sloping yield curves created 
                                                 
194
 (Minsky 1992, 7-8) 
195
 (Minsky 2008, 232). Emphasis added. In other words, hedge finance units are only vulnerable to product 
market disruptions, whereas speculative and Ponzi finance units are vulnerable to both product market and 
financial market disruptions. 
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endogenous incentives for financial institutions to accumulate risky assets. As Minsky 
describes:  
In a world dominated by hedge finance and in which little value is placed 
on liquidity because it is so plentiful, the interest rate structure yields 
profit opportunities in financing positions in capital assets by using short-
term liquid liabilities…In addition, the interest rate on short-term money-
like liabilities of firms and financial institutions will be lower than on the 
longer-term liabilities used in hedge-financing positions in capital assets. 
There are profit prospects that induce units to engage in speculative 
finance. With such a rate pattern, one can make on the carry by financing 
positions in capital assets by long- and short-term debts, and positions in 
long-term financial assets by short-term, presumably liquid, debts. Hence 
a double set of profit opportunities exists…The existence of a wide 
spectrum of financial instruments by which bankers can raise money 
means that bankers are able to finance capital-asset holdings and 
investment whenever the structure of asset prices and interest rates makes 
it profitable to do so. In a world dominated by hedge finance, profit 
opportunities exist for both borrowing units and banks to shift to a greater 




This selection from Minsky’s theory seems apt to describe the U.S. financial system in 
the early 2000s. Recall from Chapter 3 that after the 2000-2001 recession, the Federal 
Reserve slashed short-term interest rates to one percent, thus causing the interest rate 
term structure to become upward sloping. In such an environment, liquidity was 
“plentiful” and low interest rates on “short-term money-like liabilities” (e.g. ABCP and 
repo) enabled firms to earn “carry” by issuing short-term debt to purchase long-term 
assets. It should not surprise us that banks’ ABCP and repo borrowing took off within 
this robust financing environment. From 2001-2007, combined ABCP and repo 
borrowing rose from roughly $950 billion to $2.4 trillion. 
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 (Minsky 2008, 234-235) 
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Figure 19: U.S. Interest Rate Term Structure (April 15, 2003) 
Source: U.S. Department of Treasury 
Figure 20: U.S. Asset-backed Commercial Paper Outstanding 
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Figure 21: Repo Borrowing by U.S. Broker-Dealers 
Source: The Federal Reserve 
Note that there was nothing inherently fragile about using short-term debt to 
purchase longer-dated, risky assets. Indeed, this is what banks do. As long as ABCP and 
repo counterparties believe that banks’ ABS collateral was information-insensitive, such 
that no actor could gain an unfair competitive advantage based on information asymmetry 
about the quality of ABCP and repo collateral, then investors would continuously roll 
over the maturing liabilities of ABCP and repo conduits.
197
 Even if banks faced a creditor 
strike in the wholesale funding market, provided they had capital reserves sufficient to 
compensate for their capital shortfall, then shadow banking would not carry a substantial 
risk to banks’ micro-prudential solvency.  
                                                 
197
 Gorton describes information-insensitivity thusly: “Repo is essentially depository banking built around 
information-insensitive debt. In a repo transaction, one side of the transaction wants to borrow money and 
the other side wants to save money by ‘depositing’ it somewhere safe. Think of the borrowers as a bank 
and the lender as a depositor, although the lender is another firm, such as a bank, insurance company, 
pension fund, institutional investor, or hedge fund. The depositor receives a bond as collateral for his 
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Yet shadow banking in the mid-2000s was fragile because it was speculative in 
nature, since ABCP and repo conduits required fresh infusions of capital to maintain their 
liquidity. As Minsky argued, speculative finance units need to “roll over” their maturing 
liabilities, even if they can meet their obligations out of their operating income.
198
 Tobias 
Adrian and Hyun Song Shin estimate that by March 2008, Wall Street’s five biggest 
commercial and investment banks rolled over roughly twenty-five percent of their 
balance sheets on an overnight basis.
199
 It was banks’ susceptibility to roll over risk, on 
one hand, along with their undercapitalization, on the other, that made financial 
institutions vulnerable to creditor panics in the wholesale funding markets when housing 
prices fell.  
It is here where economic conventions, and in particular conventional 
expectations, play a decisive role in determining the stability of the shadow banking 
system. Recall that according to Keynes, conventional expectations described the 
tendency of agents to “conform with the behavior of the majority or the average” when 
faced with uncertainty about the future.
200
 Such is the case of counter-party confidence in 
the shadow banking system. As long as a majority of ABCP and repo counterparties 
believes that a sufficient number of fellow counterparties will extend credit to ABCP or 
repo conduits, then they will continue to roll over maturing SIV obligations. If, however, 
ABCP and repo counterparties believed that other counterparties would no longer deem 
SIVs and their sponsors creditworthy, then they might refuse to roll over SIVs’ maturing 
obligations, thus disrupting the supply of credit available to financial institutions and 
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 (Minsky 1992, 7) 
199
 (Adrian and Shin 2009) 
200
 (Keynes 1937a, 214) 




 The causal importance of conventional expectations in 
shadow banking is discussed in the following two chapters. For now, it is worth 
reiterating that in the absence of deposit insurance, favorable conventional expectations 
were critically important to the liquidity of shadow banking conduits and their sponsors.   
Based on this exposition of shadow banking as fragile finance, this chapter now 
describes how shadow banking depended on two sets of economic conventions, including 
institutionalized expert opinions about collateral quality represented by bond ratings, and 
bank-determined capital charges based on ergodic risk models. Throughout the following 
sections, effort is made to specify how bond ratings and banks’ risk models qualified as 
economic conventions and why broader financial stability became predicated upon the 
continued perceived truth-value of these economic conventions ex-ante the global 
financial crisis, such that changes in underlying conventions catalyzed changes in 
financial markets when housing prices fell.   
Bond Ratings and the Creation of Information-Insensitive Debt 
In January 2011, the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission (FCIC) issued a report 
summarizing the results of their investigation of the primary causes of the global 
financial crisis. While there was some dissent among the Commission about the crisis’ 
primary causes, the Commission agreed that the credit rating agencies (CRAs) were 
“essential cogs in the wheel of financial destruction” prior to the crisis. The report began 
with the following statement:    
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The three credit rating agencies were key enablers of the financial 
meltdown. The mortgage-related securities at the heart of the crisis could 
not have been marketed and sold without their seal of approval. Investors 
relied on them, often blindly. In some cases, they were obligated to use 
them, or regulatory capital standards were hinged on them. This crisis 
could not have happened without the rating agencies.
202
 
Post-Keynesian economist James Crotty agreed with the FCIC’s sentiment, and argued 
the following about ratings:  
…the recent global financial boom and crisis might not have occurred if 
perverse incentives had not induced credit rating agencies to give absurdly 
high ratings to illiquid, non-transparent, structured financial products such 
as MBSs, CDOs, and collateralized loan obligations.
203
  
Why did investors “blindly” rely on credit ratings? How did the three independent CRAs 
– Moody’s, Standard and Poor’s, and Fitch – become “key enablers” of America’s real 
estate bubble and credit boom? In addition, what led the FCIC and James Crotty to 
conclude that the CRAs were decisive factors of the unsustainable increase in real estate 
prices and concomitant credit boom, such that their activities were necessary 
preconditions for the global financial crisis? Why did the CRAs face incentives to grant 
“absurdly high ratings” to such in hindsight risky ABS?  
There are no easy answers for these difficult questions. In the following 
paragraphs, effort is made to put the idiosyncratic features of credit ratings into the 
context of this dissertation’s conventions-based theoretical framework. When 
appropriate, background on the CRAs is presented throughout the discussion.   
All credit markets suffer from information asymmetries – in general, borrowers 
know more about their ability to repay than their lenders. In extreme cases, this 
information asymmetry can cause adverse selection problems in financial markets, 
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wherein the least creditworthy borrowers crowd out the most creditworthy, leading to 
foregone Pareto-optimal transactions and market failure.
204
 One way to solve this 
problem is for borrowers to enlist third parties to render independent judgments on their 
creditworthiness, based on the rationale that dispassionate observers lack a vested interest 
in a transaction and can thus be trusted to provide an objective appraisal of a borrower’s 
ability to repay their loans. The big three CRAs, including Moody’s, Standard and 
Poor’s, and their European counterpart, Fitch, provided authoritative opinions on the 
creditworthiness of different borrowers, including sovereign governments, corporations, 
and ABS, to name a few examples. These firms rendered independent judgments about 
the credit quality of various issuers and thus satisfied a mutual need in capital markets: 
creditors valued having third party opinions on the creditworthiness of their borrowers, 
while debtors found that being rated by the CRAs enhanced their ability to raise capital.  
Do credit ratings qualify as economic conventions? Moody’s Investors Service 
defines credit ratings as “credible and independent assessments of credit risk” that 
“contribute to efficiencies in fixed-income markets and other obligations.”
205
 Standard & 
Poor’s (S&P) states that credit ratings are “opinions about relative credit risk” that 
represent independent judgments “about the ability and willingness of an issuer, such as a 
corporation, state or city government, to meet its financial obligations in accordance with 
the terms of those obligations.” Furthermore, S&P claims that credit ratings provide 
information about the “relative likelihood that [a security] may default,” though they 
warn that “ratings should not be viewed as assurances of credit quality or exact measures 
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of the likelihood of default.”
206
 Based on these definitions, credit ratings qualify as 
economic conventions of expert opinion. The widespread use of bond ratings shows that 
market participants and regulators believe that the CRAs have an information advantage 
that allows them to render authoritative judgments about borrowers that is otherwise 
unattainable by the investor public. In this sense, ratings represent agents’ tendency to 
“fall back on the judgment of the rest of the world which is perhaps better informed,” as 
Keynes argued.
207
 As the FCIC found, “many investors, such as some pension funds and 
university endowments, relied on credit ratings because they had neither access to the 
same data as the rating agencies nor the capacity or analytical ability to assess the 
securities they were purchasing.”
208
 The FCIC’s findings comport with Keynes’ depiction 
of conventions in financial markets, specifically that time, resource, and information 
constraints compel agents to employ economic conventions to mitigate uncertainty in 
financial markets, allowing agents to “save [their] faces as rational, economic men” by 




In 1975, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) mandated that bond 
issuers have their securities rated by one of the “nationally recognized statistical rating 
organizations” (or NRSROs, such as S&P, Moody’s and Fitch) when issuing bonds to 
investors.
210
 Around the same time, the rating agencies switched their fee structure from 
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an “investor pay” to an “issuer pay” business model. This change “[opened] the door to 
potential conflicts of interest,” as rating agencies “might shade [their] ratings upward so 
as to keep the issuer happy and forestall the issuer’s taking its rating business to a 
different rating agency,” as William White described it.
211
 This conflict of interest, 
coupled with the law requiring the CRAs to rate ABS, created a toxic mix of incentives 
for CRAs and ABS originators alike. As the FCIC found, these competitive pressures 
incentivized the CRAs to issue unrealistically favorable ratings to ABS issuers. The Final 
Report of the FCIC states the following:  
If an issuer didn’t like a Moody’s rating on a particular deal, it might get a 
better rating from another ratings agency. The agencies were compensated 
only for rated deals – in effect, only for the deals for which their ratings 
were accepted by the issuer. So the pressure came from two directions: in-
house insistence on increasing market share and direct demands from the 




Since the SEC required that ABS be rated by the CRAs, the rating agencies 
became important enablers of mortgage origination and securitization prior to the global 
financial crisis. The SEC set legal limits on the kind of collateralized debt ABCP and 
repo counterparties could purchase, limiting their holdings to top-rated collateral. 
Throughout the 2000s, financial institutions engineered risky financial products designed 
to game the CRAs’ ratings methodology to garner the highest ratings possible for risky 
tranches of debt.
213
 Because ABS received high ratings from the CRAs, many risk-averse 
investors such as money market mutual funds, pension funds, and university endowments 
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could invest in ABCP and repo of conduits, based on the logic that these loans were 
backed by sound collateral.
214
  
As Gary Gorton, Stefan Lewellen, and Andrew Metrick describe, investor 
confidence in shadow banking conduits depended on their belief that the collateral 
backing ABCP and repo was information-insensitive or “immune to adverse selection in 
trading because agents have no desire to acquire private information about the current 
health of the issuer.” Gorton et al. describe information-insensitivity as follows:  
In this context, ‘safe’ means two, related, things. First, the value of the 
bank debt does not change much, a ten dollar check is pretty much always 
worth ten dollars. And, second, because of this it is not susceptible to 
adverse selection when it is used in transactions (traded in markets). That 
is, it does not pay anyone to produce private information about the value 
of the bank debt and speculate on that information.
215
 
Thus, according to Gorton, the ability to mint information-insensitive debt was “socially 




Gorton finds that banking panics (in both traditional and shadow banking 
markets) occur when information-insensitive debt becomes information-sensitive, which 
shakes investors’ faith in banks’ collateral. This is why states, which have a vested 
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interest in financial stability, sponsor deposit insurance, which prevents bank runs by 
ensuring depositors that their deposits will remain information-insensitive, regardless of 
the idiosyncratic credit risks among depository institutions.
217
   
The CRAs played a critical role in enabling the rise of shadow banking by 
allowing financial institutions to mint collateral that, for a time, was viewed as 
information-insensitive debt by ABCP and repo counterparties. For debt to qualify as 
information-insensitive, agents must have faith that it is immune from adverse selection 
problems that emerge due to information asymmetries about the underlying collateral 
quality of the bonds themselves. As Gorton describes:    
Intuitively, informationally-insensitive debt is debt that no one need 
devote a lot of resources to investigating. It is exactly designed to avoid 
that. Just as consumers do not spend a lot of time doing due diligence on 
the bank that is holding the money of someone buying something from 
you, the counterpart amount firms and institutional investors will turn out 
to be collateral, i.e. informationally-insensitive debt. Think of it as like 
electricity. Millions of people turn their lights on and off every day 
without knowing how electricity really works or where it comes from. The 




The CRAs’ ratings gave ABCP and repo counterparties confidence that banks’ collateral 
was information-insensitive.
219
 By providing value anchors about the credit worthiness of 
ABS, bond ratings allowed counterparties to outsource their due diligence on ABS to the 
CRAs. The market’s misplaced faith in the truth-value of bond ratings allowed banks to 
mint information-insensitive debt to use as ABCP and repo collateral, which allowed 
them to profit from the difference between short-term funding costs in the wholesale 
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funding market and returns on risky ABS. Further, Gorton claimed that favorable ratings 
signaled to investors that there was “no real point to doing due diligence because nothing 
will be found out,”
220
 so they “blindly relied on credit ratings as their arbiters of risk.”
221
 
As such, bond ratings filled a valuable market niche by rendering ostensibly independent 
and credible opinions on the information-insensitivity of ABCP and repo ABS collateral 
as institutionalized economic conventions.
222
  
In this way, shadow banking can be understood as a socially contingent process 
enabled by economic conventions, which permitted financial institutions and ABCP and 
repo counterparties to create and invest in information-insensitive, high grade assets to 
take advantage of the interest rate differential between short-term liabilities and long-
term assets. The creation of information-insensitive debt is an inter-subjective process, 
which follows from financial market participants placing faith in certain key economic 
conventions about what qualifies as information-insensitive debt and what does not.  
So if bond ratings qualify as economic conventions, and ratings performed a 
‘socially valuable’ role by allowing financial institutions to manufacture highly rated, 
information-insensitive ABS for shadow banking conduits, why did the CRAs 
underestimate the probability of default of the assets underlying ABS ex-ante the global 
financial crisis? Again, the answer hinges on economic conventions. As Rawi Abdelal 
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and Mark Blyth find, the CRAs’ ratings methodology was based on historical mortgage 
default rates from the worst post-Depression default episode, Texas in the 1980s.
223
 As 
the FCIC found, the “M3 Prime” model used by Moody’s to automate ABS ratings 
assumed that, on average, home prices would increase roughly 4% per year. The FCIC 
also found that the CRAs’ models “put little weight on the possibility [home] prices 
would fall sharply nationwide,” and the CRAs were loath to adjust scenarios “to put 
greater weight on the possibility of a decline,” despite mounting evidence of the 
unsustainability of rising home prices.
224
 The CRAs needed some basis of projecting 
future default rates of residential mortgages, and chose an ergodic measure that 
underestimated the correlation risk of multiple, heterogeneous housing geographies 
collapsing simultaneously. This should not come as a surprise, since Keynes notes that 
asset market participants have a tendency “to substitute for knowledge which is 
unattainable
225
 certain conventions, the chief of which is to assume, contrary to all 
likelihood, that the future will resemble the past.”
226
 When the CRAs rendered their 
credit opinions, they assumed that the future would resemble the past, to disastrous effect 
when housing prices declined beginning in 2006.  
What do ratings tell us about the theoretical framework advanced in Chapter 2, 
which ties convention constitution to market outcomes? There are four implications.   
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instance in 2005, over 40% of Moody’s revenue came from rating ABS. And from 2003 to 2006, Moody’s 
revenue tied to rating ABS rose from $12 million to $91 million.  
224
 (The Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission 2011, 120-121) 
225
 E.g. future default rates on ABS. 
226
 (Keynes 1937b, 13) 
Neil K. Shenai 
131 
First, ratings were an important source of epistemic blindness in markets prior to 
the global financial crisis. Because the CRAs occupied an ontologically privileged 
position in financial markets, where their opinions were codified into laws regulating the 
portfolio allocation decisions of entire classes of investors, many market participants 
assumed that ratings provided an accurate assessment of the probability of default of 
ABS. After all, the CRAs employed the experts who had access to troves of historical 
data, maintained close relationships with ABS originators, and boasted sophisticated risk 
management technologies with the best human resources. Therefore, it was only natural 
for market participants to defer judgment to the CRAs, especially when their record 
seemed so impeccable during the boom years.  
Second, the institutionalization of bond ratings into regulations about the types of 
collateral ABCP and repo investors could hold predicated market stability on the 
continued perceived truth-value of favorable bond ratings. As long as market outcomes 
comported with agents’ convention-given expectations vis-à-vis ratings, markets would 
remain “tranquil” and “calm.” If, however, outcomes diverged from agents’ conventions-
given expectations based on bond ratings, then agents would reappraise their governing 
conventions, thus precipitating change in financial markets. If the “shock” associated 
with a ratings downgrade was pervasive, this could cause market participants to shun, 
say, all of the commercial paper and repo issued by a specific shadow banking entity (i.e. 
an idiosyncratic bank run).
227
 Credit ratings are useful as long as they maintain the 
allegiance of a majority of market participants. This is why credit downgrades in 2007 
and 2008 were such watched events in financial markets. When downgrades occurred, 
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agents had to reappraise their convention-given expectations, altering their decision-
making calculi and leading to different market outcomes.  As Keynes argued, 
downgrades can cause “the practice of calmness and immobility, of certainty and 
security,” to “suddenly” break down.  This is because the conventions underlying ratings 
were based on a “flimsy foundation” that housing prices would never decline nationally.  
Third, credit ratings might have changed the very material fundamentals of 
financial markets that they were meant to reflect. As Donald MacKenzie argues, bond 
ratings were not cameras that passively record events, but were engines of financial 
change.
228
 The logic underpinning this contention is as follows. High ratings for ABS 
provided an allocative decision-making anchor on behalf of both financial institutions 
and ABCP and repo counterparties: all else being equal, highly rated assets were in 
greater demand than lower rated ones. Initially favorable ratings permitted large pools of 
risk-averse capital to invest in highly rated ABS (via ABCP and repo conduits), thus 
driving down credit spreads in the highly rated asset class. Lower risk spreads facilitated 
by high ratings incentivized greater credit extension to the highly rated asset class in the 
short-run, reifying the material creditworthiness that favorable ratings were meant to 
reflect. As Hyun Song Shin found, permissive credit conditions in the shadow banking 
market, via ABCP and repo conduits sponsored by American and European financial 
institutions, added fuel to the fire of the unsustainable increase in real estate prices in the 
U.S. economy from 2001-2007.
229
 While it is difficult to dis-embed rising housing prices 
from the credit extension underpinning them, there is good reason to believe that credit 
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extension contributed to the unsustainable increase in housing prices in the 2000s. The 
empirical challenge we face, not being able to run a controlled experiment holding the 
rest of the global economy as a control variable and changing bond ratings, is showing 
that high ratings caused the credit boom that accompanied the housing bubble. A less 
ambitious (but more plausible) claim is that ratings contributed to both the amplitude and 
periodicity of the housing bubble: during the boom years, high ratings endogenously 
contributed to pro-cyclical capital flows into ABS, but when housing prices fell, 
downgrades precipitated falling collateral prices among financial institutions, thus 
exposing their fragility and vulnerability to investor panics in the shadow banking 
market. Without high ratings, it is hard to imagine a scenario in which so many risk-
averse investors like money market mutual funds would have been legally permitted to 
invest in the risky collateral peddled by America and Europe’s shadow banking conduits. 
For this reason, ratings remain a key story in the driver of asset prices before the global 
financial crisis.  
Fourth, bond ratings’ short-run success as economic conventions might have been 
responsible for sowing long-term structural changes in the economy that undermined 
their usefulness as value anchors in financial markets. Because bond ratings were popular 
prior to the global financial crisis, more capital flowed into highly rated but risky asset 
classes, compounding the momentum of rising prices in the short term but reifying the 
inexorable downturn in prices in the long term. Such is the case of data hysteresis, which 
Post-Keynesians describe as the tendency of the macroeconomy to evolve, such that 
historical outcome generators shift in non-ergodic ways over time.
230
 Paradoxically, 
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perhaps the rise in popularity of ratings in the short term sowed the seeds of their own 
irrelevance in the long term. 
In hindsight, it is tempting to blame money managers for blindly relying on 
ratings to make investment decisions, but prior to the crisis, ratings seemed like good 
indications of the credit quality of financial derivatives. In addition, since triple-A rated 
credit derivatives yielded more than Treasury debt, competitive pressures often forced 
money managers to purchase highly rated risky assets to maintain their edge against 
fellow fund managers. While institutional investors did have the option to ignore ratings, 
they did so at their own bureaucratic peril, since underperforming money managers were 
replaced with those willing to take on more risk during the boom years.  
Yet bond ratings were only one piece of the puzzle of financial fragility in the 
U.S. economy prior to the global financial crisis. If banks had regulatory capital reserves 
sufficient to absorb losses in their mortgage portfolios, then the deflating housing bubble 
might not have necessarily led to financial turmoil. The following section explores banks’ 
pre-crisis undercapitalization, and finds that economic conventions as institutionalized 
into banks’ risk management technologies left banks vulnerable to collapsing asset prices 
when the housing bubble burst.   
Ergodicity and Undercapitalization 
If financial institutions were adequately capitalized when housing prices fell, then 
buyer strikes by ABCP and repo counterparties would not have necessarily led to 
financial instability. As we now know, however, banks were undercapitalized heading 
into the global financial crisis, leading some to seek government support to make up for 
their capital shortfalls. Bank capital inadequacy was thus a key source of fragility ex-ante 
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the global financial crisis, distinct from the liquidity risk associated with shadow banking. 
This chapter now turns its attention to explaining how banks’ risk management 
technologies used to determine regulatory capital charges for risky assets was a causal 
driver of their pre-crisis undercapitalization. This dissertation finds that banks’ risk 
management techniques depended on economic conventions of ergodicity (i.e. assuming 
that future asset price returns would adhere to historical returns), which simultaneously 
made banks appear well capitalized during the bubble years while increasing their 
systemic vulnerability to a collapse in housing prices when realized market outcomes 
belied their convention-given expectations.  
While there is broad agreement among both banks and regulators that financial 
institutions should hold capital reserves in case of losses (and indeed, it is in everyone’s 
interest that they do), there is far less consensus about the “right” amount of regulatory 
capital banks should hold. Banks could be perfectly capitalized, with a 100% capital ratio 
(i.e. zero liabilities), though this would make it impossible for banks to earn revenue. 
Conversely, banks could carry a thin capital cushion as a percentage of their loans 
outstanding, but this could leave them exposed to falling collateral prices should default 
rates rise.
231
 Regulators thus face two challenges when determining banks’ optimum 
amount of regulatory capital: first, there is a natural tension between banks’ desire to hold 
capital while also maximizing profits. When growth is strong and default rates are low, 
banks prefer to hold the minimum capital required under law so they can increase their 
profits by making more loans (or, in the case of shadow banking, buy more securities). 
Therefore, banks’ preference for regulatory capital varies pro-cyclically with changing 
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market conditions. Regulators, on the other hand, prefer that banks reserve capital 
counter-cyclically, to serve as a buffer against losses during downturns.
232
 So banks and 
regulators have divergent interests about optimal amounts of regulatory capital banks 
should hold. Second, banks and regulators face a quantification problem regarding how 
best to determine capital charges commensurate with the risk associated with a given 
loan. In theory, regulatory capital charges should reflect the probability of default of a 
loan. In practice, it is difficult to estimate default rates on securities ex-ante fluctuations 
in the business cycle.  
This dissertation argues that the regulators’ solution to this capital quantification 
problem, letting banks determine their own regulatory capital charges via their internal 
ratings methodology, directly led to banks’ undercapitalization ex-ante the global 
financial crisis. Regulators’ willingness to let banks “risk-weight” capital charges based 
on internal ratings meant that banks’ capitalization became predicated on their ability to 
predict the default risk in their loan portfolios. Since their risk management technologies 
assumed market ergodicity, this left banks systemically vulnerable to non-ergodic 
changes asset prices.   
Risk-weighting ties the capital charge of an asset to its perceived risk of default, 
such that banks reserve less capital for less risky investments and vice versa. Under risk-
weighting, a loan to a start-up company would carry a greater risk-weighted capital 
charge than a loan to a triple A-rated government. While intuitively sensible, risk-
weighting presents banks and regulators with a practical challenge: how best to identify 
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the appropriate level of regulatory capital given imperfect knowledge about borrowers. 
This issue is exacerbated when banks invent new financial products that lack a trading 
history to guide estimates of future default probabilities. And even for products with long 
trading histories, historical default rates might not provide a meaningful guide to future 
default rates, especially if the market’s historical data generating process evolves in non-
ergodic ways (i.e. due to data hysteresis). As Keynes would argue, risk-weighting is 
uncertain because “there is no scientific basis on which to form any calculable probability 
whatsoever” about the appropriate capital charges associated with opaque financial 
instruments.
233
 Of course, agents nevertheless try to derive hypotheses to divine 
calculable probabilities of future default risk, and often rely on ergodic measures to do so, 
but these methods are mere approximations of knowledge because no amount of past 
sampling can give the practitioner certainty about the future.
234
  
 Notwithstanding these caveats, national regulators and financial institutions alike 
began favoring risk-weighted capital requirements by the 1980s. Banks preferred risk-
weighting because it allowed them to make more loans to ostensibly less risky borrowers. 
Regulators also preferred risk-weighting because it provided a way to get banks to count 
their off-balance-sheet loans among their total assets for calculating capital charges. This 
convergence of preferences between bankers and regulators among the G-7 countries 
culminated in the 1988 Basel Accord (i.e. Basel I) by the Basel Committee on Banking 
Supervision, which issued international standards for risk-weighting by classifying five 
risk profiles of bank assets (and thus reduced cross-national idiosyncrasies of risk-
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weighted capital adequacy regimes). Basel I’s risk tranches ranged from assets that 
carried no capital charge, such as cash and loans made to highly rated sovereign 
governments, to assets that carried 100% capital charges (e.g. claims on non-OECD 
governments). Basel I also mandated that banks with international operations hold an 




 Despite some initial success at synchronizing national capital adequacy regimes, 
during the 1990s, regulators realized that Basel I fell short in a number of respects. Risk-
weighing created incentives for banks to engage in “regulatory arbitrage,” or lending 
more to borrowers that required less regulatory capital. Securitization complicated 
matters further, since retained ABS were riskier than their capital charges would suggest. 
By the late 1990s, regulators agreed that something had to be done.
236
 The 2004 Basel II 
agreement was signed in response to these concerns and amended Basel I by changing the 
weighting system used by banks to determine capital charges, creating more latitude for 
national regulators to demand higher capital requirements in excess of international 
standards, and encouraging banks to disclose their risks more transparently.  
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Yet Basel II also constituted a clear break from Basel I insofar as it permitted 
banks to use their own internal ratings to determine the credit risk of loan portfolios, as 
opposed to Basel I’s centrally directed risk weights. This “advanced internal ratings-
based approach” (A-IRB) allowed banks to use their own internal models to gauge 
portfolio risk to determine regulatory capital charges.
237
 Banks preferred A-IRB because 
it allowed them to hold lower levels of regulatory capital and thus make more loans (and 
earn more profit), provided that they had justification on the basis of their internal 
ratings.
238
 From regulators’ perspective, knowing that they knew far less about banks’ 
risks than banks themselves, financial institutions seemed like the ideal arbiters of the 
risks that they faced. Regulators supported A-IRB because they deemed that the 
alternative, ratings from external agencies, were not rigorous and subject to abuse via 
“ratings shopping.” Knowing that member states’ financial institutions could abuse A-
IRB, the Basel Committee placed several eligibility requirements on banks before they 
were allowed to use their own internal ratings for assessing capital charges, based on the 
rationale that banks that met the Basel Committee’s stringent A-IRB prerequisites had a 
vested interest in disclosing their risks to national regulators.  
 The Basel Committee suggested that that banks use the value-at-risk (VaR) 
approach to calculate market risk and determine capital charges for different assets. VaR, 
as its name implies, is a weighted risk measure that looks at historical asset price returns 
to estimate the likelihood of loss in a loan portfolio over a given period.
239
 Even though 
the Basel Committee advocated for VaR in the late 1990s and throughout the 2000s, 
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VaR’s flaws were well known by regulators and banks alike, particularly after the 1998 
failure of hedge fund Long-Term Capital Management (LTCM, see the next chapter). 
VaR was limited by the following factors:   
First, VaR relies on historical price data to project future market prices, which is 
not a realistic assumption because future asset price distributions might not conform to 
their historical range. Second, back testing VaR models was difficult because credit 
events (e.g. defaults and downgrades) rarely occurred in financial markets. Third, VaR 
underestimated correlation risk, or the likelihood of spillover risks across portfolios, 
which we now know was a key driver of the contagion in banking system during the 
height of the crisis. Fourth, VaR underestimated the likelihood of “tail risk” because it 
assumed a normal distribution of historical asset price returns. In reality, asset prices 
might take on so-called “fat tails,” for which the bell curve is ill equipped to describe 
(usually classifying low probability, high impact events as so-called “ten standard 
deviation” occurrences).
240
 For these reasons, VaR ill-equipped at capturing the full range 
of possible futures in financial markets, and was thus a key endogenous driver of banks’ 
underestimation of portfolio risk ex-ante the global financial crisis. As James Crotty 
argues, “reliance on VaR…left banks with woefully inadequate capital reserves when 
[the crisis] broke out.”
241
 While the inadequacy of VaR is well documented by ex-post 
accounts of the crisis, VaR’s flaws reveal a lot how misplaced faith in economic metrics 
based on ergodicity can sow financial fragility. There are three conclusions one can draw 
about VaR for this dissertation’s theoretical framework.  
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First, it turns out that the methodologies used by financial institutions to gauge 
portfolio risk were endogenous drivers of adding cumulatively more risk into America’s 
financial system prior to the global financial crisis. As more banks used VaR, the credit 
available to ostensibly riskless asset classes increased, leading to lower bond spreads, 
greater risk appetites, and broader fragility. VaR also allowed broker-dealers to carry 
thinner capital cushions than a simple approach would suggest. As the FCIC reported, 
VaR helped broker-dealers lower average capital charges by 40% on average.
242
 In 
addition, to the extent that VaR provided banks with an adequate gauge of risk, the 
trading prescriptions suggested by VaR’s computer models often caused banks to 
purchase derivatives that would lower their VaR numbers, but also presented a risk to 
banks if derivatives proved inadequate risk mitigations during crisis. Banks’ derivatives 
exposed them to counterparty risk should their counterparties be unable to meet their 
derivative obligations, which often occurred when many banks purchased the same types 
of hedges from the same company. This is what happened to insurance giant AIG, which 
ended up becoming Wall Street’s de facto insurance provider of last resort for risky ABS 
(see Chapter 6). This example shows that that VaR (and the policy prescriptions 
suggested by VaR, e.g. purchasing CDS insurance on risky ABS) might sow the very 
fragility that it was meant to avoid (e.g. a single, large, systemically important firm 
insuring a majority of the mortgage market). As Abdelal et al. note, “what is rational for 
one bank
243
 can create systemic risk for all banks as asset positions become serially 
correlated.” These authors conclude that “once the entire banking system had loaded up 
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Second, VaR blinded market participants to tail risks in banks’ portfolios. 
Because VaR assumed that asset prices adhered to a normal distribution, individual 
banks’ VaR levels underestimated the expected value of loss in banks’ portfolio. In 
reality, normal distributions based on historical asset price returns were proven 
inapplicable to all market states since, as Mark Blyth surmised, “ten-sigma events 
actually happen nine years apart.”
245
 Blyth further argues that because of VaR, “not only 
did we not see [the global financial crisis] coming, we didn’t see it coming because we 
didn’t think it was possible in the first place.”
246
 The point is not to impugn the 
intellectual progenitors of VaR, nor to fault bank risk managers for their incompetence 
and moral failings like so many other accounts of the crisis.
247
 Rather, this dissertation 
claims that VaR illustrates an important point about the risks of institutionalizing 
economic metrics based on ergodicity (via assumptions of normally distributed asset 
prices based on historical returns) in a non-ergodic world: misplaced faith in ergodic 
measures of market risk blind market participants to non-ergodic shifts in financial 
markets. If a metric is shared, such that the realization of its inapplicability causes agents 
to question the truth-value of their conventions, then agent behavior can change in non-
stochastic ways. 
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Thus the third take-away about VaR: that the widespread acceptance of VaR ex-
ante the global financial crisis meant that VaR was causally imbricated into market 
outcomes, such as instability in VaR could create instability in financial markets. When it 
was revealed to banks that VaR underestimated their portfolio risk, asset managers 
logically liquidated risky assets and purchased safe assets. This individually rational 
behavior proved collectively disastrous, as the correlation risk among disparate markets 
spiked as multiple asset managers attempted to “get liquid” at the same time. VaR 
deserves some of the blame for this phenomenon, insofar as VaR caused multiple 
systemically linked financial institutions to adopt the same risk hedges, thus increasing 
the serial correlation of the entire global banking system, such that a fall in collateral 
prices triggered systemic crisis. As more firms adopted VaR, the stability of the financial 
system became increasingly predicated on the reliability of VaR methodology. For 
instance, Mark Blyth found that during the Asian financial crisis, when the price of short-
dated options rose with volatility as the Asian financial crisis spread, many financial 
institutions sought to reduce their overall VaR numbers and liquidate large portions of 
their portfolios, leading to widening bond spreads across asset classes unrelated to the 
Asian financial crisis. Blyth notes that no material change in the underlying riskiness of 
banks occurred: it was simply the increase in the cost of insurance via equity derivatives 
that caused banks to sell risky assets. In this case, a convention adopted to measure the 
risk of losses actually led to constitutive effects on market outcomes. The point remains 
that VaR risk management techniques, which were created to increase transparency and 
reduce risk in the financial sector, actually did the opposite. 
248
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These three insights show what happens when the stability of the financial system 
depends on an ergodic risk measure based on the assumption of normally distributed 
asset price returns. VaR stands out as an institutionalized metric based on key economic 
conventions that, once adopted, sowed epistemic blindness to the risks in banks’ loan 
portfolios while also making it appear as though banks were well capitalized headed into 
the crisis. Daniel Tarullo finds that the ten largest U.S. banks had risk-weighted capital 
ratios in excess of 10% in 2006, well above the 8% Basel II minimum. Therefore, from 
the standpoint of regulators, banks were well capitalized heading into the global financial 
crisis.
249
 VaR was also an endogenous driver of market outcomes, making it easier for 
banks to extend credit to risky asset classes that, for a time, supported rising prices and 
seemingly justified the favorable risk ratings generated by VaR. On the downside, VaR 
contributed to adverse feedback loops wherein risks were magnified by the fact that since 
many banks used VaR, they all sought to sell the same assets simultaneously, thus 
exacerbating already tumultuous market conditions. As Tarullo explains:  
VaR … create[d] a kind of negative feedback loop that makes the sources 
of risk partly endogenous. That is, where market actors are using similar 
models, an initial decline in the market price of an asset can prompt many 
of these actors more or less simultaneously to sell their holdings of this 
asset in order to minimize their losses or improve their capital position. 
But sales by a significant number of actors will drive the price of the asset 
down further, possibly prompting another round of sell-offs. This self-
reinforcing dynamic can magnify volatility and thus, on net, increase 
risk.
250
   
This insight corroborates what this dissertation’s conventions-based framework says we 
should expect from institutionalized economic metrics based on assumptions of 
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ergodicity: when complex social systems move in non-ergodic ways, and when agents’ 
believe that they occupy a world of ergodicity qua their animating conventions-cum-
metrics, novel surprises can catalyze non-stochastic changes in markets.  
Conclusion 
The purpose of this chapter was two-fold: first, it described the emergence of off-
balance sheet financial intermediation in which systemically important financial 
institutions sponsored asset-backed commercial paper and repurchase agreement conduits 
to borrow in wholesale funding markets to invest in asset-backed securities. This chapter 
argued that this parallel, or “shadow” banking system fell outside of the regulatory 
purview of banking authorities, and its lack of deposit insurance made shadow banking 
conduits vulnerable to bank runs in the wholesale funding markets. This chapter put the 
rise of shadow banking into the context Minsky’s financial instability hypothesis, and 
argued that the particular form of shadow banking that emerged in the U.S. economy 
prior to the global financial crisis was speculative in nature, in the Minsky sense, since 
ABCP and repo conduits relied on fresh infusions of capital to remain liquid.  
Second, this chapter argued that the rise of shadow banking was best understood 
as a function of banks’ accumulation of risky ABS and their capital inadequacy, which 
were both convention-driven phenomena. Bond ratings issued by the credit rating 
agencies served as institutionalized conventions of expert opinion that allowed 
theretofore risk-averse investors like money market mutual funds to invest in the risky 
commercial paper and repo of banks. Banks’ undercapitalization stemmed from the 
norm-cum-law of allowing banks to determine their own capital charges based on their 
internal risk models that assumed market ergodicity when reserving regulatory capital. 
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These developments created a toxic incentive mix for financial institutions, allowing 
them to adopt speculative financing arrangements to capture rents from the inflating 
housing bubble and credit boom. 
Once adopted, these conventions were responsible for two inter-related outcomes 
in financial markets: first, conventions made it easier for banks to extend credit to high 
risk borrowers in mortgage market and created ever-permissive credit conditions that in 
turn justified the rosy convention-given views of banks’ risk. As a result, conventions 
became self-stabilizing, at least in the short run, but also contributed to the amplitude and 
periodicity of the unsustainable increase in housing prices in the U.S. economy from 
2001-2006 in the long run. Second, economic conventions blinded agents to non-routine 
(i.e. non-convention-given) risks in the shadow banking system.   
By early 2007, the stage was set for a full-blown crisis. The following two 
chapters describe the market dynamic that ensued during these tumultuous years in the 
U.S. and global economy. Chapter 5 describes how regulators repeated interventions in 
financial markets created a conventional expectation that regulators would act as liquidity 
providers of last resort in shadow banking markets. This conventional expectation 
prevented funding pressures in wholesale funding markets from metastasizing into a full-
blown banking panic, which is what happened after the near-simultaneous failure of 
investment bank Lehman Brothers and bailout of insurance giant AIG. As such, chapter 6 
argues that regulators’ decision to let Lehman Brothers go bankrupt created convention 
uncertainty regarding regulators’ intentions, thus catalyzing a generalized banking panic 
in wholesale funding markets. Chapter 6 also explains how regulators’ unconditional 
bailouts of the U.S. financial system can be understood as a byproduct of the economic 
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conventions held by senior economic technocrats in the U.S. Federal Reserve and 
Department of the Treasury. It is hypothesized that the bank bailouts were successful 
because they re-established convention equilibrium qua regulators’ liquidity provider of 

























CHAPTER 5:  
REGULATORS AS DE FACTO SHADOW BANKING  
DEPOSIT GUARANTORS 
  











Proposition 4: Information shocks to agents’ convention-given expectations catalyze 
convention uncertainty. 
Proposition 5: Given the prior existence of a fragile financial structure, convention 
uncertainty causes agents to revert to first principles of survival, disrupting the market’s 
normal price mechanism and triggering financial instability. 
Proposition 6: Elite responses to financial market instability are a function of their 
economic conventions used to diagnose a crisis and the conventions held by the market 
about regulators.  
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Introduction 
 Chapters 5 and 6 of this dissertation explore the relationship between the market’s 
conventional expectations and liquidity of shadow banking conduits. Chapter 5 argues 
that regulators’ repeated interventions in financial markets in the decade prior to Lehman 
Brothers’ bankruptcy created a conventional expectation among shadow banking 
counterparties that regulators would serve as liquidity providers of last resort for shadow 
banking conduits. This conventional expectation maintained a tenuous stability in 
financial markets, as bank runs throughout this period were idiosyncratic rather than 
generalized across all commercial paper and repo issuers.  
Chapter 6 hypothesizes that the near-simultaneous bankruptcy of Lehman 
Brothers and bailout of insurance giant American International Group (AIG) negated the 
market’s conventional expectations about regulators, leading to a generalized banking 
panic in the wholesale funding markets and transmitting financial contagion in shadow 
banking conduits to the broader economy. Regulators’ response to the crisis can be 
understood as an attempt to re-establish conventional equilibrium regarding their de facto 
status as liquidity providers of last resort in financial markets by extending the public 
creditworthiness of the Federal government to guarantee private shadow banking 
liabilities.   
LTCM and the Origins of the Weekend Bailout  
The global financial crisis was not without historical precedent. One episode in 
particular – the rise and fall of hedge fund Long-Term Capital Management (LTCM) in 
the 1990s – presaged the regular weekend meetings held at the Federal Reserve Bank of 
New York that took place throughout the global financial crisis. Many of the key players 
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of the LTCM episode, including bank chief executives and senior Fed officials played 
key roles resolving the global financial crisis ten years later. And the problems that 
brought down LTCM, namely exposure to tail risk amplified by excessive leverage 
without sufficient capital reserves, foreshadowed the problems facing America’s financial 
institutions in 2008.   
LTCM signifies a key turning point in regulators’ posture toward systemically 
important financial institutions, as it opened the door for more invasive interventions 
during the global financial crisis. Although the Fed did not risk its own capital to bail out 
LTCM, it arranged the market’s private response to LTCM’s insolvency, revealing its 
willingness to use its privileged market position to cajole private actors into bailout out a 
troubled counterparty in the name of financial stability. LTCM’s bailout, deemed 
successful since it did not put taxpayer dollars at risk and avoided the disorderly 
bankruptcy of the fund, also had a subtle but ultimately more important consequence for 
the market’s conventional expectations about the Fed’s posture on financial instability. 
According to Kevin Dowd, LTCM’s bailout signaled “a major open-ended extension of 
Federal Reserve responsibilities,” which established the market’s belief that “the Fed 
should prevent the failure of large financial firms.”
251
 Fed and Treasury officials would 
repeatedly revisit this issue of moral hazard when deliberating how best to respond to the 
global financial crisis.   
In 1993, a former bond arbitrageur from the investment bank Salomon Brothers, 
John Meriwether, founded Long Term Capital Management (LTCM) with $2.5 billion of 
funds raised from investors worldwide. Meriwether tapped into his deep network of 
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seasoned Wall Street veterans and leading financial economists to recruit LTCM’s 
investment professionals, including numerous Nobel Prize laureates and many of his 
former colleagues at Salomon. LTCM’s primary investment strategy was “fixed income 
arbitrage,” or the simultaneous buying and selling of assets to take advantage of 
momentary price differences across different markets. LTCM’s strategy was not pure 
arbitrage per se; rather, its trades usually involved assets that were nearly identical (such 
as an off-the-run twenty-nine and a half year vintage Treasury bond and its on-the-run, 
thirty-year, counterpart). LTCM based its trading strategy on ergodicity, or the 
assumption that historical price relationships determined long-run equilibrium asset 
prices. When securities prices deviated from their historical trends, LTCM’s traders piled 
into the market, making highly levered bets that asset prices would self-correct back to 
their equilibrium value. When prices normalized, LTCM’s leverage allowed it to earn 
many times its initial investment. At one point, LTCM had a leverage ratio of 
approximately one hundred to one. 
 For the first few years of its existence, LTCM was successful. By 1996, LTCM 
had more assets than two investment banks, Lehman Brothers and Morgan Stanley, and 
was four-times bigger than the world’s next-largest hedge fund. At the end of 1997, 
LTCM’s traders brimmed with confidence in their ability to make above-market returns 
in what they viewed as relatively efficient markets, and their phenomenal growth caused 
Meriwether and his partners to engage in ever-riskier transactions in theretofore under-
traded asset classes, such as merger arbitrage in public equity markets.  
By summer 1998, however, LTCM’s fortunes began to turn. In August 1998, 
Russia defaulted on its debt, which led to a flight to quality in bond markets, causing 
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risky bond prices to fall and Treasury bond prices to rise. LTCM was caught on the 
wrong side of this market stampede: having made levered bets against Treasuries to 
accumulate large holdings of risky bonds, LTCM’s losses ballooned. On August 21 
alone, the firm lost $550 million.
252
 
Figure 22: Relative Performance of $1 invested in LTCM vs. the S&P 500 
Source: Lowenstein, When Genius Failed; Yahoo™ Finance 
Normally, the failure of an unlevered hedge fund does not make waves in 
financial markets. However, because of LTCM’s high leverage ratio, almost every bank 
on Wall Street had exposure to the fund. Regulators feared that if LTCM went bankrupt, 
it could lead to cascading losses and bank runs against LTCM’s counterparties. By 
September 1998, it became clear that LTCM had become a systemic risk to the global 
economy. Fearful of what a disorderly bankruptcy of LTCM might mean for the stability 
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of the global financial system, the Federal Reserve Bank of New York (FRBNY) 
organized a consortium of banks to recapitalize LTCM by employing “moral suasion”
253
 
to convince LTCM’s main creditors that a private sector bailout of LTCM would be 
preferable to a disorderly bankruptcy of the fund.
254
 The bailout consortium infused 
roughly $3.5 billion into LTCM and bought out its remaining assets. When markets 
stabilized, most of LTCM’s counterparties sold their positions for small profits. Since 
then, the episode has been seen as a success for taxpayers, since the Fed did not risk its 
own capital and nevertheless succeeded in avoiding a chaotic unwinding of LTCM.
255
   
 In defense of the Fed’s involvement, Fed Chairman Alan Greenspan echoed the 
language that his successor, Ben Bernanke, would often use to defend the Fed’s bank 
bailouts during the global financial crisis. Greenspan testified to Congress that the Fed 
judged that it was far better for all parties, including LTCM’s creditors and the broader 
economy, to “engender…an orderly resolution rather than let the firm go into disorderly 
fire-sale liquidation following a set of cascading cross defaults.”
256
 New York Fed 
President Richard McDonough affirmed Greenspan’s sentiment, and claimed “the 
American people would suffer in a way that is not appropriate for them to suffer if LTCM 
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[had] failed.” McDonough also conjectured that LTCM would have failed had it not been 
for the Fed’s involvement in orchestrating the bailout consortium.
257
  
 The significance of LTCM, in light of the 2008 financial crisis, cannot be 
overstated. LTCM’s problems – its excessive leverage, its over-reliance on sophisticated 
risk-management technologies like value-at-risk (VaR), its susceptibility to creditor 
panics, and its traders supreme belief in the ergodicity of market prices – were universal 
pathologies exhibited by America’s financial institutions throughout the 2000s. 
Moreover, the Fed’s ad-hoc approach to LTCM foreshadowed the regular weekend 
meetings at the New York Fed that took place throughout fall 2008. 
Although it is impossible to know for certain, many commentators, such as 
economist Tyler Cowen, argued that LTCM’s bailout created the expectation among 
creditors that their imprudent lending to feckless counterparties such as LTCM would be 
rewarded with bailouts. Cowen lamented that “1998 should have been the time to send a 
credible warning that bad loans to overleveraged institutions would mean losses, and that 
neither the Fed nor the Treasury would make these losses good.”
258
 Instead, regulators 
demurred, and fomented the market’s moral hazard that culminated in the 2008 global 
financial crisis ten years after LTCM.  
By organizing LTCM’s creditor-led bailout, the Fed showed that it was willing to 
use its clout among financial institutions to narrate, cajole, and persuade private 
companies to aid its goals of financial market stability. Implicit in their involvement in 
LTCM was the Fed’s belief that the economic costs of inaction (e.g. a domino effect of 
                                                 
257
 (Haubrich 2007) Specifically, McDonough claimed that “in the absence of any involvement by the 
Federal Reserve Bank of New York… Long-Term Capital would have collapsed.” 
258
 (Cowen 2008) 
Neil K. Shenai 
156 
defaults and financial contagion if LTCM were to have failed) exceed the benefits of 
exercising forbearance and allowing markets to clear on their own devices (in a 
“disorderly” fashion, as Greenspan described it). LTCM thus marked the beginning of the 
market’s conventional expectation that the Fed would serve as a liquidity provider of last 
resort in financial markets whenever systemically important financial institutions posed a 
systemic risk to the U.S. financial system.  
Early Signs of Trouble 
Despite the exigency and suspense of LTCM’s bailout in 1998, the episode had 
faded to the recesses of the market’s collective memory eight years later. 2006 was a 
banner year for financial institutions, and again, Wall Street’s risk takers received the 
same praise that the media heaped on John Meriwether and his traders a decade prior. 
Traders and bankers, only a few years removed from school, earned seven-figure 
bonuses, while the real economy enjoyed the fruits of a widespread economic 
expansion.
259
 Yet beneath this placid veneer, several developments were underway that 
would threaten the solvency of the entire U.S. financial system.   
By 2006, signs emerged that the housing market was beginning to cool, while 
rising interest rates caused ARM monthly payments to rise, increasing the likelihood of 
default among the riskiest mortgage holders. By 2007, home prices in the most buoyant 
real estate markets fell, with the hardest hit markets in the so called “sand states” of 
Arizona, California, Florida, and Nevada.
260
 At the start of the fourth quarter 2007, 
subprime mortgage origination fell to $13 billion, down from $75 billion in the second 
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quarter of the same year. CDO origination also fell, from $183 billion in the first quarter 
of 2007, to $47 billion in the fourth quarter. 
Figure 23: Primary CDO Issuance 2004-2008 
 
Source: Asset-Backed Alert 
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Figure 24: 'Sand State' Home prices vs. 20 City Average 
Source: Standard & Poor’s 
With housing prices falling and mortgage default rates rising, the big three CRAs 
downgraded swaths of high grade MBS and CDOs. In July 2007, Moody’s downgraded 
nearly four hundred subprime MBS. Banks booked large mark-to-market write-downs in 
their mortgage portfolios, which caused interest rates to rise in wholesale funding 
markets.
261
 Banks in the U.S. and in Europe booked losses in their ABS portfolios, 
illustrating how shadow banking and securitization was a double-edged sword: in theory, 
it technologies the allocation of capital to its most productive uses; in practice, they 
created a transmission mechanism of financial instability among disparate financial 
geographies.  
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Thus, one of the first victims of the U.S. housing bubble was Germany’s IKB 
Deutsche Industriebank AG, which, like many of its American counterparts, borrowed in 
the ABCP market to finance its purchases of MBS.
262
 As home prices fell and default 
rates rose, IKB’s shadow banking counterparties started to fear IKB’s ABS exposure, 
leading to a run against IKB and causing and IKB’s biggest owner, KfW Bankengruppe, 
to bail out IKB at a considerable loss.  
Figure 25: The Run on IKB 
Source: Yahoo™ Finance 
Other firms in the U.S. faced comparable pressures. In August 2007, Countrywide 
Financial, a mortgage broker, experienced a buyers’ strike in the commercial paper 
market and sold itself to Bank of America. Throughout fall 2007, America’s largest 
financial institutions booked billions of dollars of losses in their mortgage portfolios: 
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Citigroup and Merrill Lynch each lost roughly $24 billion, while Bank of America and 
Morgan Stanley lost nearly $10 billion each. The most exposed financial institutions, 
such as Bear Stearns and Lehman Brothers, saw their credit default swap insurance prices 
rise. At the end of 2007, it cost an investor $176,000 to insure $10 million of Bear 
Stearns’ debt, compared to just $68,000 for the ostensibly less risky Goldman Sachs.
263
 
Risk among financial institutions remained high for the rest of the year. The one-month 
dollar Libor-OIS spread, a common measure of bank counterparty risk, shot up in 
summer 2007 and stayed elevated, as fears about collateral quality caused funding stress 
in interbank lending markets. Even though fixed income market confidence took a hit 
during this period, U.S. equity markets told a different story altogether. In October 2007, 
the Dow Jones Industrial Average reached an all-time high, even as numerous banks 
scrambled to raise capital and interbank funding markets remained stressed.  
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Figure 26: Rising Inter-bank Funding Pressures (2007) 
Source: Bloomberg™ 
Figure 27: U.S. Stock Prices 2004-2007 
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Despite these early signs of financial distress, most regulators seemed to believe 
that the fallout of the deflating housing bubble did not threaten financial stability or the 
real economy. Federal Reserve Chairman Ben Bernanke averred that “the impact on the 
broader economy and financial markets of the problems in the subprime market seems 
likely to be contained.”
264
 Treasury Secretary Hank Paulson echoed Bernanke’s rosy 
view, arguing that “from the standpoint of the overall economy… [The crisis] appears to 
be contained.”
265
 To both Bernanke and Paulson, 2007 marked the beginning of what 
Gary Gorton termed the “subprime” phase of the global financial crisis, during which 
regulators believed that private markets could absorb the mortgage-related losses without 
spillover risks to the global financial system.
266
   
The Bailout and Sale of Bear Stearns 
Events soon belied Bernanke and Paulson’s sanguine view of the crisis when 
investment bank Bear Stearns experienced a shadow banking panic in March 2008. Bear 
Stearns’ issues largely mimicked LTCM’s ten years earlier: Bear Stearns made highly 
levered bets on the U.S. housing market via ABS funded by ABCP and repo through two 
internal hedge funds. When housing prices fell and collateral prices collapsed, Bear 
Stearns’ creditors feared for a total loss of their initial investment. Bear Stearns’ 
counterparties boycotted the firm, demanding greater repo haircuts and higher interest 
rates, leading to a bank run that culminated in Bear Stearns’ sale to J.P. Morgan for $2 a 
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share. The main difference between LTCM and Bear was in the latter case, the Fed risked 
its own capital to backstop a private deal to save a troubled financial institution.  
Like most broker-dealers during the 2000s, Bear Stearns geared its business 
toward capturing capital gains and management fees associated with the booming 
housing market. Mortgage securitization accounted for 45% of Bear Stearns’ revenue, 
and Bear had the second-largest prime brokerage business on Wall Street, which involves 
lending and brokering trades with hedge funds, many of whom traded ABS through Bear. 
Even though it was the smallest of the five biggest investment banks, Bear Stearns was a 
top three underwriter of private label MBS from 2000-2007, and it was a big buyer of 
ABS as well, sponsoring several in-house hedge funds to invest in real estate assets 
financed with short-term borrowing in the ABCP and repo markets. During the boom, 
Bear’s strategy paid off – from 2001-2006, Bear Stearns’ stock price tripled based on 
earnings from securitization fees and capital gains in the real estate market.  
However, by June 2007, with mortgage prices falling, Bear Stearns had to refuse 
redemptions from its High-Grade Structured Credit Strategies Enhanced Leverage Fund, 
which was an internal hedge fund that, as its name implied, invested in highly rated ABS 
financed by short-term borrowing. In July, Bear Stearns liquidated two of its largest 
internal hedge funds. Despite these evasive maneuvers, by November 2007, Bear Stearns 
still had a leverage ratio of thirty-eight to one, with a bulk of its loan portfolio tied up in 
risky ABS.
267
 As the crisis spread, Bear Stearns booked losses on its mortgage holdings, 
which hit the firm’s earnings and further depressed Bear’s stock price. Facing mounting 
losses and downgrades from the rating agencies, Bear scrambled for capital but could not 
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When Moody’s downgraded fifteen Bear Stearns-issued MBS, this news sent 
Bear into a death spiral: market headlines read “Moody’s downgrades Bear Stearns,” 
which, while technically untrue, was enough to ignite a full-blown creditor panic against 
Bear Stearns. Bear’s reliance on short-term borrowing and its large prime brokerage 
business – a business that boosted Bear’s profitability during the boom years – turned 
into points of vulnerability that destroyed the company. Hedge funds stopped trading 
through Bear Stearns, closing their prime brokerage accounts and further exacerbating 
Bear’s dire cash position. ABCP and repo counterparties refused to roll over Bear’s 
maturing obligations, demanding higher repo haircuts and more collateral to continue 
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Figure 28: Bear Stearns' Stock Price 
Source: Factset™  
 
Figure 29: Bear Stearns' Daily Liquidity (February - March 2008) 
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With Bear Stearns entering terminal decline and recognizing that Bear Stearns’ 
disorderly bankruptcy would be a considerable blow to investor confidence in global 
capital markets, the Federal Reserve and Treasury organized another weekend meeting at 
the Federal Reserve Bank of New York to discuss Bear’s future on March 15, 2008. 
Negotiating with rival J.P. Morgan, Bear Stearns agreed to sell itself for $2 a share (a 
figure that was later raised to $10 a share at the behest of Bear Stearns’ board of 
directors). J.P. Morgan financed its purchase with $1.15 billion of its own capital and a 
$28.82 billion loan from the New York Fed in a structure called “Maiden Lane,” 
designed to get the bad assets off Bear’s balance sheet before being sold to J.P. 
Morgan.
270
 Roughly half of Maiden Lane’s thirty billion dollars in capital was used to 
purchase mortgage assets directly from Bear Stearns.
271
  
Table 4: Maiden Lane's Capital Structure 
Assets Liabilities 
Residential Loan Trust Certificates 
Commercial Loan Trust Certificates 
Securities 
Derivatives 
FRBNY Senior Loan  
$28.82 Bn. 
J.P. Morgan Subordinated Loan  
$1.15 Bn. 
Source: Federal Reserve Bank of New York 
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Table 5: Maiden Lane Asset Composition 
Assets 
Asset Composition by Fair Value  
(December 2008, USD billions) 
Agency MBS 13.6 
Non-Agency RMBS 1.8 
Commercial Loans 5.6 
Residential Loans 0.9 
Derivatives 2.5 
Other Investments 3.4 
Cash & Cash Investments 2.5 
Other Assets and Liabilities -4.6 
Source: Federal Reserve Bank of New York 
Although some of the names had changed, the story of Bear was largely the same 
as LTCM: again, the Federal Reserved intervened in financial markets to avoid the 
disorderly bankruptcy of systemically important financial institution. This time, however, 
the Fed used its own funds to finance a private transaction to save a bank. In defending 
the Fed’s bailout of Bear Stearns to Congress, Bernanke echoed Greenspan’s defense of 
LTCM, claiming that “the adverse impact of a [Bear Stearns’] default would not have 
been confined to the financial system but would have been felt broadly in the real 
economy through its effects on asset values and credit availability.”
272
 In both cases, 
Chairmen Greenspan and Bernanke testified that allowing the firms to fail would have 
had significant negative externalities across the financial system and in the real economy. 
Indeed, Bear Stearns and LTCM were too inter-connected to fail, and a disorderly 
bankruptcy of Bear Stearns could have led to tremendous turmoil in global capital 
markets.   
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Bear’s bailout stabilized interbank lending, at least for a while. A popular metric 
of interbank credit risk, the Ted spread, which measures the difference between three-
month dollar LIBOR and the three-month Treasury bill rates, rose to two hundred basis 
points during the Bear Stearns episode, and immediately fell seventy basis points after the 
announcement of Bear’s sale to J.P. Morgan. Investment bank CDS spreads also 
tightened after Bear’s bailout, demonstrating the palliative effect of Fed involvement on 
counterparty fears about the solvency of financial institutions. On the Friday before Bear 
Stearns’ bailout, it cost an investor $300,000 and $240,000 to insure $10 million worth of 
Morgan Stanley and Goldman Sachs’ senior debt, respectively. By the end of May 2008, 
these insurance prices fell to $150,000 and $86,000.
273
  It was the certainty about Bear’s 
solvency, coupled regulators’ commitment to backstopping private deals to save troubled 
financial institutions, that was responsible for the market’s improved confidence in 
systemically important financial institutions.  
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Figure 30: The Ted Spread (February - May 2008) 
Source: Bloomberg™ 
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What is the significance of Bear Stearns for this dissertation’s conventions-based 
theoretical framework on financial instability? There are three takeaways.  
First, the most important consequence of Bear Stearns’ bailout was the 
establishment of an expectation among market participants that the Fed and Treasury 
were willing to go “all the way” to risk taxpayer dollars to avoid a chaotic unwinding of a 
systemically important financial institution. The Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission 
(FCIC) found that “the Bear episode…set a precedent for extraordinary government 
intervention” in financial markets.
274
 Several traders interviewed for this dissertation 
corroborated the FCIC’s findings. A structured credit trader at one of Bear Stearns’ peer 
investment banks claimed that Bear’s bailout created a “precedent” for other financial 
institutions by telling the market that the government would “step in and prop up 
financial institutions” when needed.
275
 According to a currency trader whose New York-
based commercial bank served as a major counterparty to Bear Stearns, Bear’s bailout 
created an “implicit understanding that banks would not go bankrupt.” The currency 
trader also recalled that ABCP and repo traders expressed to him that Bear’s bailout 
convinced them “there was an implicit safety net that large financial institutions would 
not fail.” The trader remarked that in the minds of market participants, Bear Stearns 
became the baseline “worst case scenario for any bank,” and that larger firms, if they 
experienced similar trouble, would receive comparable treatment from regulators.
276
 Alan 
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Greenspan echoed these traders’ views, telling ABC’s This Week talk show that “when 
Bear Stearns was bailed out, it drew a line under that level of firm, implying that anything 
that was larger than that firm was capable of getting federal assistance.”
277
 In the minds 
of ABCP and repo counterparties, the Fed had become, via LTCM and Bear, a de facto 
liquidity provider of last resort in financial markets.  
Second, Bear’s failure highlights the causal importance of stable conventional 
expectations in determining the liquidity of shadow banking conduits. As discussed in the 
preceding chapter, many large, interconnected bank and non-bank financial institutions, 
such as investment banks, commercial banks, insurance companies, among others, 
sponsored “structured investment vehicles” (SIVs) that issued ABCP and repo to finance 
purchases of risky ABS.  SIVs carried two types of risks: credit risk, or the probability of 
defaults in their ABS portfolios, and roll over risk, or the risk that ABCP and repo 
counterparties would demand greater collateral or outright refuse to refinance SIVs’ 
maturing obligations. During the crisis, these risks were inter-related: facing a maturity 
mismatch between short-term liabilities and long-term assets, banks were vulnerable to 
disruptions in the supply of interbank credit triggered by waning investor confidence on 
the back of collapsing collateral values. In the wholesale funding markets, rumors of 
insolvency become self-fulfilling prophecies, wherein the market restricts credit to 
shadow banking conduits based on fears of insolvency, thus creating the very funding 
problem that the market feared in the first place. This self-fulfilling, or reflexive, dynamic 
of market confidence and bank solvency precipitated Bear Stearns’ and sale in March 
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 Bear Stearns’ swift demise shows that using short-term, unsecured liabilities to 
accumulate long-term, risky assets is akin to “picking up nickels in front of a steam 
roller,” insofar as basing banks’ long-term solvency on the caprice of investors left banks 
vulnerable to liquidity risk in the wholesale funding markets.
279
 When Bear’s collateral 
prices fell because of falling home prices and rising mortgage delinquencies, ABCP and 
repo investors demanded higher collateral (in the forms of higher yields and greater repo 
“haircuts”) to roll over Bear’s maturing obligations. When investors denied Bear Stearns 
commercial paper and repo market access, Bear Stearns’ liquidity position deteriorated in 
a matter of days, leading to its failure.
280
  
The speed by which Bear Stearns’ creditors and depositors pulled their funds from 
the company also illustrates an important point about confidence in financial markets. 
Bear Stearns’ failure shows how confidence in financial markets is determined not on an 
atomistic calculation on behalf of a shadow banking counterparty qua debtors, but by the 
market’s conventional expectations regarding second and third-order guesses about 
fellow investors’ intentions. If creditors believe that a borrower will remain liquid and 
that fellow market participants hold similar beliefs, then speculative financing 
arrangements (in the Minsky sense) will remain liquid. If an individual investor believes 
that the rest of the market will continue to roll over maturing ABCP and repo obligations 
of a SIV-sponsoring financial institution, then he too will continue to roll over banks’ 
maturing ABCP and repo. If, on the other hand, an investor believes that fellow market 
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participants believe that a bank might face funding pressures, then it might be rational to 
withdraw funds from shadow banking conduits, even without a material change in the 
ability of SIVs to meet their obligations out of their investment income. Note here how 
the so-called “material fundamentals” of the SIVs’ collateral quality is a secondary 
consideration to whether fellow counterparties will continue rolling over SIV conduit 
liabilities. Bear Stearns built its reputation over decades of steady returns and reliable 
advice to clients. Once the run on the bank was on, and once market confidence yielded 
to investor fears over Bear Stearns’ insolvency, it was only a matter of days before Bear 
Stearns ran out of cash. 
Third, Bear’s failure also illustrates an important point about credit ratings as both 
enablers of pro-cyclical credit creation and triggers of financial distress. This dissertation 
argues that bond ratings represent institutionalized conventions of expert opinion that 
provide investors with a common benchmark of comparing risk across many issuers. In 
theory, ratings were passive reflections of the likelihood of default of securities, such that 
the probability of default of a triple-A rated municipal bond issuer was the same as a 
triple-A rated mortgage-backed security. In practice, ratings were endogenous drivers of 
outcomes in financial markets, rather than passive abstractions of assets’ material 
fundamentals.  
Consider how ratings became amplifiers of pro-cyclical capital flows into ABS 
prior to global financial crisis. High ratings for ABS had a constitutive effect on 
securities prices by allowing risk-averse pools of capital to invest in highly-rated, higher-
yielding asset classes via ABCP and repo conduits. Since many money market mutual 
funds were legally prohibited from investing in ABCP and repos that were backed by 
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risky collateral, high ratings allowed financial institutions to tap into a deep reservoir of 
risk-averse capital to finance their purchases of risky assets via SIV conduits. Likewise, 
banks’ access to these wholesale funding markets (enabled by high ratings for their SIV 
collateral) led to higher demand for ABS and lower ABS yields, thus validating the 
perceived truth-value of ratings. In the short run, high ratings were self-stabilizing and 
reified the very creditworthiness that they were meant to reflect. Favorable bond ratings 
also sowed financial fragility that ended up rendering large swaths of the global financial 
system insolvent when housing prices fell. Also, many financial institutions used high 
ratings to justify their thin capital cushions to regulators, so high ratings allowed banks to 
make more loans, further fueling the credit availability in risky asset classes. To 
paraphrase Donald Mackenzie, ratings became “engines” that “drove” market prices, 
rather than being passive reflections of securities’ underlying value. This is the essence of 
how economic conventions stabilize markets, where convention institutionalization leads 
to initial positive feedback, thereby legitimizing the perceived truth-value of economic 
conventions in the short term.
281
  
Even though institutionalized conventions lead to self-stabilizing market 
outcomes in the short run, bond ratings’ increased institutionalization also predicated 
broader market stability on the continued reliability of ratings as ultimate arbiters of 
value in financial markets. Bear Stearns benefitted from high mortgage bond ratings and 
the ability to set their own internal ratings for capital adequacy during the boom years, 
but suffered when the rating agencies downgraded the MBS held on their balance sheet 
during the crash. Moody’s decision to downgrade several Bear Stearns-issued MBS sent 
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the firm into terminal decline, leading to its sale to J.P. Morgan. Ratings can thus be seen 
as both an amplifier of pro-cyclical capital flows into ABS and a trigger of financial 
market instability via downgrades. The institutionalization of ratings into investors’ 
decision-making calculi led bond ratings themselves to become causally imbricated into 
market outcomes, so when rating agencies downgraded Bear Stearns’ ABS, Bear Stearns’ 
counterparties refused to roll over Bear’s maturing ABCP and repo, thus precipitating the 
bank run that caused Bear’s bailout and sale to J.P. Morgan. Bear Stearns illustrates that 
ratings are endogenous drivers of material change in financial markets, such that a high 
rating on a bond sets the market’s opinion on that bond by providing a conventional, 
inter-subjective anchor of the security’s value.
282
  
Nationalizing Fannie and Freddie 
Summer 2008 provided a brief respite from the spring’s turmoil, as concerns 
about bank solvency ebbed, financial institutions’ CDS spreads narrowed, and America’s 
fourteen biggest financial institutions raised roughly $140 billion in fresh capital. On 
March 27, 2008, the Federal Reserve created the Term Securities Lending Facility 
(TSLF), which allowed broker dealers and commercial banks exchange their Agency debt 
for U.S. Treasury bonds at par value. The Fed would later revise the terms of the TSLF, 
accepting all triple-A rated private label ABS. They also created the Primary Dealer 
Credit Facility (PDCF) to lend cash to primary dealers at interest rates comparable to 
those paid by commercial banks to borrow from the Fed’s discount window. These 
programs provided banks with a liquidity lifeline should markets deny them access to 
fresh capital. Despite banks’ initial enthusiasm for the TSLF and PDCF in the wake of 
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Bear Stearns, their use of these programs “ceased completely” by late July, according to 
the FCIC. Even though the Fed offered banks favorable terms via the TSLF and PCDF, 
banks refrained from using them out of fear that accepting the Fed’s capital would be 
construed as a sign of weakness by their counterparties, thus eroding the market’s 
confidence in their solvency.
283
  
While Bear’s sale to J.P. Morgan and the Fed’s emergency lending programs were 
successful in restoring confidence to financial institutions, signs of stress persisted in 
interbank funding markets, where the Ted spread remained elevated at one hundred basis 
points, which was well above its pre-crisis average of thirty basis points. Additionally, 
the Federal Housing Agencies, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, saw their stock prices 
decline throughout the summer 2008. Fed officials and regulators knew that the Agencies 
had little room to maneuver when it came to falling collateral prices, and the GSEs’ 
primary regulator, James B. Lockhart, testified that the market’s declining confidence in 
the GSEs had the potential to induce a “self-fulfilling credit crisis” against the companies.  
Throughout summer 2008, with mortgage prices falling, defaults rising, and the 
Agencies writing down large swaths of their mortgage portfolio every quarter, confidence 
in the two companies reached new lows. In the first half of 2007, the cost of insuring 
Freddie Mac’s debt was identical to the cost of insuring U.S. government debt at the 
same maturity, reflecting the market’s view that the GSEs’ debt was tantamount to the 
U.S. government’s. As fears mounted throughout 2007 and into 2008, however, the 
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spread between Freddie Mac and U.S. Treasury’s CDS contracts rose to seventy-five 
basis points by summer 2008.
284
  
Figure 32: The GSEs' Stock Prices (2006-2008) 
Source: Yahoo™ Finance 
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Figure 33: Credit Risks at Freddie Mac 
Source: Bloomberg™ 
Wanting to make the government’s commitment to the companies clear, Treasury 
Secretary Paulson requested and was granted the right by the U.S. Congress to inject 
capital in the GSEs and, if necessary, nationalize the nominally private corporations in 
July 2008.
285
 The Housing and Economic Recovery Act (HERA) provided Paulson with a 
self-described “bazooka” of financial firepower, authorizing the Treasury to inject capital 
into the GSEs and giving the Federal Housing Financing Agency (FHFA) the authority to 
place the companies into government conservatorship if necessary.
286
 To alleviate the 
firms’ funding pressures in repo markets, the Fed agreed to provide emergency, short-
term liquidity to the Agencies. Paulson believed that HERA and his financial bazooka 
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would provide a boon to market confidence, thus obviating the need to use his new 
authority as Treasury Secretary to save the firms.
287
  
Despite the Treasury Secretary’s leeway to do what he saw fit to manage the 
companies, the GSEs’ stock prices continued to plummet throughout the summer. By the 
third quarter 2008, Fannie and Freddie had losses totaling nearly $50 billion. Foreign 
central banks stopped purchasing GSE securities, while the spread between the GSEs’ 
preferred stock and Treasuries increased roughly four-fold from June through August. 
Facing falling share prices, rising borrowing costs, and rising delinquency rates in their 
mortgage portfolios, the housing Agencies turned to the Federal government for help. In 
August 2008, Fannie Mae told the Treasury and the FHFA that it had no way of raising 
private capital to shore its capital base, given its mounting losses. Paulson and Lockhart, 
along with their colleagues at the Federal Reserve, decided to place the housing Agencies 
into government conservatorship on September 7, 2008, eight days before Lehman 
Brothers’ bankruptcy. 
When announcing the decision, Treasury Secretary Hank Paulson assured reporters 
that he did not make this decision lightly. Paulson argued that Fannie and Freddie were so 
interwoven and systemically important that a failure of the firms would be a catastrophe 
for financial market stability. Paulson claimed the following:  
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac are so large and so interwoven in our 
financial system that a failure of either of them would cause great turmoil 
in our financial markets here at home and around the globe. This turmoil 
would directly and negatively impact household wealth: from family 
budgets, to home values, to savings for college and retirement. A failure 
would affect the ability of Americans to get home loans, auto loans and 
other consumer credit and business finance. And a failure would be 
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harmful to economic growth and job creation. That is why we have taken 
these actions today. 
To Paulson, nationalizing the companies was a bitter pill to swallow. The Agencies did 
not become over-levered financial behemoths during his two year reign as Treasury 
secretary, nor did nationalizing the companies comport with Paulson’s ideology that was, 
in theory, pro-free market and Republican.
288
  
Still, when faced with the choice between a disorderly unwinding of a 
systemically important financial institution and a bailout, Fed and Treasury officials 
blinked, thus reinforcing the conventional expectation set by Bear that the Federal 
government would serve as liquidity providers of last resort to troubled financial 
institutions. Former Federal Reserve Bank of New York President (and later Treasury 
Secretary) Timothy Geithner acknowledged as much when he told the FCIC that the 
housing Agencies were large sources of moral hazard in financial markets – a charge 




This chapter argued the Fed and Treasury’s repeated interventions in financial 
markets, including on behalf of hedge fund Long-Term Capital Management in 1998, 
investment bank Bear Stearns, and the federal housing Agencies, Fannie Mae and Freddie 
Mac in 2008, created a conventional expectation in financial markets that regulators 
would serve as liquidity providers of last resort in wholesale funding markets. Although 
some firms became the victims of self-fulfilling credit crises, ABCP and repo 
counterparty fears remained idiosyncratically isolated to specific institutions during this 
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period. Generalized contagion did not occur during these episodes because regulators 
intervened and eased credit conditions in interbank lending markets whenever a 
systemically important institution was on the brink of disorderly bankruptcy, thus 
preventing full-on bank runs against all ABCP and repo borrowers in the economy. As 
long as the market maintained confidence in this conventional expectation, the likelihood 
of system-wide bank runs in the wholesale funding markets remained low.  
Even so, this convention became predicated upon the willingness of regulators to 
backstop troubled financial institutions. If this convention were to fail, as it did following 
Lehman Brothers’ bankruptcy, then markets could become unstable. The following 
chapter presents a theoretically informed understanding about how regulators’ decision to 
let Lehman Brothers fail initiated a period of convention uncertainty and thus financial 
instability in markets. It argues that Lehman’s failure can be conceptualized as a non-
routine deviation from agents’ convention-given expectations about regulators’ 
willingness to provide de facto deposit insurance to shadow banking conduits. The 
evisceration of this conventional expectation initiated a period of convention uncertainty 
in financial markets, leading to acute financial instability and adverse selection problems 
in financial markets.  
  











CHAPTER 6:  
CONVENTION UNCERTAINTY, INSTABILITY,  
AND INTERVENTION 
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Introduction 
According to the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission, Monday, September 15, 
2008 “marked the beginning of the worst market disruption in postwar American 
history.” Within twenty-four hours, Lehman Brothers declared bankruptcy, Bank of 
America consummated a shotgun takeover of investment bank Merrill Lynch, and 
regulators risked billions of dollars of taxpayer funds to rescue insurance giant American 
International Group (AIG). ABCP and repo counterparties refused to roll over financial 
institutions’ maturing short-term liabilities, leading to a “run on the bank” scenario in 
which “the entire investment banking business model came under siege,” as described by 
Morgan Stanley’s then-Chief Executive John Mack.
290
  
The market’s reaction to the failure of Lehman Brothers was nothing short of 
catastrophic. In the wholesale funding market, investors withdrew their capital from 
ABCP and repo conduits to purchase safe havens like short-run U.S. Treasury securities. 
Financial institutions rationed credit and sold entire portfolios of risky assets en masse to 
meet collateral calls. Liquidity conditions in derivatives markets suffered, with investors 
facing wider bid-ask spreads, asset price volatility, and collapsing prices. Some markets 
did not trade at all.  
Most analysts agree that the global financial crisis took an ominous turn after the 
failure of Lehman Brothers. But what explains this sudden onset of full-blown financial 
panic? What made the first thirteen months of the crisis so different from markets after 
Lehman? How did Lehman’s bankruptcy alter agents’ conventional expectations about 
regulators’ lender of last resort function in shadow banking markets? What was the 
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relationship between convention uncertainty and financial instability? And what role did 
economic conventions play in setting the bounds on elite intervention in the economy 
when faced with bank runs in the commercial paper and repo markets?   
This chapter presents theoretically informed answers to the above questions. It 
argues that Lehman Brothers’ bankruptcy and subsequent financial fallout took market 
participants by surprise. Lehman Brothers’ bankruptcy eviscerated the market’s 
conventional expectation that regulators would serve as liquidity providers of last resort 
in wholesale funding markets. When Lehman Brothers went bankrupt, financial market 
participants pulled their funds from ABCP and repo conduits and purchased short-term 
risk-free securities, initiating a bank run in the commercial paper and repo markets. Vis-
à-vis this dissertation’s theoretical framework, market perceptions of regulators’ 
ambivalence toward saving troubled financial institutions catalyzed acute convention 
uncertainty and thus instability in financial markets.   
Letting Lehman Fail 
Immediately after the failure of Bear Stearns in March 2008, regulators viewed 
investment bank Lehman Brothers as the “next big worry” facing financial markets.
291
 
Lehman Brothers, much like Bear Stearns, geared its business toward capturing rents 
from the inflating housing bubble and credit boom, and presided over the entire value 
chain of mortgage origination and securitization. Lehman owned several retail mortgage 
brokers, earned fees for securitizing Agency and private label mortgage-backed securities 
(MBS), and was a large investor in securitized assets via off-balance sheet vehicles.   
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In 2007, while the rest of Wall Street was scaling back their ABS exposure, 
Lehman Brothers doubled down on real estate. In October 2007, Lehman purchased 
Archstone Smith, a firm that owned and leased some 90,000 apartments across the United 
States. Later that year, Lehman adopted a “countercyclical growth strategy” and directed 
its traders to accumulate more exposure to the mortgage market. In the eyes of Lehman’s 
senior management, the firm was changing its business model from the “moving 
business,” of brokering trades for third parties, to the “storage business,” by retaining 
swaths of ABS in their mortgage portfolio. Lehman’s mortgage holdings ballooned from 
$67 billion in 2006 to $111 billion by the end of 2007.
292
  
Yet as 2008 wore on, markets grew skittish about Lehman Brothers’ mortgage 
exposure, demanding higher premia to insure Lehman’s debt compared to its peer 
institutions. Investors questioned whether Lehman Brothers accurately valued its real 
estate investments. Lehman claimed that it had capital sufficient to cover any potential 
losses, though many investors, including activist shareholder David Einhorn, claimed that 
Lehman’s “fair value” calculations of their mortgage assets were not realistic. Einhorn 
told his investors that “there [was] good reason to question Lehman’s fair value 
calculations” and that “greater transparency” of Lehman’s mortgage holdings would “not 
inspire market confidence.” 
Facing uncertainty over Lehman’s mortgage exposure, investors feared for the 
worst, demanding more collateral to continue rolling over Lehman’s maturing ABCP and 
repo obligations. Because Lehman depended on short-term borrowing to finance its long-
term assets, regulators knew that Lehman’s fortunes hinged on the confidence of its 
                                                 
292
 (The Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission 2011, 176-177) 
Neil K. Shenai 
186 
counterparties. The FCIC found that when “money market [mutual] funds, hedge funds, 
and investment banks believed Lehman’s assets were worth less than Lehman’s 
valuations, they would withdraw funds, demand more collateral, and curtail lending.” As 
a result, withdrawn short-term credit lines “could force Lehman to sell its assets at fire-
sale prices, wiping out capital and liquidity virtually overnight,” since Bear Stearns 
“proved it could happen.” Lehman’s reluctance to revalue its mortgage assets and take 
credit write-downs while also refusing to reduce its reliance on short-term funding and 
raise capital proved toxic to Lehman’s credibility and ultimately precipitated the firm’s 
bankruptcy. 
In June 2008, Lehman’s trading partners demanded higher collateral to trade with 
the firm.
293
 The cost of insuring Lehman Brothers’ debt rose from approximately 160 
basis points in May 2008 to 350 basis points by mid-August. That summer, Lehman 
Brothers’ C.E.O., Richard “Dick” Fuld, requested that the Fed allow Lehman Brothers to 
become a bank holding company to gain access to the Fed’s discount window. However 
worried he might have been about Lehman Brothers, then-Federal Reserve Bank of New 
York President Timothy Geithner dismissed Fuld’s request as “gimmicky,” even though 
one week after Lehman’s bankruptcy, he afforded Morgan Stanley and Goldman Sachs 
this same privilege. Under pressure to raise capital and reassure investors, Dick Fuld 
sought a deal to shore up Lehman’s capital base, but could not agree on a fair valuation of 
the firm with Lehman’s suitors. After news broke that Lehman’s deal talks with Korea 
Development Bank soured, Lehman’s stock price crashed 55% to $8 a share - a far cry 
from its pre-crisis peak above $80 in 2007. News of the failed talks caused Lehman’s 
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creditors to demand more collateral from the firm, further depleting Lehman’s dwindling 
cash reserves. On the Wednesday before its bankruptcy, Lehman Brothers announced a 
$3.9 billion loss, and money market mutual funds like Fidelity Investments pulled their 
capital from the firm.
294
 According to Lehman Brothers’ bankruptcy estate, Lehman 
ended up posting $3.6 billion in collateral with J.P. Morgan in under the threat of 
withheld repo financing just days before its bankruptcy. Entering the weekend of 
September 13-14, 2008, regulators knew that if they could not find a buyer for Lehman 
that weekend, the firm would not have enough cash to finance its operations by the time 
Asian markets opened early Monday morning.
295
  
Figure 34: Lehman Brothers' Share Price 
Source: FactSet™  
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 By the Friday, September 12, just days before Lehman Brothers’ bankruptcy, Fidelity had reduced its 
Lehman repo exposure from $12 billion to $2 billion.  
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Figure 35: Lehman Brothers’ CDS Price 
Source: Bloomberg™  
To avoid a disorderly bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers, on Friday, September 12, 
2008, Treasury Secretary Hank Paulson summoned the heads of America’s biggest 
financial institutions to the Federal Reserve Bank of New York to discuss a plan to save 
the firm. Going into what is known as the “Lehman weekend,” regulators believed that 
Bank of America was Lehman’s most logical suitor. However, Merrill Lynch’s C.E.O., 
John Thain, had plans of his own. Knowing that Merrill Lynch was “next in line” should 
Lehman Brothers go under, he positioned his firm as Bank of America’s ultimate 
takeover target, selling the whole firm, including its highly coveted retail brokerage 
business, for forty billion dollars’ worth of Bank of America common stock. In doing so, 
the transaction dashed Lehman’s hopes of being purchased by Bank of America.  
Throughout the weekend deliberations, Paulson maintained that there would be no 
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Cromwell bankruptcy attorney H. Rodgin Cohen, viewed Paulson’s edicts as mere 
posturing. According to Cohen, several bank chiefs believed that regulators were trying 
to play a game of “chicken” or “poker” with financial institutions to avoid having to risk 
taxpayer dollars to avert Lehman’s bankruptcy. The FCIC confirmed Cohen’s suspicion, 
claiming that since regulators took a great deal of political “blowback” for their Bear 
Stearns bailout, they had to keep the potential of Federal support for a Lehman deal under 
strict confidentiality. According to the United Kingdom’s former Chancellor of the 
Exchequer, Lord Alistair Darling, Secretary Paulson told him that regulators might have 
been willing to give a potential Lehman buyer, Barclays investment bank, “regulatory 
assistance to support a transaction if it was required.” Outwardly, however, Paulson 
maintained that banks had to arrange a private sector solution to bail out Lehman 
Brothers, since Federal assistance would not be forthcoming.
296
 
Despite the withdrawal of Bank of America from negotiations, by Saturday 
evening, September 13, it appeared as though Lehman found a buyer in the British 
investment bank Barclays. To finance Barclays’ purchase of Lehman, a private 
consortium of banks agreed to provide bridge financing for Lehman’s forty to fifty billion 
dollars of mortgage assets to allow Barclays to purchase Lehman’s coveted broker-dealer 
unit. Even though Barclays, Lehman, and U.S. regulators agreed to a deal in principle, 
England’s Financial Services Authority (FSA) refused to exempt Barclays from their 
requirement for a shareholder vote for such an acquisition. The FSA said that it would 
sanction the deal, provided the Fed, and not Barclays, guaranteed Lehman’s debts until 
the transaction could be completed. Paulson’s team demurred, since such a guarantee 
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would violate their policy of not risking taxpayer dollars to save Lehman Brothers, and 
would leave regulators exposed to tens of billions of dollars of bad assets should the deal 
fail at the last minute. The FSA’s reluctance to fast-track Barclays’ acquisition of 
Lehman, coupled with the Fed and Treasury’s refusal to backstop Lehman’s liabilities to 
facilitate a transaction, killed the Barclays deal. With Barclays out of the running, it 
became clear that there would be no buyer for Lehman Brothers. By Sunday night, Fuld 
convened his board of directors and, at the behest of regulators, filed for Chapter 11 
bankruptcy protection early in the morning of September 15, 2008.
297
  
The events of that fateful weekend have received much scrutiny by journalists, 
academics, and everyday observers, all wanting to know the same thing: why did Lehman 
Brothers go bankrupt? The short answer is that regulators chose to let it fail. Although 
Federal Reserve Chairman Ben Bernanke insisted that he did not have the legal authority 
to bail out Lehman Brothers, the FCIC found that the Fed had statutory authority under 
the Federal Reserve Act that allowed them to engage in “emergency lending” under 
extraordinary circumstances. If Bear Stearns warranted a bailout on the basis of the Fed’s 
emergency lending powers, then Lehman Brothers, both larger and more interconnected 
than Bear Stearns, deserved equal consideration.
298
  
So if regulators had the statutory authority (if not the willingness) to bail out 
Lehman Brothers, why did they choose to let it fail? The short answer is that regulators 
wanted to contravene the notion that they would roll over and grant bailouts any time a 
financial institution ran into trouble. In other words, Lehman failed because of regulators’ 
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desire to fight moral hazard. Recall from Chapter 5 that LTCM, Bear, Fannie, and 
Freddie created a conventional expectation among market participants that regulators 
would serve as liquidity providers of last resort in wholesale funding markets. Federal 
Reserve and Treasury officials believed that the promise of this de facto shadow banking 
deposit insurance risked sowing moral hazard among banks. To contravene this notion, 
regulators wanted to show that they were willing to “play chicken” with the market by 
letting a systemically important financial institution fail.
299
 At a press conference on the 
morning of September 15, 2008, Secretary Paulson claimed “moral hazard is something” 
that he did not “take lightly.”
300
 In hindsight, while regulators were successful in dashing 
the market’s hopes for future bailouts (or least confusing the market about regulators’ 
intentions), the market’s reaction to Lehman’s failure was far worse than regulators had 
anticipated.  
Bailing Out AIG 
Even though regulators let Lehman Brothers fail based on the premise of moral 
hazard, regulators immediately retreated from their hardline stance when insurance giant 
American International Group (AIG) teetered on the brink of bankruptcy because of its 
exposure to the U.S. housing market. From 2001-2007, AIG’s financial products group 
(AIG-FP) sold billions of dollars’ worth of credit default swap (CDS) protection on 
subprime ABS, and by 2007, AIG-FP sat on a portfolio of roughly $2.7 trillion notional 
CDS tied to the mortgage market. AIG also issued $6 billion in commercial paper 
liquidity puts on ABCP and repo issued by CDOs. During the boom years, these 
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businesses earned AIG steady income. Housing prices continued to rise, liquidity in 
wholesale funding markets was plentiful, and AIG seemed to earn a risk-free profit by 
selling insurance on a doomsday scenario that its risk models anticipated would never 
occur.
301
   
Yet once homeowners began defaulting on their mortgages, AIG faced the 
prospect of having to make a large, simultaneous cash payout to their counterparties 
because of its CDS exposure. By summer 2008, with mortgage prices plummeting, the 
rating agencies put AIG on notice for a bond downgrade, which triggered collateral calls 
by AIG’s trading partners and further depleted AIG’s dwindling cash reserves. AIG’s 
CDS contracts stipulated that AIG’s counterparties could use their own trading marks 
when determining the market value of their CDS contracts facing AIG. Thus, firms like 
Goldman Sachs could demand as much collateral as they wanted from AIG, based on 
their internal trading marks on thinly traded over-the-counter derivatives contracts.
302
   
On September 12, 2008, AIG faced a buyer’s strike in the commercial paper and 
repo markets and struggled to raise the cash necessary to meet Wall Street’s relentless 
collateral calls. Facing obligations in excess of their $9 billion on hand, AIG reached out 
to the New York Fed for a loan under the Federal Reserve’s 13(3) emergency lending 
authority. Privately, the Fed believed that such a loan might not be necessary since a 
consortium of banks had agreed in principle to provide bridge financing to AIG, but 
Lehman Brothers’ bankruptcy caused AIG’s loan syndicate to fall apart. Rather than 
lending to AIG, syndicate banks hoarded cash to protect their own balance sheets. 
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Without a private sector loan for AIG, the Fed knew that it faced a choice between 
allowing the firm to go bankrupt or invoking its 13(3) authority to save the company. 
Fearing that a “a disorderly failure of AIG could add to already significant levels of 
financial market fragility and lead to substantially higher borrowing costs, reduced 
household wealth, and materially weaker economic performance” of the U.S. economy, 
on Tuesday, September 16, 2008, the Fed made an $85 billion loan to AIG in exchange 
for preferred stock in AIG and its subsidiaries. In defending AIG’s bailout just hours after 
allowing Lehman Brothers to go bankrupt, Fed Chairman Ben Bernanke told Congress 
that a disorderly bankruptcy of AIG would have been a devastating market blow to 
confidence in already-reeling commercial paper and money markets, which were 
experiencing full-on bank runs after Lehman’s bankruptcy.
303
 Regulators feared that an 
AIG bankruptcy would have disastrous consequences for the U.S. economy, bankrupting 
state pensions, damaging AIG’s counterparties, and shattering confidence in the entire 
financial system. Bernanke concluded that an AIG bankruptcy “could have resulted in a 
1930s-style global financial and economic meltdown, with catastrophic implications for 
production, income, and jobs.”
304
 
What does the rise, fall, and bailout of AIG tell us about the role of economic 
conventions in financial markets? There are two key takeaways.  
First, AIG, much like Bear Sterns and Lehman Brothers, demonstrates the causal 
importance of credit ratings as both an amplifier of pro-cyclical capital flows and a 
trigger of financial instability. The FCIC found that “AIG’s most valuable asset was its 
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credit rating,” which allowed the firm to “borrow cheaply and deploy the money in 
lucrative investments.” Firms that purchased mortgage insurance from AIG were 
permitted by regulators to reserve less regulatory capital because they insured their 
mortgage exposure vis-à-vis a highly credible counterparty. Banks that purchased CDS 
from AIG could carry thinner capital cushions, allowing them to make more loans and 
earn more revenue. Thus, there was a social pro-cyclicality to AIG’s triple-A rating, 
wherein AIG’s rating endowed the company with a “halo-effect” that helped the firm 
earn rents from insuring risky mortgages. During the boom years, AIG earned hefty 
profits from insuring Wall Street’s riskiest assets, in turn making the entire company (and 
by extension, the global financial system) appear safer.
305
 However, favorable bond 
ratings also sowed AIG’s financial fragility, since the terms of AIG’s CDS contracts tied 
its collateral requirements to the firm’s favorable credit rating. When the CRAs 
downgraded AIG after Lehman Brothers’ bankruptcy, AIG had to meet Wall Street’s 
collateral calls simultaneously. For this reason, the institutionalization of bond ratings 
into AIG’s CDS contracts made AIG vulnerable to credit downgrades when collateral 
prices declined, which is what happened (and went into overdrive) after Lehman’s 
bankruptcy. AIG stands out as a case study in how institutionalized, ergodic conventions 
such as bond ratings can be both amplifiers of pro-cyclical capital flows into risky asset 
classes and also triggers of instability within fragile financial systems. When conventions 
changed, agent behavior and market outcomes changed with them. Rather than being 
cameras that passively expressed the market’s “material fundamentals,” ratings were 
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important engines of non-stochastic change in financial markets, as Donald MacKenzie, 
Rawi Abdelal, and Mark Blyth have argued.
306
  
Second, AIG’s fragility illustrates how risk models based on ergodic conventions 
can sow financial fragility. AIG-FP retained Yale University economist (and shadow 
banking expert) Gary Gorton as a consultant to build models to forecast potential losses 
in AIG’s CDS portfolio. In December 2007, Gorton told AIG’s investors that AIG’s risk 
models were “very robust” and introduced “as little model risk as possible.” Gorton 
mined reams of historical data of real estate prices across the United States to forecast the 
likelihood of default in AIG’s subprime MBS insurance business. According to one of 
AIG’s pre-crisis SEC filings in 2006, AIG claimed that the likelihood of having to make 
simultaneous payouts on its entire mortgage portfolio remained “remote, even in severe 
recessionary market scenarios,” based on the assumption that housing prices would not 
decline nationally. Even if there were a housing bubble, AIG told its investors that 
housing prices would plateau, rather than fall across the board.
 307
 As the FCIC found, 
AIG-FP “predicted with 99.85% confidence that there would be no realized economic 
loss on the safest portions of the CDOs on which they wrote CDS protection, and failed 
to make any provisions whatsoever for declines in value – or unrealized losses – a 
decision that would prove fatal…in 2008.”
308
 By basing their loan loss provisions on 
historical default and home price data, AIG predicated its solvency on the reliability of 
their risk models, which vastly underestimated the likelihood of home prices declining 
nationally and thus left AIG vulnerable to creditor panics when the housing bubble burst.    
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Convention Uncertainty and Financial Instability 
Immediately after Lehman’s bankruptcy, the market experienced a “flight to 
quality,” as money poured out of wholesale funding markets, causing healthy, non-
financial companies to have trouble raising money via commercial paper and repo. 
Trading in entire derivatives markets ceased. Stock prices collapsed as equity volatility 
surged. Without irony and exaggeration, Fed Chairman Ben Bernanke testified to the 
FCIC that he “honestly believe[d] that September and October of 2008 was the worst 
financial crisis in global history…”
309
 
How can we make sense of this market dynamic, given the theoretical framework 
put forth in Chapter 2?  
This dissertation found that the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers and bailout for 
AIG negated the market’s conventional expectation that regulators would serve as de 
facto deposit guarantors in wholesale funding markets. Absent this credible shadow 
banking deposit insurance, shadow banking conduits experienced bank runs as shadow 
banking depositors (e.g. money market mutual funds) refused to roll over banks’ 
maturing short-term debt. According to Charles Doran, “nonlinearities in the reality one 
is trying to predict” undermine the reliability of conventions-based expectations of the 
future.
310
 Doran defines nonlinearity as a “discontinuity” that “signals a total break with 
the past” in complex social systems.
311
 As this dissertation argues, given sufficient 
financial fragility, when agents realize that a pre-existing, taken-for-granted conventions-
based understanding of the future no longer holds, then non-routine change will occur in 
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financial markets. The shock of having to cope with defied expectations based on 
conventions-based forecasts of the future catalyzes convention uncertainty. How do we 
know that Lehman’s bankruptcy eviscerated the market’s conventional expectations 
about regulators as de facto liquidity providers of last resort? There are three reasons to 
believe this is the case, and that Lehman’s bankruptcy initiated an interval of massive 
structural uncertainty in markets, just as Charles Doran depicts.  
First, there is evidence that regulators themselves believed that the market had 
grown accustomed to repeated interventions in financial markets. At the beginning of the 
weekend meeting to save Lehman, Secretary Paulson told the bank chiefs in attendance 
that the Fed would not provide “any form of extraordinary credit support” to save 
Lehman.
312
 As the Wall Street Journal surmised on the eve of Lehman’s bankruptcy, 
Lehman presented regulators with a ‘Catch-22’: “in rescuing those businesses to prevent 
chaos in the markets, the government may have created the expectation that it would be a 
major financial player in other distressed situations.” As a result, Lehman served as a 
“line in the sand” regarding future bailouts.
313
 Secretary Paulson told President Geroge 
W. Bush that “allowing Lehman to fail would send a strong signal to the market that his 
administration wasn’t in the business of bailing out Wall Street firms any longer.”
314
 
Based on these accounts, we can conclude that moral hazard (or more specifically, 
regulators’ desire to fight moral hazard) was the causa prima of Lehman Brothers’ 
bankruptcy. Second, several econometric tests confirm the existence of structural breaks 
in the model parameters of the time series relationship between interbank lending and 
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bank credit spreads on September 15, 2008, the day of Lehman’s bankruptcy (see 
Appendix IV). Since nothing else lest the market’s perceptions regarding regulators’ 
posture toward systemically important financial institutions changed that weekend, there 
is reason to believe that Lehman’s failure was responsible for this structural break in 
financial markets. Third, several traders interviewed for this dissertation confirm that 
Lehman’s bankruptcy negated whatever preconceptions market participants had about 
regulators’ intentions to bail out troubled Wall Street firms. According to a foreign 
exchange derivatives trader at a major New York commercial bank, many of his clients 
believed that a Bear Stearns scenario was the “worst case scenario” for any bank, and 
prior to Lehman’s bankruptcy, ABCP and repo counterparties believed that “everything 
would get sorted out” by regulators and the Fed. This trader claimed that Bear Stearns, 
Fannie, and Freddie convinced market participants that regulators “would always agree to 
step in to prevent something much worse from happening.” Prior to Lehman’s 
bankruptcy, there was an implicit understanding that banks would not go bankrupt or, if 
they did, shadow banking depositors would be “made whole” for their counter-party 
exposure. Banks were so intertwined that most market participants took for granted that 
their trading partners would remain solvent in all scenarios. The trader hypothesized that 
regulators decision to let Lehman fail reflected regulators’desire to “to send a signal to 
the market that systemically important trading partners would fail.”
315
  
So what happened after the market realized that regulators would not uniformly 
backstop troubled financial institutions? In other words, what effect did convention 
uncertainty have on financial markets?  
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The most important, proximate effect of Lehman’s bankruptcy was undermining 
confidence in the wholesale funding market creditors, which triggered a bank run in both 
commercial paper and repo markets. When the Reserve Primary Fund, a money market 
mutual fund that invested in some $785 million of Lehman’s commercial paper, “broke 
the buck” of $1.00 net asset value, this was the first time a money market mutual fund 
refused redemptions and broke par value since 1994.
316
 This credit event caused an 
across-the-board run in all commercial paper and repo markets. As Kacperczyk and 
Schnabl found, “investors interpreted the Lehman’s bankruptcy as a signal that 
commercial paper, issued and sponsored by financial institutions, was far riskier than 
investors had previously thought.”
317
 Lehman Brothers’ bankruptcy altered the market’s 
risk perception of ABCP, thus triggering a bank run throughout the commercial paper 
markets. From September 10 to October 22, 2008, the total amount of financial 
commercial paper outstanding fell roughly thirty percent as commercial paper spreads 
widened. Money market mutual funds boycotted all commercial paper issuers, even those 
with no connection to Lehman Brothers, which initiated a “a broad-based run on 
commercial paper markets,” as Timothy Geithner told the FCIC.
 
Investors withdrew 
some $450 billion from prime money market funds, and to meet the rush of redemptions, 
money market mutual funds sold their illiquid investments, though “there was little 
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Repo markets experienced similar stresses following Lehman’s collapse. As Gary 
Gorton and Andrew Metrick found, the average repo “haircut” (or discount to face value 
accepted of repo collateral) on structured debt jumped from 25% to 43% percent after 
Lehman’s bankruptcy.  As the authors argue, the failure of Lehman Brothers meant, 
“Repo depositors did not know which securitized banks were most likely to fail (or 
whether the Fed would let them fail).” As a result, Lehman’s failure caused repo 
counterparties to assume that shadow banking collateral was information-sensitive, since 
regulators knew more about their willingness to backstop troubled counterparties than did 
their wholesale lenders. When wholesale funding counterparties lost faith in the collateral 
backing repo transactions, they demanded greater repo haircuts as a hedge against the 
information asymmetry created by this convention uncertainty.
319
   
Rising repo haircuts are to shadow banking as depositor withdrawals are to 
traditional banking: faced with rising haircuts, financial institutions had to sell risky 
assets to make up for their funding shortfall, but the collective effect of rising haircuts for 
all repo issuers for all risky assets was a generalized banking panic in which many large, 
inter-connected financial institutions sold the same assets at the same time. As a result, 




Because of these pressures, interbank lending markets exhibited signs of stress. 
The one month Libor-OIS spread, a commonly accepted measure of bank counterparty 
fears, increased from roughly 100 basis points before Lehman to 360 basis points by 
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 The spread between three-month dollar LIBOR and three-month 
U.S. Treasury bills, known as the “Ted spread,” increased from approximately 200 basis 
points pre-Lehman to 460 basis points by mid-October.
322
  
Figure 36: Financial and Non-Financial Commercial Paper Rates after Lehman 
Source: The Federal Reserve 
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Figure 37: 1-month Libor-OIS Spread 
Source: Bloomberg 
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Credit spreads among the last two standing investment banks, Goldman Sachs and 
Morgan Stanley, also widened. On Friday, September 12, 2008, it cost 182 basis points to 
insure Goldman Sachs’ five-year debt. By Wednesday, September 17, it cost roughly 550 
basis points for the same protection. Morgan Stanley’s five-year CDS insurance rose 
from 250 basis points pre-Lehman to 850 basis points after Lehman’s bankruptcy.  
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Figure 40: Goldman Sachs CDS Spread 
Source: Bloomberg 
 Another sign of convention uncertainty was the “flight to quality” in financial 
markets, in which investors sold risky assets and purchased money and money 
equivalents. As Keynes described, “partly on reasonable and partly on instinctive 
grounds, our desire to hold Money as a store of wealth is a barometer of the degree of our 
distrust of our own calculations and conventions concerning the future.” Further, money 
“operates…at a deeper level of our motivation. It takes charge at the moments when the 
higher, more precarious conventions have weakened.” This quality of money reflects the 
fact that “the possession of actual money lulls our disquietude; and the premium which 
we require to make us part with money is the measure of the degree of our 
disquietude.”
323
 In other words, Keynes believed that money demand, or demand for 
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money and its equivalents, surged during periods of convention uncertainty. The FCIC 
describes this tendency as the “flight to quality,” which, in the context of the global 
financial crisis, meant that ABCP and repo investors pulled their funds out of shadow 
banking conduits and purchased perceived safe-havens like U.S. Treasury securities.
324
 
 After the fall of Lehman Brothers, the market exhibited several signs of the flight 
to quality because of convention uncertainty. Yields on the riskiest corporate bonds, those 
rated CCC and higher by the CRAs, shot up from roughly 9% to 16%. The foreign 
exchange value of the dollar rose approximately 10% in the month after Lehman’s 
bankruptcy, while four-week Treasury bill interest rates fell from 1.5% before Lehman to 
0% afterward. Public equity markets also reeled: stock market volatility surged, with the 
VIX, or “fear index,” rising almost 200% immediately after the fall of Lehman.  
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Figure 41: Post-Lehman Rising Bond Yields 
Source: The Federal Reserve 
Figure 42: Post-Lehman Falling Bond Prices 
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Figure 43: Post-Lehman Flight to Quality I: The Appreciating Dollar 
Source: The Federal Reserve 
Figure 44: Post-Lehman Flight to Quality II: The 4-Week Treasury Bill Rate 
















4 Week Treasury Bill Rate
Neil K. Shenai 
208 
Figure 45: The VIX 
Source: Bloomberg 
 Convention uncertainty made it difficult for buyers and sellers to agree upon the 
value of various illiquid and non-transparent ABS. As a result, some markets were 
“completely locked” and “some things couldn’t trade at all,” as J.P. Morgan Chief 
Executive Jamie Dimon told the FCIC.
325
 Stephen Morris and Hyun Song Shin argue that 
the breakdown of “market confidence” led to an adverse selection problem in financial 
markets. These authors claim that markets will function normally as long as there is 
“common understanding” about potential losses in an asset class. When markets lack a 
common understanding of securities values, then adverse selection problems emerge and 
trading stops. Economic conventions provided this social basis of knowledge in financial 
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 The FCIC found that the over-the-counter derivatives market came to a 
“grinding halt” after Lehman’s bankruptcy, which illustrates the relationship between an 
absence of convention-given common understanding and adverse selection in financial 
markets. As the FCIC described:  
…in the absence of a liquid derivatives market and efficient price 
discovery, every firm’s risk management became more expensive and 
difficult. The usual hedging mechanisms were impaired. An investor that 
wanted to trade at a loss to get out of a losing position might not find a 




Several traders interviewed for this dissertation corroborated the FCIC’s findings. One 
former Lehman Brothers investment banker claimed that the market came to be 
dominated by “fear and uncertainty” during this period.
328
 Another structured credit 
trader observed that Lehman’s bankruptcy “threw a lot of pricing off,” and that so-called 
market fundamentals depended on market confidence, which was absent during the 
market turmoil. The trader argued that market prices “just didn’t make sense 
mathematically,” and recalled seeing so-called fifteen standard deviation events occur on 
almost a daily basis. Implied default rates on loan derivatives appeared “astronomical,” 
and prices seemed disconnected from fundamental value. Structured credit markets 
suffered from a “lack of conviction” because there were no value anchors upon which 
traders could base their decisions.
329
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 The structured credit trader claimed that the small size of the derivatives market 
meant that anticipating the beliefs and actions of fellow traders was crucial for success:  
Understanding how other people behave is very important. Knowing what 
key players think is always important. Understanding how other people 
are thinking about the world is very important. If certain people are 
shorting a certain asset class, this causes you reevaluate your strategy and 
timing specifically… information about what other investment managers 
are doing is crucial to any successful trading strategy.  
Regarding the market uncertainty after Lehman and AIG, Lehman and AIG “changed 
everything” because “all of a sudden, [traders] had to guess the intentions of regulators. 
Since there were no clear guidelines about who would fail and who would be saved, 
everybody just assumed the worst.” Allowing Lehman to fail and bailing out AIG 
initiated a bank run against all financial institutions that ended only after U.S. authorities 
guaranteed the solvency of all systemically important financial institutions, as argued in 
the subsequent section. Lehman and AIG began a period of profound uncertainty in 




As the results of this selected market data and this interviews show, the failure of 
Lehman Brothers catalyzed a generalized bank run in the wholesale funding market, 
which had a profound impact on the stability of shadow banking conduits. Lehman’s 
bankruptcy invalidated the market’s conventional expectations that regulators would 
serve as liquidity providers of last resort in wholesale funding markets. AIG signaled that 
some firms would receive bailouts and others would fail, confusing market participants 
further. Trying to guess the caprice of regulators introduced novel stress in the wholesale 
funding market, causing banks’ ABCP and repo collateral to become information-
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sensitive while also invalidating the market’s “common understanding” of the potential 
losses in ABS. Generalized convention uncertainty took hold. Wholesale funding markets 
experienced bank runs and derivatives markets seized. Equity volatility surged and 
investors partook in a flight to capital. Stock prices fell, and the long-term solvency of all 
systemically important financial institutions came into question. 
In hindsight, the rationale of letting Lehman fail to send a signal to the market of 
no more bailouts seems moot based on markets’ behavior after the default of Lehman 
Brothers. Rather than adding transparency to the market, Lehman’s failure triggered a run 
on all systemically important financial institutions, thus beginning the most acute and 
harrowing phase of the global financial crisis. Regulators retreated from their anti-bailout 
posture and ended up risking hundreds of billions of dollars to rescue the U.S. financial 
system.
331
 If the goal of letting Lehman fail was to send a signal to markets that 
regulators would no longer bail out troubled financial institutions, then regulators failed. 
Less than twenty-four hours after Lehman’s failure, regulators ended up bailing out the 
much larger and systemically important AIG. 
Note that many of these outcomes adhere to Keynes and Crotty’s hypotheses 
about convention uncertainty and financial stability. Keynes claimed that money demand 
would surge under conditions of convention uncertainty, which is exactly what happened 
when the dollar’s foreign exchange value appreciated and short-term interest rates 
plummeted.
332
 As Crotty describes, “on…occasions when the consensus forecast turns 
out to be disastrously mistaken, the irreducible ignorance of the collective wisdom will be 
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made painfully manifest to all agents, the convention will collapse, and the confidence in 
the ability to forecast the future that is built on that convention will shatter.” This 
selection seems apt to describe financial markets after market participants realized that 
they were “disastrously mistaken” regarding regulators’ intentions to save troubled 
counterparties.
333
 Lehman’s bankruptcy caused wholesale funding market counterparties’ 
conventional expectations of regulators’ lender of last resort function to “collapse,” and 
confidence in their future forecasts to “shatter.”  
Responding to the Crisis and Restoring Convention Certainty 
After the bailout of AIG, regulators realized that they had a big problem on their 
hands. Liquidity was pouring out of money markets and into safe Treasury securities, 
while non-financial corporations struggled to raise cash in short-term money markets. 
Bank share prices fell as the cost of insuring their debt via CDS rose. Stock market 
volatility surged. Financial institutions were forced to sell large portfolios of risky assets 
en masse to keep up with margin and collateral calls, which further depressed asset prices 
and exacerbated banks’ already-dire liquidity and solvency issues. Throughout the crisis, 
regulators worked around the clock to prevent other systemically important financial 
institutions from failing. Their response to the crisis sought to achieve three goals: 
stemming the bank runs in the shadow banking markets, recapitalizing financial 
institutions, and getting bad assets off of bank balance sheets. 
Regulators’ first order of business was to stop the shadow banking bank run in 
both the ABCP and repo markets. Thus, on September 19, 2008, just days after the failure 
of Lehman Brothers and after the Reserve Primary Fund “broke the buck,” the Federal 
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Reserve created the Asset-Backed Commercial Paper Money Market Mutual Fund 
Liquidity Facility (AMLF) under their emergency lending provision of the Federal 
Reserve Act. The AMLF allowed financial institutions to borrow from the Fed to 
repurchase their own ABCP, thus allowing money market mutual funds to redeem their 
commercial paper holdings from financial institutions at par value. When announcing the 
AMLF, the Federal Reserve stated that illiquidity in money markets and high 
redemptions meant that in the absence of Federal involvement, more money market 
mutual funds would “break the buck” of a $1.00 net asset value, further exacerbating 
funding pressures in the money markets.
334
  
Other programs included the Commercial Paper Funding Facility (CPFF), which 
came into effect on October 7, 2008, and provided a Federal backstop to “eligible 
issuers” of short-term debt, extending unlimited commercial paper insurance to all 
issuers, both financial and non-financial, in the commercial paper market.
335
 In essence, 
the Federal Reserve extended sovereign credit to non-financial industrial companies such 
as General Electric, McDonalds Corporation, and Harley-Davidson, Inc.
336
 On October 
14, 2008, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation created the Temporary Liquidity 
Guarantee Program, which extended a FDIC deposit guarantee to all senior unsecured 
debt issued by qualified financial institutions.
337
 One week later, on October 21, 2008, the 
Fed created the Money Market Investor Funding Facility (MMIFF) to purchase assets 
from U.S. money market mutual funds.  
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A second plank of regulators’ plan to save the U.S. financial system was to 
recapitalize financial institutions. Less than one week after Lehman Brothers declared 
bankruptcy (which occurred, in part, because of New York Federal Reserve Bank 
President Timothy Geithner’s decision to refuse to allow Lehman Brothers to convert to a 
bank holding company), the Federal Reserve Board allowed Morgan Stanley and 
Goldman Sachs to become bank holding companies, thereby granting the firms access to 
the Fed’s discount window. Meanwhile, the FOMC slashed the target federal funds rate 
to 0%, further attempting to ease interbank funding pressures. Some companies received 
special attention from regulators during this period as well. For instance, on November 
23, 2008, the U.S. Treasury and Federal Reserve backstopped over $300 billion of real 
estate assets on Citigroup’s balance sheet.  
Treasury Secretary Hank Paulson convinced the U.S. Congress (after a series of 
legislative missteps including a Congress’ original refusal to pass the bill) to pass the 
$700 billion Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP), which was designed to purchase 
bad assets from financial institutions but morphed into a recapitalization program after 
regulators realized that asset purchases would take too long to work themselves through 
the financial system. So on October 28, 2008, the U.S. Treasury purchased some $125 
billion in preferred stock from nine U.S. financial institutions. On November 14, 2008, 
the Treasury purchased another $33.5 billion worth of preferred shares from twenty-one 
banks, and on November 17, 2008, TARP funding was extended to insurance companies 
as well.  
Finally, regulators knew that in order to help financial institutions, they had to get 
the bad assets off their balance sheets. To that end, the Federal Reserve ended up 
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purchasing some $1.5 trillion in various assets, including MBS, repo transactions, 
securities lending, asset-backed commercial paper, among countless others. In essence, 
the Federal Reserve became the U.S. economy’s repository of risky financial assets and 
the Fed’s balance sheet remains well above its pre-crisis level to this day. In mid-2009, 
the Treasury and Federal Reserve also orchestrated the Public-Private Investment 




These measures prevented America’s financial institutions from falling into 
disorderly bankruptcy. For instance, the AMLF, CPFF, and MMIFF succeeded in 
diminishing funding pressures in the interbank lending market. By mid-November 2008, 
one-month dollar Libor-OIS, the Ted spread, and investment bank CDS spreads fell to 
about half of their pre-Lehman highs.
339
 Idiosyncratic concerns about specific banks, 
such as Bank of America and Citigroup, persisted throughout early 2009. Equity prices 
continued their slide until March 2009, while risky bond yields fell and hit their pre-crisis 
levels by summer 2009.  
Still, regulators’ interventions could not prevent the broader fall in market 
confidence and credit contraction from affecting the real economy. America’s 
unemployment rate increased to above 10% as firms shed jobs to cut costs given rising 
macroeconomic uncertainty. From September 2008 to April 2009, the U.S. economy lost 
roughly 680,000 jobs per month.   
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Figure 46: Bank of America and Citigroup’s CDS Spread 
Source: Bloomberg 
Figure 47: S&P 500 Index (June 2008 – December 2009) 
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Figure 48: U.S. Unemployment and Job Creation (2008 – 2010) 
Source: U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics 
Figure 49: U.S. GDP Growth (2006-2011) 
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 Having described regulators’ response to the crisis, this chapter now explains how 
this dissertation’s conventions-based theoretical framework can shed light onto several 
aspects of their response. There are two key takeaways. 
 First, the bank bailouts illustrate the causal role of economic conventions held by 
regulators during crisis periods. Matthias Matthijs defines a crisis as “a moment of 
decisive intervention in the process of institutional change when contradictions in the 
system are generally acknowledged.”
340
 Mark Blyth identifies a crisis as a moment of 
“Knightian” or “type-three” uncertainty, in which agents have to cope with the fact that 
the past does not provide a guide to the future. In the case of the global economy (and 
markets more specifically), “not only can one not see the generator [of outcomes] 
directly, but also agents can sample the past until doomsday and become steadily more 
wrong about the future in doing so.”
341
 As Abdelal et al. put it, “highly complex, 
unobservable generators produce patterns that shift in unexpected directions.”
342
 
According to Matthijs economic ideas “will play a decisive role by explaining what went 
wrong and how to fix it” during a crisis.
343
 To Matthijs, Blyth, and Abdelal et al., 
economic ideas (or in the case of this dissertation, economic conventions) mitigate 
uncertainty by providing agents behavior blueprints of navigating an unforeseen material 
and ideational terrain.  
Regulators’ response to the crisis can be understood as an example of ergodicity 
conventions informing regulators’ response to a crisis, specifically their fears of 
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repeating the Great Depression. Immediately after the failure of Lehman Brothers, 
regulators realized that bank runs in the ABCP and repo markets, interbank funding 
pressures, collapsing asset prices, and rising stock market volatility, were untenable in the 
long-run, and posed a tremendous risk to the overall health of the U.S. economy. 
Allowing the market to clear on its own led regulators to fear that they might have to 
endure the bankruptcy of the entire global financial system and drastic fall in economic 
activity, well below the economy’s productive potential.   
Although there was heterogeneity of beliefs among regulators regarding the 
structural causes of the crisis, there was a near universal consensus among the Treasury 
and the Federal Reserve that it was imperative to prevent further bankruptcies of 
systemically important financial institutions after Lehman’s failure, lest the U.S. 
economy experience another Great Depression. For instance, Bernanke claimed that the 
lessons of the U.S. economy in the 1930s had “been learned” and that during the global 
financial crisis, regulators’ repeated financial market interventions spared the global 
economy “an even worse cataclysm that could have rivaled or surpassed the Great 
Depression.” Bernanke went on to claim that the Great Depression occurred because of 
bad policy choices on behalf of regulators, arguing that their responses “ran the gamut 
from passivity to timidity.” In contrast, he and his fellow policymakers “acted sooner and 
with greater force than in the 1930s.” The biggest lesson Bernanke took from the Great 
Depression was that a greater sense of urgency by regulators to stem bank runs could 
have avoided a domino effect of cascading defaults across the global financial system. 
Bernanke, like Gorton, described shadow banking as banking per se, and found that the 
U.S. financial system “experienced the equivalent of runs on the network of nonbank 
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financial institutions that has come to be called the shadow banking system.” It was 
imperative to Bernanke to stop these shadow banking bank runs, since he knew that they 
could spiral out of control and cause a steep contraction of credit with disastrous real 
economy consequences.
344
 No doubt, Bernanke’s academic background as a scholar of 
the Great Depression influenced his thinking and predisposed him to responding to the 
threat of bank runs and contagion. However, his decisions were by no means pre-
ordained or historically path dependent. Rather, Bernanke’s socialization, both as an 
academic and policymaker, made him more likely to buy into the Great Depression as a 
salient narrative about the consequences of not responding forcefully to the crisis.
345
 
Second, the success of regulators’ response to the shadow banking bank runs 
reveals much about the market’s conventions about regulators. As argued earlier in this 
chapter, one of the reasons why ABCP and repo counterparties ran on shadow banking 
conduits was because the failure of Lehman Brothers revealed that regulators were 
willing to go all the way and allow some financial institutions to fail while bailing out 
others, and the Reserve Primary Fund’s “breaking the buck” further exacerbated the 
market’s waning confidence. In response to the shadow banking runs, regulators sought 
to re-establish conventional expectations that regulators would serve as liquidity 
providers of last resort in financial markets. Regulators were successful in restoring 
confidence to the banks because they effectively guaranteed the face value of all money 
market instruments, thus extending de facto deposit insurance to the shadow banking 
market. By directing the FDIC to backstop bank and non-bank short-term borrowing, the 
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federal government extended its public creditworthiness to the financial system’s private 
liabilities. Because the market deemed regulators’ commitment credible, and because the 
market held America’s sovereign credit in high esteem, regulators were able to halt the 
run on shadow banking conduits.  
This credibility transfer of sovereign credit to private liabilities reflects many 
conventional processes at play in the market. As Jonathan Kirshner writes, capital market 
liberalization introduced new constraints on national regulators, wherein polices deemed 
illegitimate by the market were punished by capital outflows, while legitimate policies 
were rewarded with capital inflows and lower borrowing costs. Kirshner finds that 
“ideas…can profoundly shape policy in ways divorced from the economic logic or merits 
of those ideas.”
346
 In this case, whether or not banks were really insolvent was beside the 
point – what mattered was the market’s perceptions of bank solvency, which in turn had 
implications for bank solvency in self-fulfilling ways: those financial institutions that the 
market deemed creditworthy gained access to cheap credit, thus improving the material 
profitability of those banks and justifying the market’s initial belief.  
The question, then, is why did the market view regulators as particularly 
creditworthy? The answer to this question exceeds the scope of this dissertation, though 
scholars point out that America’s relative creditworthiness relates to the fact that America 
has never defaulted on its debt and that the dollar was the global reserve asset (and thus 
faced structurally higher demand and thus lower interest rates than other currencies).
347
 
Together, these factors explain why regulators had tremendous intervention capacity to 
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restore confidence to America’s financial system, and were able to engage in credibility 
transfer of public creditworthiness to the shadow banking system’s private liabilities.    
Conclusion 
 The purpose of this chapter was three-fold: first, it explained how the failure of 
Lehman Brothers catalyzed convention uncertainty in financial markets, triggering bank 
runs on shadow banking conduits, and stressing financing conditions in interbank lending 
markets and leading to broader market instability via falling asset prices and rising 
volatility. Second, it explained how regulators’ reaction to the shadow banking bank runs 
could be understood via the conventions-based theoretical framework advanced in 
Chapter 2. It argued that regulators’ response to the crisis is best understood as a function 
of their conventions of ergodicity, specifically their fears of repeating the Great 
Depression. The salience of this historical data point predisposed regulators to pushing 
for carte blanche bailouts of the entire financial system. These bailouts succeeded 
because regulators were able to convince the market of their credible commitment to the 
shadow banking system qua their capacity of serving as liquidity providers of last resort 
in wholesale funding markets. This chapter argued that America’s sovereign 
creditworthiness enhanced U.S. regulators’ intervention capacity to extend public credit 
guarantees to private liabilities, thus alleviating funding pressures in shadow banking 
markets, allowing regulators to re-establish conventional equilibrium in markets. 
 The following chapter concludes the dissertation. It summarizes the dissertation’s 
main theoretical and empirical findings, responds to potential critiques and limitations of 
its research design and conclusions, suggests several avenues of future research.    
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Based on this study’s findings, what conclusions can we draw about the role of 
economic ideas, and in particular economic conventions, in financial markets? This 
chapter summarizes the dissertation’s ontological and theoretical implications and main 
empirical findings. It then discusses the limitations of the study and highlights avenues of 
further research. The final section of this chapter concludes the dissertation, and 
emphasizes the importance of further study of financial stability.  
Theoretical Implications 
Primarily, this dissertation sought to understand the relationship between 
economic ideas and financial market instability. This dissertation studied a subset of 
economic ideas, known as economic conventions, of which there are three types: 
ergodicity, expert opinion, and conventional expectations. This dissertation situated 
economic conventions in the Post-Keynesian model of financial crises. It argued that 
incorporating a thorough understanding of economic conventions into the Post-Keynesian 
model lends itself to more theoretically robust and empirically valid theory. What are the 
primary theoretical conclusions one can draw from this study? This dissertation finds four 
broad theoretical take-aways.  
First, this dissertation supports the argument, often made by international relations 
and political economy constructivists, that ideational scholarship occupies a unique 
ontological niche of investigating outcomes in complex social systems. This dissertation 
advanced a strongly constitutive standard of causality, rejecting Humean linear causality 
in favor of a more probabilistic or emergent causal standard. Linear causality (i.e. ‘X’ 
produces ‘Y’) is problematic in financial markets because the variables under 
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investigation, X and Y, are mutually constituted and deeply recursive.
348
 Of course, 
adopting a strongly constitutively standard of causality might open the present study to 
criticism for a lack of rigor and parsimony, but what this study lacks in theoretical 
elegance, it compensates for in external validity. As Mark Blyth points out, most 
mainstream accounts of complex social systems tend to be static, linear, treat change as 
exogenous, and see outcomes as normally distributed.
349
 This dissertation challenges each 
of these contentions on a theoretical level, and showed that misplaced belief in the above 
four assumptions actually generates the very fragility that culminates in systemic crises. 
Risk models built on the assumption of asset price distribution normality, central bankers 
who believed that the greater risk to the U.S. economy was a Japanese-style deflation 
(rather than a debt-fuelled real estate and equity binge), and bond ratings that ignored the 
possibility of home prices decreasing nationally all show that agents’ tendency to think of 
the world as a stable and linear place can sow the very fragility and epistemic blindness 
that culminates in non-routine change in financial markets. This dissertation corroborates 
Blyth’s view that the narratives that agents invent to guide their behavior generate the 
very stability that they end up taking for granted, while also ensuring that we are 
surprised when outcomes belie our convention-given expectations.
350
 Standard linear 
models do not account for the two-way, reflexive relationship between economic 
conventions and material outcomes. As this dissertation showed, asset markets are 
dynamic and non-linear, and also generate change endogenously with outcomes adhering 
to so-called “fat-tailed” distributions.  
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Second, this dissertation’s theoretical framework comports with many of the 
foundational tenets of neoclassical financial economics. This dissertation does not reject 
notions of market efficiency (or the belief that market prices reflect all publicly known 
information).
351
 Rather, it augments the efficient markets hypothesis by positing that 
publicly known information must first be intermediated by agents’ animating economic 
conventions, such that market prices are informationally efficient with regard to agents’ 
dominant social constructs. Yet it is impossible to know exactly when and how these 
constructs change, which explains why agents are occasionally surprised by discrete 
shifts in their economic conventions. A greater point of departure between this 
dissertation and neoclassical finance is in this study’s treatment of bubbles and crises as 
endogenous, rather than exogenous, features of markets. The global financial crisis was 
not the financial equivalent of a meteor from space. Rather, it resulted from many 
\complex factors, including the structure of the global economy and agency of policy 
elites and market participants. By accepting instability as an unpleasant fact in complex 
social environments, this dissertation advances a more theoretically realistic and 
empirically robust approach to understanding continuity and change in financial markets.  
Third, this dissertation showed how incorporating economic conventions into the 
Post-Keynesian model of financial crises could lead to a better model of financial crises. 
This dissertation problematized and identified the sources of stability in the Post-
Keynesian model, argued that “displacements” are endogenous, rather than exogenous, 
features of financial markets, provided a framework of understanding how stable (but 
fragile) systems erupt into crisis, and described the ideational constraints of elite 
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intervention in the economy during crisis periods. This dissertation argued that while 
Charles Kindleberger and Hyman Minsky provide a plausible heuristic model of financial 
instability, their model suffers from the fact that it understates the causal importance of 
economic ideas, and specifically economic conventions such as credit ratings and 
expectations of regulators’ behavior, as drivers of stability and instability in asset 
markets. By drawing on insights from J.M. Keynes, Charles Doran, and economic 
constructivists, this dissertation brought economic conventions “back into” the Post-
Keynesian model of financial crises.  
Fourth, this dissertation shows how cross-discipline collaboration can lead to 
better theories. The guiding premise of this dissertation was that insights about crises in 
the international system could be used to explain the timing and nature of crises in other 
domains. For this reason, this dissertation borrowed from Charles Doran’s work on power 
cycle theory, which is an apt framework of understanding continuity and change in the 
international system. Doran’s “single dynamic” of expectations and material power 
trends provides a useful analog for understanding both how agents form their 
expectations based on linear extrapolations from past trends (i.e. via conventions of 
ergodicity) and how non-ergodic deviations from conventions of ergodicity trigger 
structural uncertainty in complex social systems. This dissertation illustrates how insights 
from one domain, international relations theory, can be applied to other domains such as 
asset markets. Further scholarship should continue in this tradition, attempting to break 
down institutional barriers to cross-discipline collaboration.  
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Empirical Implications 
 Empirically, this dissertation used its conventions-based theoretical framework to 
explain America’s monetary policy prior to the global financial crisis. Chapter 3 
described how economic conventions of ergodicity, expert opinion, and conventional 
expectations led the FOMC to cut short-term interest rates and keep them “too low for 
too long,” thus inducing an unsustainable increase in housing prices and the proliferation 
of fragile, adjustable-rate mortgage structures.
352
This chapter used process-tracing 
techniques and counter-factual analysis to illustrate how Japan’s historical experience 
with deflation, the Greenspan Doctrine ideology that held that it was better to “clean up” 
after a bubble burst rather than to “lean against” its inflation, and the construction of the 
Fed’s inflation metrics via the CPI and PCE deflator explain the Fed’s rationale for 
keeping interest rates low in the early 2000s. The chapter concluded that different 
economic conventions could have led to different monetary policy outcomes in the U.S. 
economy, potentially averting the housing bubble and credit boom that culminated in the 
global financial crisis. The key take-away from this chapter is that central bankers are not 
Turing programmable, black box automatons processing material inputs and translating 
them into monetary policy in discernable ways. Rather, central bankers’ decisions follow 
from their economic ideas. Monetary policy can therefore be understood as both 
historically contingent and agency-driven. This is not to damn central bankers and blame 
the entire crisis on the Fed. Instead, this dissertation uses the Fed as a laboratory for 
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demonstrating the political power of central bankers’ ideas, showing how central 
bankers’ conventions need to be taken seriously as causal drivers of monetary policy and 
economic outcomes.  
 Additionally, this dissertation described how economic conventions drove the rise 
of America’s fragile financial system that emerged in tandem with the inflating housing 
bubble from 2001-2006. Chapter 4 spelled out the mechanics of shadow banking, or off-
balance sheet financial intermediation, in which various wholesale “depositors” made 
loans to “borrowers” via ABCP and repo conduits. Building on the work of Gary Gorton, 
Viral Acharya, and others, this dissertation found that institutionalized conventions of 
expert opinion via bond ratings had a pro-cyclical effect on capital flows into risky asset 
classes. The CRAs were important cogs in the machine in which banks manufactured 
“information-insensitive” ABS for shadow banking purposes. Chapter 4 explained how 
banks’ pre-crisis capital inadequacy was a function of their economic conventions of 
ergodicity vis-à-vis their risk models and regulatory rules at the time. Bank risk models 
such as value-at-risk institutionalized ergodic conventions regarding market volatility, 
correlation risk, and Gaussian normality, and thus made banks vulnerable to large shocks, 
such as moments in which realized market outcomes deviate from convention-given 
expectations of the future. Together, bond ratings and banks’ internal risk models 
illustrate how economic conventions can be causal drivers of stability and fragility in the 
financial system, since banks’ stability depended on the continued truth-value of their 
economic conventions. When conventions changed (e.g. via bond downgrades), this 
initiated non-stochastic changes in market outcomes.  
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 Chapters 5 and 6 studied the role of conventional expectations in shadow banking 
markets, and demonstrated how the most acute phase of the global financial crisis can be 
understood as a generalized, shadow banking bank run catalyzed by the failure of 
Lehman Brothers. Chapter 5 drew on findings from interviews with market participants 
and other primary source material to show that regulators’ repeated interventions in 
financial markets from LTCM in 1998, Bear Stearns in March 2008, and the GSEs in 
September 2008, created a conventional expectation that regulators would serve as 
liquidity providers of last resort in shadow banking conduits. This convention explains 
why bank runs prior to Lehman were idiosyncratic, or isolated to specific firms, rather 
than generalized, or across all shadow banking conduits. Chapter 6 explained how the 
failure of Lehman Brothers eviscerated this convention and initiated a generalized bank 
run against all ABCP and repo markets. It cited market data to show how Lehman’s 
failure precipitated a flight to quality in financial markets, just as Keynes would have 
predicted, as agents coped with the stress of convention uncertainty. This chapter also 
explained how conventions held by regulators shaped their response to the crisis. 
Regulators’ fears of initiating a “second Great Depression” colored their thinking and 
made them much more likely to issue unconditional bailouts to the entire financial 
system, thereby offering de facto deposit insurance to shadow banking markets and 
stemming the ABCP and repo bank runs after Lehman. Together, Chapters 5 and 6 
illustrate the importance of economic conventions during crisis periods, showing that 
conventions held by elites shape their behavior during crises.    
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Limitations 
 There is no perfect theory. Despite this dissertation’s central belief that economic 
conventions explain America’s pre-crisis monetary policy and shadow banking fragility, 
the present study is not without its limitations. The subsequent paragraphs respond to 
some of the potential critiques of the dissertation’s ontology, theoretical insights, and 
empirical conclusions. Effort is made to be as charitable as possible to potential critiques, 
while responding to them in turn.   
 Central to any theory of the social sciences is an epistemological, ontological, and 
methodological posture about the role of agency in complex systems. One of the most 
contested issues in the social sciences is the “agency and structure” debate.
353
 On one end 
of the spectrum, pure agency-based approaches elevate the decision-making of specific 
actors as important causal determinants of outcomes. Agency-based accounts of financial 
crises tend to focus on the decisions of elites in shaping financial institutions’ risk 
tolerance, monetary policy, and political preferences for deregulation, to name a few 
examples. Implicit in such agency-based views is that actors make certain choices over 
others based on their own volition. On the other end of the spectrum are purely structural 
arguments. Rather than focusing on the idiosyncratic cognition of specific agents in 
explaining outcomes in complex systems, structural theories treat the existence of self-
interested, rational agents as ontologically given, and study the constraints and incentives 
that shape agent behavior. According to a purely structural account of the global financial 
crisis, the economic conventions held by the market, policymakers, central bankers, and 
financial institutions were epiphenomenal to structural factors like factor endowments, 
                                                 
353
 See, for example: (Dessler 1989) and (A. E. Wendt 1987). 
Neil K. Shenai 
232 
global imbalances, banks’ institutionally determined mono-focus on bottom-line profits, 
politicians’ goal-oriented electioneering, and central bankers’ goals of maintaining their 
independence, among many others. The specific features of such structural arguments are 
not important to the present study. Rather, it is worth reiterating that structural arguments 
tend to elevate non-agency based explanations of outcomes over alternatives.  
 Where does this dissertation fit into the agency and structure debate? At first 
appraisal, this dissertation seems to confirm the argument, often made by ideational 
scholarship, that ideas matter because structures do not come with “instruction sheets” 
that tell agents how to act in complex environments.
354
 This dissertation’s strongly 
constitutive causal standard posits that economic conventions give factor endowments, 
market prices, interest rates, and asset classes with meaning to agents. Economic 
conventions provide the researcher with a lens to understand agent behavior that “would 
make little sense without them,” as Abdelal et al. argue.
355
 In addition, an honest reading 
of the facts surrounding agent behavior during the crisis should prompt even the 
staunchest structuralist to accept that during crisis periods, agency matters.
356
 There was 
nothing structurally pre-ordained about Bear Stearns’ bailout and Lehman’s bankruptcy, 
other than the unique inter-subjective constructs guiding regulators’ behavior. Can one 
say for certain that different central bankers, each with their own unique socialization 
distinct from Alan Greenspan and Ben Bernanke would have made the exact same 
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 Indeed, one can be a structuralist ad absurdum and claim that conventions too are structurally 
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dissertation. After all, this dissertation argued that economic conventions need to be taken seriously as 
causal drivers of displacements, stability, fragility, and crises in asset markets. Even if economic 
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decisions in comparable circumstances? Perhaps an anti-bailout central banker might 
have refrained from extending sovereign credit to America’s financial system after 
Lehman Brothers. Of course, we do not have the luxury of running a controlled 
experiment to test this proposition and provide a definitive answer. Nevertheless, the 
author hopes that the empirical work presented in Chapters 3-6 convinced the reader that 
central bankers, regulators, politicians, and the market exhibited agency qua their 
economic conventions, such that different economic conventions would have led to 
different outcomes in the U.S. economy.   
 A second potential limitation of the study is that it did not address the conventions 
behind other material causes of the crisis. These other causes include populist credit 
expansion on behalf of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac and global imbalances fueled by 
surplus saving countries such as China, Japan, Germany, and commodity exporting 
states, which might have depressed long-term real interest rates in the United States. 
Certainly, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac added incremental demand to the housing 
market, using their quasi-government status to purchase and securitize mortgages.
357
 
Nevertheless, there are reasons to believe that the GSEs were not decisive factors in the 
inflation of the housing bubble, including the fact that numerous countries experienced 
housing bubbles during the 2000s without government sponsored housing finance. Global 
imbalances could have been important co-determinants of the housing bubble, but 
America’s current account deficit of 6.5%, while a symptom of fragility, was not large 
enough to account for the surge in demand for housing assets in the U.S. economy pre-
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 After all, the U.S. had run a current account deficit from the early 1980s onward, 
so it is hard to see how the current account deficit suddenly became a problem in the 
early 2000s. More broadly, even if these explanations do shed some light onto the causes 
of the housing bubble, this dissertation was as much about fragility as it was about the 
unsustainable increase in housing prices that accompanied it. Therefore, even if one 
accepts that Fed policy, along with global imbalances and Federally-sponsored housing 
finance, contributed to the housing bubble, these factors alone do not explain the sources 
fragility in America’s financial sector that transmitted the deflating housing bubble to 
broader financial instability.  
 A third potential limitation of the present study was the amount of evidence it 
brought to bear when trying to demonstrate its causal propositions. This dissertation 
marshalled a variety of qualitative and quantitative data to make its argument that 
economic conventions must be taken seriously as important causal drivers of financial 
stability. Nevertheless, more work could be done. With adequate research access, it 
would be possible to analyze the specific shadow banking mechanisms within specific 
financial institutions to understand how and why banks’ capital commitment committees 
agreed to adopt such structures prior to the global financial crisis. Granted, there is only 
so much one can do when completing a doctoral dissertation, and banks are reluctant to 
allow researchers into their institutions to ask the tough questions about their own 
incompetence. Luckily, numerous other actors had access to such data, which is why this 
dissertation borrowed from the findings of the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission, the 
Federal Reserve, and the U.S. Department of the Treasury. Still, more evidence could be 
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gathered with proper institutional access, and subsequent work can build upon the 
empirical work and evidence presented by this dissertation.  
Avenues for Further Research 
 It is this author’s hope that this dissertation is not the only post-global financial 
crisis study to take a serious look at economic ideas as important causal drivers of 
financial market outcomes. Indeed, numerous authors, such as Rawi Abdelal, Craig 
Parsons, Mark Blyth, Matthias Matthijs, and others have made important contributions 
using ideational political economy to explain economic crises. Still, more work can be 
done. Below are five avenues of further research that can build on the insights put forth 
by the present study.  While by no means exhaustive, these five suggested avenues could 
prove fruitful for scholars interested in the links between economic ideas and financial 
stability.  
 First, future work can apply this dissertation’s conventions-based theoretical 
framework to different cases of financial market instability. This dissertation focused on 
a “single-n” case study of the global financial crisis. While its core theoretical 
propositions are generalizable and non-case specific, further scholarship can test its 
applicability to novel cases. One could apply this conventions-based theoretical 
framework to the Asian financial crisis of 1997-1998, and focus on the inter-subjective, 
conventions-based drivers of fragility in Southeast Asian economies. One might begin by 
studying the epistemic consensus of capital account liberalization among economic 
technocrats in the 1990s as an endogenous “displacement” that induced pro-cyclical 
portfolio flows into risky assets in Southeast Asian nations, creating a “double mismatch” 
of both currency and maturity of financial institutions’ liabilities. As a result, many 
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Southeast Asian states accumulated large, foreign exchange-denominated, short-term 
debt, which made them vulnerable to both rollover risk in global capital markets and 
credit risk if the value of their assets fell. This underlying fragility was exposed with the 
devaluation of the Thai baht in 1997, which triggered capital flight out of Southeast 
Asian economies. This crisis trigger can be conceptualized as a non-routine deviation 
from agents’ convention-given expectations, in turn catalyzing convention uncertainty 
and causing a flight to quality out of risky developing country capital markets and into 
perceived safe havens like U.S. Treasuries. The IMF and U.S. Treasury-led bailouts can 
be understood as a manifestation of regulators’ attempt to restore convention certainty to 
financial markets in exchange for painful (and in hindsight, counterproductive) structural 
reforms.
359
 Other potential crises worth investigating using this framework could include 
the European sovereign debt crisis, various emerging market crises in Mexico and Latin 
America, and historic cases ranging from the Great Depression to the Dutch tulip bubble.  
Second, future work can study the relationship between antecedent crisis 
resolutions and subsequent market displacements. For instance, the primary policy 
response of many Southeast Asian states after the Asian financial crisis was a de facto 
policy of dollar accumulation to buffer their economies in case of capital flight. Countries 
such as Vietnam, South Korea, Thailand, Indonesia, Malaysia, Hong Kong, Singapore, 
and the People’s Republic of China undervalued their nominal exchange rates to spur 
export-led growth and accumulate foreign exchange reserves. These countries 
subsequently re-invested their foreign exchange into U.S. capital markets, thus 
depressing long-term interest rates and fueling the housing bubble. Excess savings from 
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North and Southeast Asia lowered interest rates and caused an increase in demand for 
risky assets by financial institutions.
360
 Several empirical studies demonstrate that foreign 
capital flows did indeed affect borrowing costs in the U.S. economy, which summarily 
impacted borrowing decisions in the U.S. housing market. Economists estimate that 
foreign capital inflows accounted for a roughly fifty to one hundred basis point fall in 
U.S. Treasury bond yields from 2004 and 2006.
361
 Considering that many of the riskiest 
mortgages issued during the housing bubble were “adjustable rate,” it is conceivable that 
falling interest rates did have a disproportionate effect on the incentives facing 
prospective homeowners in the U.S., encouraging home construction and fueling the 
housing bubble. William Miles argued that long-term interest rates – those most likely to 
be influenced by global imbalances – had independent predictive power over housing 
prices.
362
 Maurice Obstfeld and Kenneth Rogoff find that low interest rates, touched off 
by the acceleration in dollar recycling from abroad, “fed into a powerful multiplier 
mechanism” that entrenched “unrealistic expectations” and “asset-market distortions” in 
the U.S. housing finance market.
363
 This is not to argue that all financial crises are path 
dependent and follow from prior crisis resolutions, or that foreign savings and investment 
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decisions caused the housing bubble. Rather, researchers should consider that the policy 
responses to today’s problems might induce future displacements. More work should be 




 A third avenue of research opened by this dissertation is studying the role of 
ideational transfer among borrowers during crisis periods. In particular, this line of 
research tends to support this dissertation’s ontology of strongly constitutive causality 
that problematizes the false dichotomy between ideational and material factors in asset 
markets. For instance, during the height of the global financial crisis, South Korea 
experienced acute net capital outflows, likely due to the flight to quality in asset markets 
after Lehman’s failure. South Korean markets stabilized when the United States struck a 
$30 billion notional currency swap arrangement with the Bank of Korea, which in turn 
stemmed the capital flight and stabilized Korean markets. Korea also signed a number of 
other currency swap arrangements with other foreign central banks. Yet Korea drew less 
than 10% of their swap line with the United States, with comparable levels for other swap 
agreements. Thus, the real impact of the currency swap arrangements was that they 
provided a form of ideational transfer between the sovereign creditworthiness of the 
United States and third parties. As this episode shows, during crisis moments, the 
distinction between material and ideational factors is moot, since conventions are so in 
flux and subject to considerable uncertainty that notions of fundamental value become 
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 Fourth, another related but distinct avenue of research opened by this dissertation 
is a broader discussion of other economic ideas and market outcomes, particularly the 
role of norms. Finnemore and Sikkink define a norm as “a standard of appropriate 
behavior for actors with a given identity.”
366
 To all market participants, it is clear that the 
economy is dominated by many normative frameworks that imbue agent behavior with 
meaning. For instance, the norm of homeownership could be used to explain the rise of 
government-sponsored housing finance in the United States. Notions of “housing as the 
American dream” and the “ownership society” are understudied as causal drivers of 
populist credit expansion in the United States from 1930-2008. Nevertheless, the U.S. 
economy experienced a bipartisan push to expand homeownership from the Great 
Depression onward, culminating in the nationalization of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac in 
September 2008. Therefore, the norm of homeownership might be to blame for the 
housing bubble. Usually, such norms are relegated as epiphenomenal to material 
interests, though further should challenge this assumption to show that ideas, along with 
interests and institutions, should be considered when explaining outcomes like populist 
credit expansion in the U.S. economy.  
 Fifth, this dissertation provides a predictive framework of anticipating future 
financial instability. For if we accept that the systematic failure of agents’ taken-for-
granted conventions catalyzes convention uncertainty and thus financial market 
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instability, then it is possible to appraise the vulnerability of our most taken-for-granted 
conventions when judging the likelihood of financial market instability. For instance, in 
today’s post-crisis environment in early 2014, market concerns over the Fed’s tapering of 
its bond-buying program, lingering fears about sovereign credit risk in Europe, political 
uncertainty in the U.S. Congress, among many others, dominate the market’s headlines. 
Yet there are other, far subtler but more substantial risks to the global recovery, including 
the risk of America ceasing to provide its litany of global public goods that guarantee a 
liberal trade and monetary order, a potential hard economic landing in the People’s 
Republic of China, and the looming threat of inflation. While this dissertation’s primary 
goal is not to speculate about future economic events for which the author is unprepared 
to foresee, this dissertation’s theoretical framework can at least tell us that if we want to 
understand the nature of future systemic crises, it helps to examine the potential fragility 
of our most taken-for-granted beliefs that stand as the premises for other, second and 
third-order investment hypotheses.  
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APPENDIX I: Non-Routine Change Triggering Convention 
Uncertainty367 
 
Above is a visualization of expectations formation in non-ergodic systems. Note how 
expectations are formed by linear projections of current trends. For all t < t1, market 
outcomes and expectations are congruent and self-stabilizing, such that the perceived 
truth-value of agents’ conventions increases with market confirmatory data. For all t > t1, 
however, non-ergodic deviations from agents’ convention-given expectations engenders a 
“shock” that causes agents to reappraise their taken-for-granted convention set. Non-
                                                 
367
 Adapted from (Doran 1991) and (Doran 1999) 
Neil K. Shenai 
242 
routine change reveals to agents the bankruptcy of their linear projections of past trends 
into the future (i.e. conventions of ergodicity), thus catalyzing a period of convention 
uncertainty in financial markets. Provided a sufficient number of agents must cope with 
the shock of missed expectations at the same time, and given the pre-existence of a 
fragile financial system, the likelihood of systemic crisis rises.    
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APPENDIX II: Modified CPI Calculations 






100.0% 152.4 156.9 160.5 163.0 166.6 
Housing (Owners' 
Equivalent Rent) 
Original Data 42.7% 148.5 152.8 156.8 160.4 163.9 
Transportation Original Data 17.2% 139.1 143.0 144.3 141.6 144.4 
Food and 
beverages 
Original Data 15.0% 148.9 153.7 157.7 161.1 164.6 
Medical care Original Data 6.3% 220.5 228.2 234.6 242.1 250.6 
Education and 
communication 
Original Data 6.0% 92.2 95.3 98.4 100.3 101.2 
Recreation Original Data 5.6% 94.5 97.4 99.6 101.1 102.0 
Apparel Original Data 3.7% 132.0 131.7 132.9 133.0 131.3 
Other goods and 
services 
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Item 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 
All items 172.2 177.1 179.9 184.0 188.9 195.3 
Housing (Owners' 
Equivalent Rent) 
169.6 176.4 180.3 184.8 189.5 195.7 
Transportation 153.3 154.3 152.9 157.6 163.1 173.9 
Food and beverages 168.4 173.6 176.8 180.5 186.6 191.2 
Medical care 260.8 272.8 285.6 297.1 310.1 323.2 
Education and 
communication 
102.5 105.2 107.9 109.8 111.6 113.7 
Recreation 103.3 104.9 106.2 107.5 108.6 109.4 
Apparel 129.6 127.3 124.0 120.9 120.4 119.5 
Other goods and services 271.1 282.6 293.2 298.7 304.7 313.4 
Case-Shiller Index 113.6 123.6 142.2 161.3 191.4 221.9 
Scaled Case-Shiller 219.9 239.4 275.3 312.3 370.7 429.8 
Homeownership Rates 67.1% 67.6% 67.9% 68.1% 68.7% 69.2% 
Weighted Average  
Housing Component 
203.4 219.0 244.8 271.6 314.0 357.7 
Composite Counter- 
Factual CPI 
181.1 190.0 202.6 216.4 237.5 259.9 
 
Item 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
All items 201.6 207.3 215.3 214.5 218.1 224.9 
Housing (Owners'  
Equivalent Rent) 
203.2 209.6 216.3 217.1 216.3 219.1 
Transportation 180.9 184.7 195.5 179.3 193.4 212.4 
Food and beverages 195.7 203.3 214.2 218.2 220.0 227.9 
Medical care 336.2 351.1 364.1 375.6 388.4 400.3 
Education and 
communication 
116.8 119.6 123.6 127.4 129.9 131.5 
Recreation 110.9 111.4 113.3 114.3 113.3 113.4 
Apparel 119.5 119.0 118.9 120.1 119.5 122.1 
Other goods and services 321.7 333.3 345.4 368.6 381.3 387.2 
Case-Shiller Index 222.4 200.7 162.1 158.2 156.0 149.6 
Scaled Case-Shiller 430.7 388.6 313.9 306.3 302.2 289.7 
Homeownership Rates 68.6% 68.5% 67.9% 67.4% 67.2% 66.5% 
Weighted Average  
Housing Component 
359.3 332.2 282.6 277.2 274.0 266.0 
Composite Counter- 
Factual CPI 
263.9 255.6 239.5 236.9 239.5 241.7 
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Goldman Sachs USA 18.8 4.8 5.6 8.4 
Société Générale France 17.4 0.9 6.9 9.6 
Deutsche Bank Germany 14.9 6.4 2.8 5.7 
Barclays UK 8.5 7 0.6 0.9 
Merrill Lynch USA 8.1 1.9 3.1 3.1 
UBS Switzerland 5.5 1.7 2.5 1.3 
Bank of America USA 5.3 4.5 0.5 0.3 
BNP Paribas France 4.9 4.9 0 0 
Calyon France 4.3 0 1.2 3.1 
HSBC UK 3.5 3.3 0 0.2 
Citigroup USA 2.3 2.3 0 0 
Dresdner 
Kleinwort 




Germany 1.8 0 1 0.8 
ING Holland 1.5 1.5 0 0 
Bank of Montreal Canada 1.4 0 0.9 0.5 
Royal Bank of 
Scotland 
UK 1.1 0 0.5 0.6 
Morgan Stanley USA 1 1 0 0 
Wachovia USA 1 0 0.8 0.2 
AIG International USA 0.6 0.6 0 0 
Rabobank Holland 0.6 0 0.3 0.3 
Credit Suisse Switzerland 0.4 0.4 0 0 
Dresdner Bank 
AG 
Germany 0.4 0 0.4 0 
Paloma Securities USA 0.2 0.2 0 0 




Germany 0.1 0 0.1 0 
Source: The Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission
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APPENDIX IV: Econometric Evidence of Convention Uncertainty 
Catalyzing Parameter Instability in Financial Markets 
Introduction 
While Chapter 6 presented anecdotal and qualitative evidence that the failure of 
Lehman Brothers catalyzed convention uncertainty and the subsequent financial market 
instability, it is possible to test this proposition empirically using publicly available 
financial market data. The purpose of this Appendix is to test whether Lehman Brothers’ 
bankruptcy constituted a break in agents’ convention-given expectations, which 
manifested in market prices. Specifically, this section completes two types of 
econometric tests, including a Chow test for parameter stability in in interbank lending 
markets with a hypothesized break date of September 15, 2008, along with the 
computation of a Quandt likelihood ratio test that tests for breaks in time series data with 
unknown break points.
376
 The results of both tests corroborate this dissertation’s 
hypothesis that the failure of Lehman Brothers constituted a structural break in financial 
markets and was the proximate trigger of financial instability, intermediated by 
convention uncertainty.   
The purpose of this Appendix is to show how the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers 
and bailout of AIG created a break in agents’ economic conventions that regulators 
would serve as liquidity providers of last resort in shadow banking markets. According to 
this dissertation’s conventions-based theoretical framework, systemic crises occur when a 
majority of financial market participants re-appraises their most ontologically taken-for-
granted ontological beliefs simultaneously within a fragile financial structure. This re-
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appraisal is initiated when events belie agents’ convention-given expectations, thus 
invalidating their conventional anchors of behavior and causing them to revert to first 
principles of survival in financial markets.
377
 If the shock is sufficiently large and 
widespread, markets can enter a period of acute panic as all investors are forced to cope 
with the fact that their most taken-for-granted economic conventions no longer apply to 
their given situation. Convention instability causes theretofore-stable (but fragile) 
financial systems to tip into instability by delegitimizing taken-for-granted conventions, 
thus eroding financial market participants’ faith in their value anchors and, by extension, 
one another. As a result, trading can become choppy as market actors return to first 
principles of survival, hoarding capital and liquidating portfolios en masse.   
In the case of the global financial crisis, Chapter 6 argued that the failure of 
Lehman Brothers caused a generalized bank run in ABCP and repo markets. This is 
because Lehman’s failure invalidated agents’ conventional expectations that regulators 
would serve as liquidity providers of last resort in financial markets. As a result, agents 
simultaneously attempted to “get liquid” at the same time, causing a flight to quality in 
financial markets and causing interbank funding pressures to surge. When Lehman 
Brothers went bankrupt, a classic “run on the bank scenario” emerged against all 
commercial paper and repo market borrowers, including bank and non-bank financial 
institutions. The market’s trust in financial institutions waned as ABCP and repo 
counterparties were left to divine the intentions of fickle regulators who, while preaching 
the ills of moral hazard and allowing Lehman Brothers to go bankrupt, also bailed out the 
comparatively much larger and systemically important insurance giant AIG.   
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 Immediately after Lehman Brothers failed, many money market mutual funds (the 
principle buyers of ABCP) and repo counterparties boycotted the debt of other financial 
institutions. The Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission estimates that roughly $165 billion 
in funds was pulled out of ABCP markets because of Lehman Brothers’ failure. As a 
result, one of the biggest holders of Lehman Brothers ABCP, the Reserve Primary Fund, 
announced that it “broke the buck,” or could not repay their creditors at face value of 
their investments. Until that time, money-market mutual funds were considered some of 
the safest investments available.
378
 Original losses at the Reserve Primary Fund 
immediately led to an investor boycott of all money-market mutual funds. The Financial 
Crisis Inquiry Commission found that “investors pulled out simply because they fared 
that their fellow investors would run first” – a classic sign of a bank run in the 
commercial paper market. 
379
 
 The withdrawal of liquidity from short-term debt markets led to a unidirectional 
trade across financial markets, wherein market participants sold their risky assets en 
masse and purchased safe dollar assets. This “flight to quality” manifested itself in 
plunging dollar bond yields for short-term Treasury notes but also reflected the fact that 
investors had grown fearful of the counter-party solvency of financial institutions. 
Lehman Brother’s bankruptcy made it much more difficult for financial institutions to 
finance themselves, leading to a credit crunch across the entire U.S. credit market. For 
instance, the thirty and ninety-day Libor-OIS spread, a common measure of bank 
counter-party risk, shot up roughly four-fold in the immediate aftermath of Lehman. With 
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rising short-term interest rates, banks found it difficult to finance their operations. The 
cost of insuring bank debt rose, reflecting heightened investor concern over the solvency 
of financial institutions.   
Chow Test of Known Break 
One way of testing for the existence of structural breaks in asset markets is to use 
a technique developed by Chow (1960), which evaluates the stability of econometric 
parameters over time. Chow identified that if one has a potential break date in mind (and 
in this case, we do), then it is possible to execute a Chow test to evaluate whether there 
exists a meaningful statistical difference between model parameters before and after a 
hypothesized “break point” in the data. Statistically speaking, the Chow test determines 
whether separate regressions for different time periods explain more of the variance in 
the dependent variables than a single, pooled regression that includes both time periods.  
 Before executing the test, it is helpful to spend some time discussing the variables 
chosen for the given study. Recall that the purpose of this exercise is to test whether the 
failure of Lehman Brothers catalyzed convention uncertainty, and thus bank runs and 
market instability. If the below test shows that there is no statistically significant 
difference in model parameters before and after the failure of Lehman Brothers, then it 
follows that the failure of Lehman Brothers did not constitute such a break in convention 
certainty. If the test does show that there is a statistically significant difference between 
pre and post-Lehman market data, then it follows that Lehman Brothers did precipitate a 
structural break in financial markets.  
 Empirical evidence of a structural break is a necessary but insufficient condition 
to explaining the causal link between Lehman Brothers’ bankruptcy and market 
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outcomes. To specify this link, Chapter 6 summarized this dissertation’s findings from 
interviews with market participants to show that Lehman Brothers’ bankruptcy initiated a 
period of convention uncertainty. Recall from Chapter 5 that financial market participants 
accepted the notion that any time insolvency and illiquidity threatened a systemically 
important financial institution, U.S. regulators at the Department of Treasury and Federal 
Reserve would intervene in financial markets to restore stability in a liquidity provider of 
last resort function in financial markets. The market’s conventional expectation that 
regulators would save troubled counterparties provided some stability in asset markets 
after the sale of Bear Stearns to J.P. Morgan, ensuring a base level of market confidence 
in all financial counter-parties. Yet the failure of Lehman Brothers and simultaneous 
bailout of insurance giant AIG sent mixed signals to financial markets that some financial 
institutions would fail while others would receive government assistance, though markets 
were left with little guidance about which of their trading partners would live on to see 
another day. As a result, perceptions about bank counter-party risk surged as financial 
intermediaries hoarded liquid capital to protect their balance sheets. The core argument of 
this dissertation is that it was the structural uncertainty engendered by the simultaneous 
bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers and bailout of AIG that triggered a panic in commercial 
paper and repo markets and thus catalyzed broader financial instability. Lehman and AIG 
caused bank counterparties to hoard liquid capital from one another, spreading credit 
risks among America’s biggest financial institutions. This relationship – fears of 
counterparty risk and credit risk among investment banks – is hypothesized to have 
shifted after the failure of Lehman Brothers and bailout of AIG  
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 One can measure the market’s fears over counter-party solvency via several 
economic aggregates, including the Libor-OIS spread and TED spread. According to the 
Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco and Alan Greenspan, the spread between Libor 
(the London Inter-bank Offered Rate) and the overnight index swap rate (OIS, or the rate 
on an interest rate swap for fixed to floating interest rates in the overnight market) 
provides a proxy for uncertainty about the creditworthiness of financial institutions and 
their access to liquidity. A high Libor-OIS spread indicates higher levels of counter-party 
risk in financial markets, whereas a lower Libor-OIS spread indicates diminished fears of 
counter-party risk.  
 After the failure of Lehman Brothers, one and three-month Libor-OIS spreads 
increased, which reflected heightened market fears of financial institution counter-party 
risk. This surge in perceived counter-party risk after the failure of Lehman Brothers and 
AIG caused the market generally to speculate against the creditworthiness of systemically 
important financial institutions that caused the cost of insuring their debt via the CDS 
market to increase in tandem with higher Libor-OIS spreads.    
This dissertation proposes a finite distributed lag model (FDL) of order seven to 
model the relationship between one-month Libor-OIS spreads (this study’s independent 
variable) and an index of the credit default swap premiums of America’s five biggest 
financial institutions: Citigroup, Bank of America, Goldman Sachs, Morgan Stanley, and 
J.P. Morgan. The “index” value is the joint cost of insuring equal notional tranches of the 
senior debt of the above issuers in basis points. The model takes the below functional 
form, estimated using the robust least squares approach: 
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Indext = β0 + β1LOt + β2LOt-1 + β3LOt-2 + β4LOt-3 + β5LOt-4  
+ β6LOt-5 + β7LOt-6 + β8LOt-7 + ε, 
where “Index” is the joint cost of insuring equal-sized tranches of debt from Citigroup, 
Bank of America, Goldman Sachs, Morgan Stanley, and J.P. Morgan, and LO is the one-
month Libor-OIS spread for a given day. The time periods investigated are 1,107 trading 
days before Lehman’s failure (i.e. January 2, 2004 through September 12, 2008) and the 
819 trading days after Lehman’s failure (i.e. September 15, 2008 through December 30, 
2011). 
The model’s lag selection depended on the results of Schwartz’s Bayesian 
information criterion (SBIC), Akaike’s information criterion (AIC), and the Hannan and 
Quinn information criterion (HQIC). Both the SBIC and HQIC lag criteria confirmed a 
lag order of seven for the proposed model.
380
  
For a given breakdate t* (September 15, 2008), given dummy variable d, such that 
d=1 if t > September 12, 2008, there are two potential models:  
1. The original model:  
Indext = β0 + β1LOt + β2LOt-1 + β3LOt-2 + β4LOt-3 +  
β5LOt-4 + β6LOt-5 + β7LOt-6 + β8LOt-7 + ε, 
2. And the model with a structural break at t = September 15, 2008  
Indext = β0 + β1LOt + β2LOt-1 + β3LOt-2 + β4LOt-3 + β5LOt-4 + β6LOt-5  
+ β7LOt-6 + β8LOt-7 + δdt + γ1dtLOt + γ2dtLOt-1 + γ3dtLOt-2 +  
γ4dtLOt-3+ γ5dtLOt-4+ γ6dtLOt-5 + γ7dtLOt-6 + γ8dtLOt-7 + ε 
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 Ivanov and Kilian argue that for fine data series (i.e. daily data), SBIC tends to be the most accurate 
method of lag selection. (Ivanov and Kilian 2001). For more on lag selection, see: (Biernas 2006) 
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The intuition behind model 2 is that for all t > September 12, 2008, there is a statistically 
significant difference in the effect that Libor-OIS spreads had on bank CDS after the 
simultaneous bankruptcy and bailout of Lehman Brothers and AIG.  
Based off of this model specification, the dissertation tested the following null 
hypothesis:   
H0: δ = γ1 = γ2= γ3 = γ4 = γ5 = γ6 = γ7 = 0 
If, based on the results of the Chow test, we fail to reject the null hypothesis, then 
it follows that September 15, 2008 did not constitute a structural break point in the 
relationship between Libor-OIS and the bank CDS spread index.  
This study uses five-year credit default swap spread data from five financial 
institutions. Spread data is presented in basis points. For instance, on January 2, 2007, it 
cost approximately twenty-one basis points to insure the debt of Goldman Sachs. This 
implies that a notional amount of $10,000,000 worth of five-year debt would cost 
$21,000 in annual payments. Libor-OIS data is also presented in basis points. Note that 
most signs of risk in the U.S. financial services sector surged after Lehman’s bankruptcy. 
None of the data is seasonally adjusted. All data was retrieved via Bloomberg™.  
Table 6: Chow Test Variable Descriptions 
Variable Description 
JPM J.P. Morgan 5-year CDS value (basis points) 
GS Goldman Sachs 5-year CDS value (basis points) 
BAC Bank of America 5-year CDS value (basis points) 
C Citigroup 5-year CDS value (basis points) 
MS Morgan Stanley 5-year CDS value (basis points) 
INDEX Imputed cost of insuring a basket of debt of JPM, GS, BAC, C, and 
MS 
lois 3-month Libor-OIS spread (basis points) 
loisL1 3-month 1-day lag Libor-OIS 
loisL2 3-month 2-day lag Libor-OIS 
loisL3 3-month 3-day lag Libor-OIS 
loisL4 3-month 4-day lag Libor-OIS 
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loisL5 3-month 5-day lag Libor-OIS 
loisL6 3-month 6-day lag Libor-OIS 
loisL7 3-month 7-day lag Libor-OIS 
break Dummy variable for all t > September 12, 2008 
break_lois Interaction term between dummy and 3-month Libor-OIS 
break_loisL1 Interaction term between dummy and 3-month 1-day lag Libor-OIS 
break_loisL2 Interaction term between dummy and 3-month 2-day lag Libor-OIS 
break_loisL3 Interaction term between dummy and 3-month 3-day lag Libor-OIS 
break_loisL4 Interaction term between dummy and 3-month 4-day lag Libor-OIS 
break_loisL5 Interaction term between dummy and 3-month 5-day lag Libor-OIS 
break_loisL6 Interaction term between dummy and 3-month 6-day lag Libor-OIS 
break_loisL7 Interaction term between dummy and 3-month 7-day lag Libor-OIS 
Source: Bloomberg 
Table 7: Selected Summary Statistics 
 Observations Mean St. dev. Max Min 
JPM 1927 62.9 45.4 232.3 11.5 
GS 1927 104.0 94.9 545.1 18.8 
BAC 1927 97.1 99.7 483.1 8.0 
C 1927 116.6 126.2 665.5 7.4 
MS 1927 136.4 147.9 1360.0 17.8 
INDEX 1927 517.1 482.6 2552.5 65.7 
LO 1927 30.9 45.3 364.4 1.9 
Source: Bloomberg 







JPM 5-year CDS 106.2 127.1 20% 
GS 5-year CDS 145.6 350.2 140% 
BAC 5-year CDS 120.7 143.0 18% 
C 5-year CDS 151.7 246.2 62% 
MS 5-year CDS 227.3 617.6 172% 
INDEX 751.5 1484.1 97% 
3-m Libor-OIS Spread 76.4 228.2 197% 
Source: Author Calculations 
The following table shows the result of the chow test from STATA. The results 
imply that a structural break occurred on September 15, 2008, the day Lehman Brothers 
declared bankruptcy.  
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Table 9: STATA Results for Chow Test 
Number of obs =    1920 
 F( 17,  1902) =  413.48 
Prob > F      =  0.0000 
R-squared     =  0.8120 
Root MSE      =  210.25 
 




lois 4.51 2.02 2.23 0.03 0.55 8.47 
loisL1 1.87 2.63 0.71 0.48 -3.28 7.01 
loisL2 0.02 2.46 0.01 0.99 -4.80 4.85 
loisL3 -1.09 2.38 -0.46 0.65 -5.76 3.57 
loisL4 -0.75 2.33 -0.32 0.75 -5.33 3.83 
loisL5 0.05 2.16 0.02 0.98 -4.19 4.29 
loisL6 0.12 2.04 0.06 0.95 -3.88 4.11 
loisL7 1.53 1.72 0.89 0.37 -1.83 4.90 
break 721.49 13.22 54.59 0.00 695.58 747.41 
break_lois 6.75 3.81 1.77 0.08 -0.72 14.21 
break_loisL1 -0.54 5.22 -0.10 0.92 -10.77 9.70 
break_loisL2 -4.26 5.60 -0.76 0.45 -15.25 6.72 
break_loisL3 1.66 5.60 0.30 0.77 -9.31 12.63 
break_loisL4 -6.73 6.20 -1.09 0.28 -18.88 5.43 
break_loisL5 -0.04 7.47 -0.01 1.00 -14.70 14.62 
break_loisL6 1.97 7.27 0.27 0.79 -12.28 16.22 
break_loisL7 -1.03 5.08 -0.20 0.84 -10.98 8.93 
_cons 60.32 2.96 20.39 0.00 54.52 66.12 
 
Chow test for structural break at observation September 15, 2008 
1. break = 0 
2. break_lois = 0 
3. break_loisL1 = 0 
4. break_loisL2 = 0 
5. break_loisL3 = 0 
6. break_loisL4 = 0 
7. break_loisL5 = 0 
8. break_loisL6 = 0 
9. break_loisL7 = 0 
 
F(  9,  1902) =  439.71 
Prob > F =    0.0000  
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Based on the above test, it follows that we reject our null hypothesis, and conclude that 
there was a structural break in our model parameters after the failure of Lehman Brothers 
and bailout of AIG. 
Of course, one should be hesitant to put too much stock into the results of one 
regression, and the mere existence of an empirical structural break in the relationship 
between interbank lending rates and bank credit indices might suffer from several 
potential pitfalls. First, there is the potential endogeneity problem associated with 
assuming that interbank lending issues drove bank credit spreads rather than the other 
way around. Second, there is the potential for omitted variable bias insofar as Libor-OIS 
spreads were not the only drivers of rising bank CDS spreads. 
 Regarding endogeneity, there is reason to believe that banks stopped lending to 
one another in the inter-bank lending markets because they began to conceive of the 
possibility of several large trading partners defaulting on their obligations at the same 
time. Funding stress then forced banks to sell assets en masse, which further depressed 
banks’ asset base and made them appear like risky bets in financial markets. And while 
there were many other factors that drove bank CDS prices during this period, at its core, 
the global financial crisis was a banking crisis, and as such, other confounding variables 
like stock prices, mortgage prices, and market volatility are symptomatic of the broader 
causal relationship tested by this dissertation.  
 In either event, the tentative conclusion that there was indeed a structural break in 
the relationship between interbank lending rates and bank CDS spreads forces us to dig 
deeper into the causal relationship between these variables and ask ourselves “what 
changed?” after Lehman’s failure and AIG’s bailout. The earlier parts of this chapter 
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attempted to put these developments in the theoretical context of convention stability 
theory, and the above econometric exercise should be considered in concert with other, 
more qualitative and nebulous, but equally important, modes of inquiry. 
Quandt Likelihood-Ratio Test 
Another method of testing for structural breaks in time series data is to relax the 
presumption that the researcher knows the series break date a priori. While the results of 
the above Chow test do corroborate this dissertation’s hypothesis that the failure of 
Lehman Brothers initiated break in financial markets, it is subject to confirmation bias 
because it presupposes the existence of a break at Lehman’s bankruptcy and no other 
dates. For this reason, this dissertation tested for the existence of structural breaks in the 
above time series data using a technique developed by Richard Quandt (1960). This 
Quandt Likelihood-Ratio Test computes a series of F tests for various break dates, with 
the largest F statistic comprising the most logical break date in a series.  
The intuition behind this Quandt likelihood-ratio (QLR) is as follows:   
QLR = max[F(t0), F(t0+1), … , F(t1)], 
Where ‘F’ is the F statistic of a Chow test for a given break date, t in the following time 
series:  
CDS INDEXt = β0 + β1LOt + β2LOt-1 + β3LOt-2 + β4LOt-3 +  
β5LOt-4 + β6LOt-5 + β7LOt-6 + β8LOt-7 + ε, 
Based on the critical values of the F-test given by Stock & Watson, we can reject the null 
hypothesis of parameter stability for all F > critical values at times t. Note that in the case 
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of the QLR test, we must trim the data series (usually omitting the first and last 15% of 
the time series sample).
381
  
 This dissertation computed QLR statistics for three dependent variable series, an 
investment bank index (ibank), comprising the combined CDS spreads of Morgan 
Stanley and Goldman Sachs, a commercial bank index (cbank), comprising the combined 
CDS spreads of Citigroup, Bank of America, and J.P. Morgan,  and the total index 
(comprising all five financial institutions, discussed above). The results of this QLR test 
indicate an existence of a break after Lehman’s bankruptcy. However, this test also 
indicates that the biggest structural break took place mid-February 2009. There are many 
explanations for these large QLR values, the most logical one being that there were 
numerous breaks in the above time series relationship, of which Lehman Brothers’ 
bankruptcy was one. In either event, the results of this test do provide prima facie 
evidence of a structural break in financial markets after Lehman’s bankruptcy.  
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 (Stock and Watson 2006) 
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Figure 50: QLR of ibank index 
Source: Author calculations, STATA output 
Figure 51: QLR of cbank index 





















QLR-cbank Critical value (5%, 15% trimming)
Neil K. Shenai 
260 
Figure 52: QLR of index 
Source: Author calculations, STATA output 
 The results of the three tests corroborate this dissertation’s hypothesis that the 














QLR-index Critical value (5%, 15% trimming)
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 Designed and taught a not-for-credit international economics “crash course” to 
American University graduate students 
 
Johns Hopkins University – School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS). 
Washington, DC 
Professorial Lecturer, June 2011-current 
 Teaching Introduction to Economic Development and Macroeconomics  
 Received top reviews for clarity, enthusiasm, subject area expertise, and reliability 
Teaching Assistant, August 2006-December 2012 
 Served as a teaching assistant in both International Relations and International 
Economics for twenty-four semester-long courses, including Microeconomics (6 
semesters), Macroeconomics (7 semesters), Theories of International Relations (4 
semesters), International Monetary Theory (2 semesters), Comparative Political 
Economy (1 semester), International Political Economy (1 semester), Economic 
Development (2 semesters), International Trade Theory (1 semester) 
Research Assistant for Dr. Matthias Matthijs, Summer 2009-current 
 Performed data analysis of global income distribution for Dr. Matthijs’ paper “Crying 
Wolf Again? The Decline of Western Economic Influence after the Great Recession,” 
The International Spectator: Italian Journal of International Affairs 47, no. 3 (2012), 
37-52.  
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 Analyzed and synthesized data on national income accounts and global 
macroeconomic balances for Dr. Matthijs’ Max M. Fisher Excellence in Teaching 
award lecture entitled “After the Crisis, the Compromise: The Politics of Economic 
Adjustment” (November 2011)  
 Provided extensive research for Dr. Matthijs’ book Ideas and Economic Crises in 
Britain from Attlee to Blair (1945-2005) (London: Routledge, 2011) 
Case-writer for Dr. Francis Fukuyama and Dr. Roger Leeds, April 2010-October 2010 
 Research and published a case study on the Philippines’ FDI attraction strategies for 
the Bernard Schwartz Forum on Constructive Capitalism at SAIS 
 Completed independent field research in the Philippines 
 Case currently used as a part of a curriculum of executive training on strategies to 
promote private sector growth 
 
Johns Hopkins University, SAIS Bologna Center. Bologna, Italy 
George H. Abernethy Fellow, August 2012-May 2013 
 Pre-doctoral researcher at SAIS Bologna Center 
 Completed field research for doctoral dissertation 
 
RAND Corporation. Washington, DC and Tbilisi, Georgia 
Consultant, September 2012-October 2012 
 Designed, developed, and taught intensive course in international economics to senior 
Georgian technocrats in Tbilisi, Georgia 
 Consulted with the Georgian Foundation for Strategic and International Studies 
(GFSIS)  
 
Nanjing University, Hopkins-Nanjing Center. Nanjing, China 
Visiting Scholar, January 2012-May 2012 
 Designed, developed, and co-taught course on international finance to over fifty 
students 
 Lectured on Sino-U.S. monetary relations 
 Co-authored series of articles on Chinese domestic politics (see Selected 
Publications) 
 
Citigroup Global Markets, New York, NY 
Structured Credit Trader, June 2006-December 2008 
 Traded fixed income securities during the global financial crisis 
 Presented research findings on counterparty credit risk to senior management 
following the default of Lehman Brothers 
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EDUCATION 
Johns Hopkins University, SAIS. Washington, DC, Bologna, Italy, and Nanjing, 
China 
Ph.D. in Global Theory & History and International Economics, 2009-2014 
 Fields of Specialization: International Political Economy (Passed with Honors), 
International Relations Theory (Passed with Honors), Comparative Politics 
 Doctoral Thesis: “Feckless and Fickle: Central and Shadow Banking During the 
Global Financial Crisis” – Primary Readers: Dr. Charles Doran (SAIS), Dr. Gordon 
Bodnar (SAIS), Dr. Matthias Matthijs (SAIS), Dr. Roger Leeds (SAIS), Dr. Mark 
Blyth (Brown University) 
 Successfully defended doctoral dissertation on May 8, 2014 unconditionally and 
without revision 
 GPA: 3.78/4.00 
 
M.A. in International Relations & International Economics, 2006-2008 
 Concentrations in IR (Global Theory & History) and International Finance 
 Graduated with Distinction on M.A. oral examination defense  
 GPA: 3.58/4.00 
 
Johns Hopkins University, Krieger School of Arts and Sciences. Baltimore, MD 
B.A. in Economics and International Relations, 2003-2007 
 Vice President – Woodrow Wilson Debate Council, nationally-ranked parliamentary 
debater 




SELECTED PROFESSIONAL PUBLICATIONS 
 “What U.S. should do about Islamic State group” Newsday (July 17, 2014) 
 “The Rupee Dilemma” Foreign Affairs (April 30, 2014) 
 “Challenging the Dollar’s Dominance: Is China’s RMB the Next Global Reserve 
Currency?” SAISPHERE (January 2014)  
 “China: Europe’s White Knight or Economic Blank Swan?” Business brief for 
European Union Center of North Carolina (July 2012) 
 “Chinese succession and Chinese foreign policy” CNN (April 19, 2012) 
 “Bo Xilai and the politics of Chinese succession” CNN (March 28, 2012) 
 “Why Chinese succession matters” CNN (March 14, 2012) 
 “The real power behind North Korea” CNN (January 13, 2012) 
 “The infection of French markets” CNN (November 23, 2011) 
 “Why the G-20 matters” CNN (October 31, 2011) 
 “Global rebalancing act at the G-20” CNN (October 24, 2011) 
 “A grim economic reality” CNN (August 9, 2011) 
 “How to save the Eurozone” CNN (July 21, 2011) 
 “3 fault lines running through China’s economy” CNN (April 21, 2011) 
 “Flight Risk” SAISPHERE (January 3, 2011) 
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 “U.S.-ROK Economic Relationship: The 2008 Crisis and Beyond” USKI 2008 
Yearbook (Fall 2010) 
 “Dynamic Balances: U.S. Power in the Age of Innovation” SAIS Review (Summer-
Fall 2010) 
 “Leave Lebron Alone!” The Huffington Post (July 11, 2010) 
 “The G-20’s Dead Ideas: Why Fiscal Retrenchment is the Wrong Response to the 
Crisis” Foreign Affairs (July 9, 2010) 
 “Selling the Deficit: When Austerity Matters” The Huffington Post (June 3, 2010) 
 “Europe’s Reckoning” The Huffington Post (May 6, 2010) 
 “Free Fraudin’ at Goldman” The Huffington Post (April 16, 2010) 
 “A Revalued People’s Currency? Be Careful What You Wish For” The Huffington 
Post (April 5, 2010) 
 “Plato’s Bankrupt Republic” The Huffington Post (February 15, 2010) 
 “Ben Bernanke Deserved Confirmation” The Huffington Post (February 3, 2010) 
 “Obama’s Plan Finally Attacks ‘Too Big to Fail’” The Huffington Post (January 21, 
2010) 
 “Why Taxing Wall Street Makes Sense” The Huffington Post (January 14, 2010) 
 
PUBLIC LECTURES, MEDIA APPEREANCES, AND PAPER PRESENTATIONS 
 “Is Ukraine’s economy on the brink of disaster?” Fox News. Interviewed by KT 
McFarland as an in-studio expert discussing Ukraine’s economy for a segment 
featured on FoxNews.com’s Defcon 3 program (July 15, 2014) 
 “The Shangri-La Dialogue” CCTV America. Interviewed as an in-studio, live, prime-
time expert discussing Shinzo Abe’s speech at the Shangri-La Dialogue (May 30, 
2014) 
 “Expats play key role in Indian elections” CCTV America. Interviewed for prime-time 
news segment on the Indian elections (May 14, 2014) 
 “The Waiting Game” Arabian Business. Interviewed for opinion on the Indian 
elections for Arabian Business news magazine (May 2014) 
  “Challenges in American Foreign Policy,” lecture given for the University of 
Antwerp – Georgetown University Exchange Program at Washington, DC. Lectured 
on economic and international political challenges to the United States (July 18, 
2013) 
 “Market Anarchy: The Theory of Convention Stability,” paper accepted and 
presented at Cambridge University, Cambridge, United Kingdom. Delivered at 
conference on ‘The Economics of Structural Change: Theory, Institutions, Policy’; 
paper based off of theory chapter of doctoral dissertation. (September 13, 2012) 
 “American Foreign Policy,” lecture given for the University of Antwerp – 
Georgetown University Exchange Program at Washington, DC. Lectured on 
American foreign policy since 1945 (July 20, 2012) 
 “Rebalancing Acts: China and the Global Financial Crisis,” guest lecture at Nanjing 
University, Nanjing, China. Delivered original lecture on U.S. economic imbalances 
and the inflation of the housing bubble. (April 25, 2012) 
 “Will the Greek government survive the debt crisis?” CNN Europe. Quoted in article 
about the future of the Papandreou government (November 3, 2011)   
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 “Greece in the Eurozone” BBC World Service Radio – World Have Your Say 
program. Appeared as live radio guest discussing the future of Greece in the 
Eurozone (November 3, 2011) 
 “Irish Debt Crisis” BBC TV – World Have Your Say program. Appeared as live TV 
participant discussing Ireland’s austerity measures (November 19, 2010) 
 “Future of the G-20 and Financial Regulation” Couchiching Institute on Public 
Affairs panel discussion. Served as co-panelist with former Canadian Prime Minister 
RH Paul Martin, covered across international media outlets.  
 “To Cut or Spend?” BBC World Service Radio – World Have Your Say program. 
Appeared as live radio guest discussing austerity politics in the G-20 (June 22, 2010) 
 “Eurozone Crisis” BBC World Service Radio – World Have Your Say program. 
Appeared as live radio guest discussing the future of the Eurozone (May 12, 2010) 
 
ADDITIONAL INFORMATION 
Technical Skills: STATA, VBA, Microsoft Office, LaTeX, Bloomberg, FINRA Series 
7/63 
Honors: Selected as one of twenty-five promising Young Scholars for the Institute for 
New Economic Thinking's third plenary session in Berlin (March 2012); Starr Grant 
Award Recipient for travel to the People's Republic of China (March 2011) 
Languages: English: mother tongue, Marathi: fluent, Italian, French, Spanish: 
advanced, Mandarin Chinese: conversational 
GRE Scores: math: 780/800, analytical: 800/800, verbal: 680/800 
Interests: fitness, coffee, cooking, spades and bridge card games, and the Buffalo Bills 
 
